Consumer law and artificial intelligence : challenges to the EU consumer law and policy stemming  from the business' use of artificial intelligence : final report of the ARTSY project by JABŁONOWSKA, Agnieszka et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LAW 2018/11 
Department of Law 
Consumer law and artificial intelligence  
Challenges to the EU consumer law and policy stemming  
from the business’ use of artificial intelligence 
Final report of the ARTSY project 
Agnieszka Jabłonowska 
Maciej Kuziemski 
Anna Maria Nowak 
Hans-W. Micklitz 
Przemysław Pałka 
Giovanni Sartor 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
European University Institute 
Department of Law 
 
 
 
CONSUMER LAW AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
CHALLENGES TO THE EU CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY 
STEMMING FROM THE BUSINESS’ USE OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 
 
Final report of the ARTSY project 
 
Agnieszka Jabłonowska 
Maciej Kuziemski 
Anna Maria Nowak 
Hans-W. Micklitz 
Przemysław Pałka 
Giovanni Sartor 
EUI Working Paper LAW 2018/11 
 
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the authors. If cited or quoted, 
reference should be made to the full names of the authors, the title, the working paper or other series, 
the year, and the publisher. 
 
ISSN 1725-6739 
 
 
 
© Agnieszka Jabłonowska, Maciej Kuziemski, Anna Maria Nowak, 
Hans-W. Micklitz, Przemysław Pałka, Giovanni Sartor 2018 
Printed in Italy 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I-50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
Abstract 
Potential regulation of use of artificial intelligence by business should minimize the risks for consumers 
and the society without impeding the possible benefits. To do so, we argue, the legal reaction should be 
grounded in an empirical analysis and proceed case-by-case, bottom-up, as a series of responses to 
concrete research questions. The ambition of this report has been to commence and facilitate that 
process. We extensively document and evaluate the market practice of the corporate use of AI, map the 
scholarly debates about (consumer) law and artificial intelligence, and present a list of twenty five 
research questions which, in our opinion, require attention of regulators and academia.  
The report is divided into four sections. The first explains our understanding of the concepts of “artificial 
intelligence” (a set of socio-technological practices enabled by machine learning and big data) and 
“consumer law” (various legal instruments concretizing the principles of the weaker party protection, 
non-discrimination, regulated autonomy and consumer privacy). The second section documents the 
ways in which the business uses artificial intelligence in seven sectors of the economy: finance and 
insurance, information services, energy and “smart solutions”, retail, autonomous vehicles, healthcare 
and legal services. For each analyzed sector we study the gains for the businesses stemming from the 
deployment of AI, the potential gains, but also challenges for consumers, as well as third party effects. 
In the third section, we repeat the analysis through the lens of four general “uses” of AI by businesses 
in various sectors: knowledge generation, automated decision making, advertising and other commercial 
practices and personal digital assistants. Finally, in the fourth section, we present the questions which 
we believe should be addressed in the next stage of the research. We cluster them into: normative 
questions about regulatory goals, technological and governance questions about regulatory means, and 
theoretical questions about concepts and preconceptions. 
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Introduction: What are we doing here and why?1 
The overall objectives of the ARTSY project have been to 1) map and document the use of artificial 
intelligence and other algorithmic techniques by business, 2) analyze and evaluate this practice 
through the prism of rules and principles of EU consumer law, including personal data protection law, 
3) reflect on the challenges to consumer law and policy stemming from this practice; 4) prepare the 
next stage of the research, in which normative scientists, engineers and governance experts will 
collaborate. This will be a longer project, which will inquire into possible regulatory goals and means 
of achieving these goals, and put forward concrete policy recommendations. All this should be 
executed with a scholarly mindset, in dialogue with other researchers studying related subjects, hence 
5) our ambition to also extensively map the state of the art in (consumer) law and artificial intelligence 
scholarship.  
The structure of this project rests on four methodological premises. First, that the normative (legal) 
research in the field of emerging technologies must be based on empirical studies. This way, we 
analyze the actual practices (what is really going on), instead of merely an idea of what artificial 
intelligence is and what it is used for. That is why we begin with extensive mapping and documenting. 
Second, such research must be grounded in concrete normative theory, in order to provide a clear 
threshold for evaluation. That is why we have chosen EU consumer law. This is not to say that this is 
the only normative threshold, or the best normative threshold. On the contrary, many other 
perspectives – including human rights – are needed, but to move forward in a dialogue, we need these 
perspectives to be clear and specified. Third, there will be no one-size-fits-all, top-down solution 
to the “AI challenge”, because there is no one “AI challenge”. Different technologies, used by 
different types of actors, for different purposes, pose different risks and might need very different 
solutions. That is why we aim at identifying as many concrete challenges as possible, and asking 
specific questions. Fourth, to regulate AI, or even to ponder whether to regulate it, a wise 
interdisciplinary approach is needed. Lawyers (and other normative scientists) are well-trained to 
provide an evaluation of phenomena, and to propose goals. However, they are not the only ones out 
there who should be proposing means for achieving those goals. That is where expertise of engineers 
(concerning technical means) and governance experts (concerning political means) is needed. 
Therefore we limit our normative analysis to evaluation and asking questions about policy goals, but 
leave the questions about means for the next stage of the research. 
This project has been a response to several overlapping phenomena. On the one hand, market 
practice. Businesses and different corporate actors currently employ artificial intelligence and other 
algorithmic techniques in essentially all sectors of the economy, for tasks ranging from pattern 
recognition and behavior prediction, to optimization and influence on consumers. Our research has 
shown that companies use AI in all the studied sectors: finance and insurance, information services, 
energy and “smart solutions”, retail, autonomous vehicles, healthcare and legal. Across those sectors, 
AI is used to generate new knowledge, automate the decision-making processes, create and deliver 
targeted advertising and other commercial practices, and power digital agents (chatbots, personal 
                                                     
1  The authors would like to thank the participants of the workshop Before Machines Consume the Consumers. Consumer Law 
and Policy in the Algorithmic Age, organized on 28-29 June 2018 at the European University Institute in Florence, for their 
feedback, suggestions and comments, which made this report much better thought-through. In particular, they would like 
to thank Professor Urs Gasser for his invaluable support at all stages of the project, and express their gratitude towards the 
Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, for funding which made the research leading to this 
report possible. 
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digital assistants). These uses, which influence the economic decisions of consumers, as well as their 
autonomy, privacy and other protected values are sufficient reason to at least ask the question: is there 
a role for consumer law to play in these dynamics? 
All this created a sense of political urgency. With numerous relevant events taking place on a weekly 
basis, reports being published faster than one human being can read them, and within the narrative of 
“we have to do something now!”2, what is more important than ever is a cold legal analysis that is 
critical by design. Scholars agree that the development of AI has a range of impacts in settings as 
diverse as job provision (Frey et al., 2013), human rights protection (Eubanks, 2018), healthcare 
delivery (Jiang et al., 2017), and energy management (Lösch and Schneider, 2016). Yet the evident 
lack of clarity as to the expected magnitude of disruptions, does not preclude a sense of political 
urgency shared by decision-makers, scientists, and entrepreneurs. Considered against the backdrop of 
environmental challenges, unsustainability of growth models, or democratic decay, one may – and 
many have – come to conclusion that we are living through a critical juncture – a brief period of time 
with a heightened probability that choices will affect outcomes, launching new pathways and 
transforming institutions (Capoccia, 2015). In such times, it is particularly relevant to scrutinize 
actors, processes and dynamics, while options are still wide open (Jasanoff and Kim, 2015). To 
critically observe and ponder, where indeed we need to act fast, and where it is rather preferable to 
stand and stare. 
Finally, all this gave rise to a specific scholarly practice. Numerous published articles treat artificial 
intelligence as one technology, posing a uniform set of problems across different sectors and 
consequently calling for a uniform set of solutions. Questions about “liability for artificial intelligence 
systems”, “personality for artificial agents” or “ways of dealing with the black-boxing problem” are 
not uncommon, overlooking the fact that often the term “artificial intelligence” is used as an umbrella 
category, capturing extremely diverse types of socio-technological phenomena. On the other extreme, 
there are publications studying very specific issues, overlooking the context in which they are 
embedded, or works already done in other “fields”, which however can often be useful directly or 
indirectly. We term this scholarly practice Phase One of AI & Law scholarship. This stage, 
necessary but insufficient, can be characterized by high excitement, a sense of urgency, initial 
familiarization with the technical and social knowledge, testing initial intuitions and hypotheses. We 
claim it is now time for Phase Two: moving to concrete questions, addressed in a wise 
interdisciplinary dialogue, aware of the broader context and other debates, though proceeding 
not top-down, but bottom-up, case by case, problem by problem.  
The project aims at making several contributions and serving several objectives. First, it wants to 
provide a map – description and analysis – of the market practice and of the scholarship. We want 
this document to serve as a reference point for anyone – scholars, policymakers, journalists, 
activists – who might feel overwhelmed with the sheer amount of material they need to deal with. 
Second, we propose a methodological contribution, suggesting that while researching challenges 
posed by AI, one should proceed in steps: empirical analysis, normative evaluation, proposing goals, 
technical means and governance means, all this within the overarching frame of a wider theoretical 
reflection. Third, having executed the mapping and explained the method, we make all the material 
freely available to any research groups who might want to pick up on what we did here, and actually 
proceed to stage two. 
                                                     
2  For an overview of national and transnational AI strategies, see: https://medium.com/politics-ai/an-overview-of-national-ai-
strategies-2a70ec6edfd  
Consumer Law and artificial intelligence challenges to the EU consumer law and policy… 
European University Institute 3 
A couple of reservations. This was a short, preparatory, sprint research project, by design aimed at 
preparing avenues for further work. We do not aspire to solve anything here. On the contrary, our 
claim is that the debates, both scholarly and policy-oriented, would benefit a lot from slowing down, 
not jumping straight to regulatory conclusions, and devoting slightly more time to trying to 
understand what is going on first. Moreover, the ambition for his project was to be comprehensive 
in subjects, i.e. to provide an overview of spaces where in-depth research into consumer law & AI 
could/should be done. With time and person-power limitations, we needed to make choices, and we 
chose breadth over depth. This follows from our conviction that one should study concrete 
questions, but one needs to have a general idea of the whole problem to pose them in the first place. 
Finally, this document is a bit experimental in form. In the times when everyone writes and so there 
is no time to read, we wanted to make it more readable and enjoyable to study. Hence, sections 2 
and 3 consist of introductions and tables, which we hope facilitate familiarization with the material.  
All this said, we would welcome any feedback with great joy, especially when it is critical. The 
task at hand is a hard one. Let us take it seriously.   
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1. Setting the scene 
1.1. Artificial intelligence in context 
Beginning a paper by asserting that no commonly accepted definition of artificial intelligence/robotics 
exists seems to be a good practice within the field. Having done so indirectly, we would like to argue 
that this is not really a problem.  
Definitions, roughly speaking, perform two functions: 1) clarify the meaning of words (what are we 
referring to when employing the terms “artificial intelligence”, “robotics” and “algorithmic 
techniques”?) or 2) increase our understanding of the entities that the words refer to (assuming we all 
refer to the same things when using the term “algorithm”, what are the characteristics of these things?).3 
Regarding the first: as we argue, “artificial intelligence” is not exactly the same thing in autonomous 
weapons as in high frequency trading and it neither does the same thing in personalized advertising as 
in self-driving cars: it poses different problems depending on who uses it, in what way, and for what 
purpose. As a consequence, there will be no Artificial Intelligence Act, regulating the whole 
phenomenon top-down, administered by the Artificial Intelligence Agency (just like there is no Internet 
Act, or Internet Agency). Hence, there is no need for one, all-encompassing definition, at least for 
the purpose of legal research and regulation. And even sector-wise, as long as we know what we are 
talking about, definitions are not necessary. Ever wondered how is it possible that the legal system 
manages to regulate the behavior of human beings, even though no commonly accepted definition of a 
“human being” exists? 
As long as we know what we are talking about. But do we? That is the second function of definitions. 
Again, part of the problem with the law and artificial intelligence scholarship is that our understanding 
of AI is often influenced by linguistic intuitions and sci-fi movies and books, rather than by the socio-
economic reality itself. However, increasing knowledge and understanding does not have to come 
through the definition, or even a series of definitions. It can come in various forms, like explanations, 
exemplifications or a narrative. A short and concise statement might meet our aesthetic needs – scholars 
like order and, yes, definitions – but given how complex the phenomenon is, it might lead us to 
generalizations and a loss of nuance.  
This said, being content with not having one all-encompassing definition does not free us from our 
scholarly obligation to understand what we are talking about when invoking artificial intelligence or 
algorithms. 
When speaking about the “regulation of AI” or “challenges of AI”, or essentially regulation or 
challenges of any technology, we have to bear in mind that by this “technology” one actually should 
understand a socio-technological practice, i.e. what different actors do with it, what the technology 
enables them to do, and what the consequences of these technologically enabled actions are. An 
algorithm for assessing an individual’s willingness to pay, when simply placed on a repository online, 
does not pose any challenge yet. A company using this algorithm to show lower flight prices to less 
wealthy consumers and higher prices to the wealthier ones might pose one challenge, while a company 
using the same algorithm in order to show unaffordable prices to people professing a certain religion 
definitely poses another one. In the words of Jack Balkin (2015a): 
When we consider how a new technology affects law, our focus should not be on what is essential 
about the technology but on what features of social life the technology makes newly salient. What 
problems does a new technology place in the foreground that were previously underemphasized or 
deemed less important? 
                                                     
3  These, again roughly speaking, are respectively the “nominal” and “real” definitions. See also: 
https://przemyslaw.technology/2015/11/15/the-trouble-with-what-is-x-questions/   
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And further: 
What lawyers call “technology” is usually a shorthand for something far more complex. When we talk 
about “technology,” we are really talking about (1) how people interact with new inventions and (2) 
how people interact with other people using those new inventions or presupposing those new 
inventions. What we call the effects of technology are not so much features of things as they are 
features of social relations that employ those things (…) Innovation in technology is not just 
innovation of tools and techniques; it may also involve innovation of economic, social, and legal 
relations. (Balkin, 2015a) 
In this sense, what we need to do here is to highlight what techno-sociological practices we are planning 
to study, and say something about the technology that enables them. If the reader still thinks that a 
definition of artificial intelligence is in place, we refer to Russell and Norvig (2016) who survey 
numerous definitions, pointing out that scholars tend to define the discipline differently, depending on 
whether they are concerned with the process (“thinking”) or outputs (“acting”), and whether they take 
as a threshold “being like a human”, or being “rational”. To give an example, Kurzweil et al. (1990) 
define artificial intelligence as “The art of creating machines that perform functions that require 
intelligence when performed by people”, while Haugeland (1985) defines it as: “The exciting new effort 
to make computers think . . . machines with minds, in the full and literal sense.”  
This does not get us anywhere. We might spend hours debating the concepts of “rationality”, 
“intelligence”, “acting like humans”, but that in no way enriches the understanding of the practice nor 
the challenges it poses to (consumer) law. Fortunately, the approach of the businesses is much more 
concrete. 
What is actually happening now, under the label of “artificial intelligence”, is businesses using 
machine learning to make sense out of vast amounts of data (big data), to generate new knowledge, 
and act upon that knowledge in order to optimize certain processes, and undertake new tasks, 
previously impossible. Now, one by one. 
The story usually goes like this (see, for example, Domingos, 2015; Alpaydin, 2016). Once upon a time, 
to have a computer “do” something, a human programmer needed to write the software explaining the 
machine how to go about solving some problem. This had certain limitations, given that for many tasks 
that seem simple for humans, we do not actually know how to formalize them. A classic example: 
recognizing a photo of a cat. Every person can tell if there is a cat on a picture. But how to “program” 
an instruction for recognizing a cat, for a machine that only “sees” pixels out there?  
Machine learning puts the idea upside down. Instead of telling a machine how to do something, we 
provide it with a huge amount of input and output data – for example, one billion photos with cats and 
one billion photos without them – and let it “figure out” how to do this by itself. What the computer gets 
from humans is the learning algorithm (how to learn something) and data, but it “programs itself” when 
it comes to finding a recipe for solving a given problem. This, by the way, is one of the meanings of the 
“black box” or “inexplicability”: in machine learning, we do not know how a computer did something. 
What we do know, however – what many industries representatives often do not mention openly – is 1) 
what the task was for which the machine was being trained; 2) what learning algorithm has been 
employed; 3) what (types of) data it has been trained on.  
Data. “Data is the new oil”. Indeed, it has been data, big data, that enabled the machine learning 
revolution. Numerous tasks (machine translation, image/voice recognition, medical diagnostics) were 
automatable because we had 1) the learning algorithms; 2) sufficiently high computing power; 3) 
sufficiently big data sets. How much is sufficient? That highly depends on the nature of the task. But 
usually a lot. The process of digitization led to the creation of the (big) data sets, as a by-product of 
simply living. More and more parts of our lives have been moved into the “cyberspace”, using 
smartphones all the time, shopping online and sharing our lives on social media. And if someone wants 
to learn something, there is really a lot to be learned there. Consumer data is valuable. Ever wondered 
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why Facebook and Google are worth billions of dollars – even though they charge you nothing for using 
their services?  
So what we have until now is: companies using machine learning techniques – training machines, using 
learning algorithms and huge amounts of data – to automate various tasks that were not automatable 
using traditional programming. If we know what data is, let us maybe take a look at the other widely 
used term, which is seldom defined: “algorithm”. In its report on algorithmic accountability, the World 
Wide Web Foundation stated: 
Although typically defined as a set of “encoded procedures” or “a logical series of steps for organizing 
and acting on a body of data to quickly achieve a desired outcome”, the term “algorithm” is often 
intended to describe a larger intersection of code, data and automated decisions. Originating from 
computer science and used in various social science disciplines, the term has been used to convey 
various meanings on the intertwining of human and machine decision inputs, and the extent to which 
the term includes code, data and ecosystems often varies. (World Wide Web Foundation, 2017) 
Indeed, also in legal scholarship, the term “algorithm” is often employed in quite a loose way, in order 
to capture various situations of “computers doing stuff”. In the technical sense, it is usually defined as a 
“method of solving a problem”, a “formalized set of steps to realize a particular task”, in short: an 
algorithm is a recipe for doing something. This recipe can be computed by a human or a machine.  
For example, think of an algorithm for establishing a scholar’s h-index.4 The instruction (algorithm) 
would be: order the scholar’s papers in a list, by the number of citations; look for the last paper where 
the number of citations is equal or greater to position in the ranking; that position number is the h-index. 
This instruction can be executed by a human or a computer. Google Scholar does this for every author 
who has a profile there. Here we need a clarification: if an algorithm is just an instruction, what is the 
name for the “entity” executing it in the sentence “Google Scholar does so for every author”. Google 
Scholar’s employee? Of course not! It would be tempting to say “Google Scholar’s algorithm”, but the 
algorithm is just the instruction, not the entity executing it. 
There is a word we are lacking. Try to solve the following puzzle: IF humanity THEN human, IF robotics 
THEN robot, IF artificial intelligence THEN… what, exactly? We seem to be missing a word here. 
Some call it “artificial agent” (Chopra and White, 2011), some call it “autonomous systems”, some just 
also say “algorithms”. None of this is perfect. In this report we try to be descriptive, speaking rather of 
“business using AI-powered tools”. Yet when we need a term, we rely on the good old “artificial agent”. 
These agents can be categorized in various ways. By embodiment: robots vs software agents; degree of 
autonomy: autonomous vs automatic; the task they realize; the legal good they put in danger; the 
economic good their functioning is supposed to optimize. Here, we want to claim, one should be careful 
not to fall too deep into the dichotomies – “autonomy” or “embodiment” are much more often different 
shades of green than pure blue and yellow. 
What is more, terms like “algorithms”, “artificial intelligence” or “artificial agents”, as well as the 
“challenges they pose”, are often meant to relate to much wider sets of socio-technological phenomena. 
This is what we call the degree of inseparability. To a large extent, it is not possible, and probably not 
even desirable, to separate the phenomena of big data, online platforms, regulation by the code, Internet 
of Things 5, internet to begin with, and artificial intelligence. When necessary, we do analyze them 
jointly.  
                                                     
4  A metric equal the number (h) of an author’s publications that have been cited at least h times. For example, an author with 
two papers cited at least two times will have h-index equal 2, five papers cited at least five times h index equal 5 etc.  See: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H-index  
5  The term “Internet of Things” (IoT) has already been used in the literature for more than a decade. In 2005, the International 
Telecommunication Union described the upcoming development of “new forms of communication between people and 
things, and between things themselves”. The ITU further asserted: “A new dimension has been added to the world of 
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Summing up: When speaking of “artificial intelligence” we refer to a socio-technological practice 
of companies (or other actors) using machine learning tools to generate computer-readable 
knowledge out of big amounts of data, and further use that knowledge to optimize certain 
processes and undertake new types of actions, for example to predict consumer (individual/group) 
behavior, influence it, take decisions etc. The entities performing these tasks are called artificial 
agents. Depending on the type of agent or its task, the exact legal challenges and regulatory 
responses might be very different in content and in form.  
1.2. The bird’s eye view: lawyers reflecting upon artificial intelligence  
Artificial intelligence, as a technology and as a phenomenon, has attracted attention from a variety of 
disciplines, including legal scholarship. Even though it could seem that the subject is new, parts of the 
legal community have been interested in AI for quite some time already. Indeed, the regular attendees 
of the bi-annual International Conference on AI and Law (first held in Boston in 1987), as well as the 
regular readers of the Artificial Intelligence and Law journal (established in 1992) would probably 
strongly oppose the claim that AI & Law is a new discipline, or that artificial intelligence is a new 
phenomenon that has only recently been discovered by the legal community. However, upon a closer 
examination of what subjects excite the mainstream legal scholarship nowadays, both would probably 
admit that, indeed, there is a certain divergence in the types of questions that have been asked. 
To put it short (and slightly simplistically): for most of its existence, AI & Law as a discipline has been 
concerned with issues of formalization of legal norms and legal reasoning, essentially struggling with 
the question: given the properties of law and information systems, to what extent is it possible to 
have computers do what lawyers do? This problem has been approached by scholars working at the 
intersection of legal theory and informatics. It has remained at the periphery of the mainstream legal 
scholarship, which arguably either found it too boring, or could not understand all the mathematical 
formulas used there. An overview of this endeavor is neatly presented by Bench-Capon et al. (2012) in: 
A history of AI and Law in 50 papers: 25 years of the international conference on AI and Law. Numerous 
publications on the subject have been written, and the discipline still thrives (Ashley, 2017). This is not 
the strand of literature we wish to review here.6 
The approach to the intersection of law and artificial intelligence that has been slowly crawling into the 
mainstream legal scholarship for the past five years, kindling excitement in lawyers and the public, is 
the policy-oriented approach. Here, to again put it simplistically, the general question is: given that 
artificial intelligence is being successfully employed by different actors across numerous sectors 
of socio-economic life, with all its promises and challenges, what should we do about law? It is this 
strand within which the ARTSY project situates itself, and it is this strand of which we would like to 
provide an overview here. 
Artificial intelligence as a subject of (potential/insufficient) regulation attracted attention of scholars 
form numerous branches of law. This includes criminal law and the questions of criminal liability or 
mens rea (Hallevy, 2013); competition law with the questions of data as market power and algorithmic 
collusion (Ezrachi and Stucke, 2016); intellectual property law with the questions about authorship of 
computer-generated works and inventions and the possibility to use AI to enforce IP rights (Abbott, 
2016), private law i.e. tort and contract (Pagallo, 2013) and international law, where extensive debates 
about the use of automated weapon systems took place (Krishnan, 2016).  
                                                     
information and communication technologies (ICTs): from anytime, anyplace connectivity for anyone, we will now have 
connectivity for anything.” Item identification systems, sensors technologies, embedded intelligence as well as further 
miniaturization and nanotechnology have been described as key enablers of the IoT development (International 
Telecommunication Union, 2005; see also: Weber and Weber, 2010). 
6  This said, an attempt, within this strand precisely, to automate the legal evaluation of consumer contracts and privacy policies 
is the objective of the other AI & consumer project hosted at the Law Department of the European University Institute: 
https://claudette.eui.eu/.  
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A distinction cutting across these branches can be drawn between the law-centric approaches, where 
the primary object of inquiry was still the law, in the context of artificial intelligence; and machine-
centric approaches, where the primary object of study would be the socio-technological phenomenon 
seen from the point of view of laws goals rather than established institutions. Within the first strand, 
questions would be asked about the suitability of law for artificial intelligence, for example: is a contract 
made by a machine binding according to the current doctrine (Allen and Widdison, 1996; Sartor, 2009)? 
Or who is responsible for a tort committed by a robot as the law stands now (Pagallo, 2013)? Within the 
second strand, the authors would depart from an issue, a challenge posed by AI-systems, and ask 
questions about possible ways of solving it, either by interpreting the existing legal norms (Balkin, 
2015b), or by proposing new regulatory solutions (Calo, 2015; Scherer, 2015). 
Another way to categorize the scholarship is by the type of legal problem that the author identifies as 
central. Numerous contributions have touched upon the questions of liability for actions of artificial 
agents/ AI-powered systems (Asaro, 2016), transparency of algorithmic decision making (Perel and 
Elkin-Koren, 2017), accountability, data bias and potential for discrimination, personalization of 
goods/services/communications, the legal status of artificial agents (including calls for potential 
granting them legal personality), privacy and more recently questions about AI governance. Within 
the last strand, numerous solutions have been proposed, including the creation of administrative bodies 
certifying autonomous systems (Sherer, 2015), “tinkering” the algorithms to deduce the rationale of 
their functioning (Perel and Elkin-Koren, 2017), granting the companies that employ them a specific 
fiduciary status (Balkin, 2015b, see also: Lightbourne, 2017), employing various techniques for ex ante 
and ex post oversight and control of AI-powered systems (Kroll et al., 2017; Kim, 2017a). 
We provide a much more detailed analysis of the particular parts of the field in section 3, discussing 
various perspectives on business’ use of AI. However, what should be made clear now is: moving 
forward with the legal research about artificial intelligence and law will require a case by case approach. 
Meaning: there will always be the question of liability, of transparency, of accountability etc.; but the 
answer to these questions might differ across the sectors/uses/types of systems and/or legal goods 
endangered.  
1.3. EU consumer law: What’s that all about? 
We have so far clarified what we mean by “artificial intelligence” and “algorithms”, as well as what the 
subjects were that the scholarship has found exciting until now. Before moving to the actual market 
analysis, we should still explain what we mean by the “concrete normative threshold”, and in our case, 
European consumer law. One way to approach the problem would be to through the existing legal 
instruments that make up the system of consumer law in the EU. We do so indirectly below. However, 
since these instruments were certain particularizations of the general ideas – principles – created in a 
given socio-economic-technical context, it might just as well be that their content and form do not 
necessarily best suit the challenges of the AI. Hence, what we explain in detail are these principles – a 
much more stable foundation of the EU consumer law (though of course also not carved in stone). These 
guiding principles, around which the analysis is built, are:  
• Protection of the weaker party 
• Regulated autonomy  
• Non-discrimination  
• Consumer privacy 
However, before getting into the technical legal analysis, we want to give the reader a “feeling” of what 
the issues at stake are. Consider the following story:  
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Feel the Consumer Struggle: A Short Story 
Frank was devastated. Rushing out of the sterile building hosting the CoolMed Inc., he was wondering whether 
he could lose weight by simply walking faster. Cholesterol three times the norm, BMI 39, severely obese. “No 
progress” – two words uttered by the disappointed doctor still echoed in his ears – “if you want to live past 60, 
you MUST lose weight”. 
It’s not that he didn’t try. He REALLY tried. After hearing the doctor’s recommendation three months ago he 
bought all these veggies, signed up for the gym, got his bike serviced… Yet in the end most of the veggies rotted in 
the fridge and the two sessions he attended in the gym turned out to be ridiculously expensive, given the cost of 
the three-month $150 membership. With all the deadlines at work, additional jobs he accepted in hope of finally 
getting the pay-raise, children hitting adolescence in a painful way, and his marriage essentially falling apart, 
Frank really did not have the time to do all the healthy cooking and grocery shopping. He was also really too tired 
to go jogging in the morning, after the by-now-unfortunately-regular 5 hours of sleep every night.  
With tears in his eyes, Frank left the CoolMed behind him and started walking towards his car. That is when he 
got approached by the marketer. “Looks like you could use some help!” – uttered a man of his age, though way 
more fit. “With Lose10poundFor10poundsTM your body will burn the fat four times faster than normal. You don’t 
even need to do sport, simply walking will do all the burning for you!”. Frank was not convinced, though down 
there, in the subconscious part of his mind, a faint voice kept shouting: “yes, give me this magic!”. Seeing the 
doubt on Frank’s face, the marketer changed the tone from euphoric to compassionate and said: “Look, I know 
this sounds improbable. But I only sell those because it helped me, and I want to help others. This is a photo of me 
half a year ago” – the marketer showed Frank a picture – “and with Lose10for10, that’s the short name, I 
managed to go down 30 kilograms in six months. It’s really effective, British lab stuff”. Ok, this was convincing. 
He had a photo. He had proof.  
“How much?” – Frank asked. “$99 for a 30 days pack” – answered the marketer. “I’ll take three then” – Frank 
replied. And thought “I hope this will save me. What is 300 bucks when speaking about health”.“What a 
moron” – the marketer thought. He still could not believe that these cheap tricks they learned during the training, 
and the photoshopped picture of himself, would convince anyone in their right mind.  
Lose10poundFor10poundsTM obviously did not work, being made of chalk that used to stand next to the green 
tea. It took Mark a few weeks to realize he got tricked, but when he finally did, he got furious. He googled the 
product, and realized it was a scam. He tried to contact the company, but they pointed out that the contract he 
signed clearly stated that he accepts the possibility of the product not working, and that there would be no refunds. 
Frank lost money, time and nerves. 
The purpose of the story above is to give the reader a feeling of what EU consumer law is about. The 
principles discussed below, which have informed the regulation, remain the same. However, as the 
reader can certainly imagine by now, the challenges to consumer law have changed in form and in 
substance. In the next two sections, which form the core of this document’s content, we rely on these 
principles as our normative threshold, our normative intuition, informing our analysis of what should be 
perceived as a challenge and why.   
1.3.1. Protection of the weaker party 
In the Western World, the birthday of consumer law is associated with the declaration of president 
Kennedy in 1962. It took more or less ten years before the message arrived in Europe. Here it got a 
particular twist – the European democracies put the emphasis on consumer protection law. The founding 
years were marked by attempts to legitimize and define the consumer as the weaker party in economic 
transactions. ‘Weak’ was associated with the consumption sphere. The consumer is the one who is not 
doing business. Scholars made many attempts to draw parallels to the role of the worker in the 
production process. However, these efforts did not really lead to practical consequences. The doctrinal 
debate focused on the imbalance of power: whether there is one at all and if so, how the imbalance can 
A. Jabłonowska, M. Kuziemski, A. M. Nowak, H.-W. Micklitz, P. Pałka, G. Sartor 
10 Department of Law Working Papers 
be defined. The idea was generally linked to the perceived asymmetry in the level of knowledge, 
experience and bargaining power7. 
From the 1980s onward, the EU – back then still the European Economic Community – gradually took 
over consumer law. As it is argued below, this shift was not without effect for the understanding of the 
principle of the weaker party protection in European law. Originally, however, the involvement of the 
Community in the field of consumer law was driven by similar considerations as those prevalent in the 
Member States. Even if  consumers were no longer perceived as entirely helpless due to the case law of 
the Court of Justice8, the early Community-level debates clearly emphasised the need of their protection. 
The 1975 Council resolution observed that the new market conditions, such as an increased abundance 
and complexity of goods and services, have shifted the balance between suppliers and customers in 
favour of the former. According to the Council, such an accentuated imbalance resulted in the need to 
keep consumers “better informed of their rights and protected against abuses”.9 Shortly after, in the 
second consumer programme of 1981, further factors were mentioned that transform the relationships 
between market participants, including the “new data processing and telecommunications technology”10. 
The perception of the consumer as a weaker party in need of protection was reflected in the subsequent 
legislative developments at the Community level, most notably in the principle of minimum 
harmonisation upon which the common rules had originally been based and the areas in which they were 
developed (product safety11, unfair terms12). Already at this early stage, however, the protection granted 
to consumers was balanced against market considerations. By way of illustration, instead of banning the 
practice of selling at the doorstep, the European lawmaker provided consumers with the right to 
withdraw13. The interaction between market and protection is also visible in the concept of legitimate 
expectations found in the instruments on product liability14 and, less conspicuously, on unfair terms15. 
Over time, the importance of market-related objectives increased, partially at the expense of the original 
protective goals. The shift was also reflected at the rhetorical level. The adopted policy documents no 
longer focused on consumer protection as such, but rather on making it possible for consumers “to 
realise the benefits of the internal market” 16 and “benefit from the opportunities presented by the 
information society”17. Despite Treaty reforms that occurred in the meantime18, most of the 
Commission’s legislative initiatives affecting the position of consumers continued to derive their legal 
basis from the provisions related to the functioning of the internal market and have increasingly followed 
the full harmonisation approach (Tonner, 2014). The functions of the advancing harmonisation policy 
were associated not so much with the removal of barriers to trade, but rather with the promotion of 
                                                     
7  See cases: C-89/91 Shearson Lehman Hutton; C-240/98 to C-244/98 Océano; C-168/05 Claro. 
8  See in particular case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide, ECLI:EU:C:1998:369 and the average consumer notion. 
9  Council resolution of 14 April 1975 on a preliminary programme of the European Economic Community for a consumer 
protection and information policy [1975] OJ C92/1. 
10  Council resolution of 19 May 1981 on a second programme of the European Economic Community for a consumer 
protection and information policy [1981] OJ C133/1. 
11  Directive 92/59/EEC on general product safety (later repealed and replaced by Directive 2001/95/EC) and Directive 
85/374/EEC on product liability. 
12  Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, Article 5. 
13  Directive 85/577/EEC on contracts negotiated away from business premises; later repealed and replaced by Directive 
2011/83/EU on consumer rights. 
14  Directive 85/374/EEC on product liability, Article 6. 
15  See the elaboration on the requirements of good faith in the preamble of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts. 
16  COM(2002) 208 final. 
17  COM(95) 519 final. 
18  In particular the introduction of the current Article 169 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. 
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“consumer confidence” in the viability of the border-free market (Weatherill, 2001). Such an approach 
envisages a consumer who wishes to engage actively in the increasingly integrated market and clearly 
builds upon the notion of an “average consumer” (see also: Mak, 2013). Under the Internal Market 
doctrine, consumer protection law turned into consumer law without protection (Micklitz, 2012). This 
view is supported by the type of legal tools applied to protect consumer interests, many of which did not 
really aim at the protection of the weaker or at social redistribution, but rather at the creation and 
safeguarding of “access justice” (Micklitz, 2011).  
To be sure, even though the principle of the weaker party protection has to some – or even 
considerable – extent been instrumentalized to further market integration, it continues to occupy a 
prominent place in the European legal framework. The principle continues to be invoked by the Court 
of Justice in the different areas of the acquis, such as Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial 
practices (UCPD)19, Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts (UCTD)20 or Directive 
1999/44/EC on consumer sales21, to provide consumer-friendly interpretations. This is particularly true 
when the existential consumer interests are at stake as has been the case in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis (see also: Grundmann, 2016). In an attempt to better reflect this nuanced picture, particularly with 
consumer law entering ever broader fields of the economy in the new millennium, the EU started to 
differentiate between the responsible, the confident and the vulnerable consumer. The latter two, and 
particularly the vulnerable consumer – even if only gradually entering the European scene (Reich, 
2016), come closest to the original concept of the weaker party, the one where the consumer finds him 
or herself confronted with a big and/or experienced business. The time seems right to ask a further 
question: does digitalization, and particularly the rise of AI, bring anything new to this picture? 
The extent to which consumers should be treated as the weaker parties in the digital market has been the 
subject of debate. Overall, there are two conflicting positions. The first perceives digital consumers as 
most likely to actually correspond with the responsible/confident model, which the EU has created for 
them. Such an interpretation has also found support of some national courts, which consider digital 
consumers as more technology-savvy, active, well-informed, cautious and attentive22. The second 
position, by contrast, sees all digital consumers as potentially vulnerable, due to, among others, the 
technological advantage of their counterparts. This view has been prominently represented by Mik 
(2016), who criticized the European legal framework, especially the UCPD, for failing to advance the 
idea of vulnerability as a “dynamic state”. According to the author “each consumer can be vulnerable in 
its own way and … vendors have the technological capacity to exploit temporary vulnerabilities – not 
just those caused by age, mental infirmity or credulity” (Mik, 2016). A similar argument is made by 
Helberger et al. (2017), who observe that, in view of the possibility for traders to “target individuals”, 
more legal attention should be paid to the individual characteristics and vulnerabilities (Helberger et. al, 
2017; see also: Sax et al., in the context of mHealth apps). This thread of discussion is also linked to the 
potentially new dimensions of information asymmetries in the algorithmic society. First of all, in the 
age of big data and learning algorithms that are able to identify the needs and risk profiles of particular 
consumers, it is valid to ask questions about the degree and scope of the informational advantage that 
controllers of the algorithms possess over consumers. One may argue that such an advantage is no longer 
limited to the product or service and the overall market experience, but also extends to the characteristics 
of consumers themselves. By contrast, consumers may be unaware not only of the existence of such 
factors, but also of the very fact of being subject to the technological influence. What is more: even if 
they possess such knowledge, they might still be unable to draw meaningful conclusions (e.g. evaluate 
the quality of the advice provided or the accuracy of an algorithmic prediction made). All this might 
                                                     
19  Cases C-59/12 Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs; C-388/13 UPC Magyarország. 
20  Case C-137/08 Pénzügyi Lízing; C-415/11 Mohamed Aziz. 
21  Cases C-497/13 Faber; C-149/15 Wathelet. 
22  Judgment of the Polish Supreme Court of 17 September 2014 in case I CSK 555/13. 
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place additional strains on the tools traditionally used to level the asymmetry between consumers and 
traders, such as the classical disclosure duties.   
Overall, the extent to which the weaker party protection is revitalized through the use of big data and 
learning algorithms by the businesses appears as one of the most pertinent questions to be addressed in 
the course of further research on consumer law and AI. 
1.3.2. Regulated autonomy  
The importance of personal autonomy in the discussions about democratic rights and individual freedom 
is undisputed (Young, 1986). As observed by Reich (2014), “every liberal legal order has the autonomy 
of private parties as its basic philosophy”. The idea of autonomy is also clearly reflected at the market 
level. The freedom of suppliers to decide whether and on what conditions to enter markets is considered 
fundamental to the functioning of open market economies, as is the freedom of the customers to choose 
the products and services and the conditions on which they are willing to enter into legal relationships. 
Both of these perspectives (the freedom of active market participants to decide and the freedom of 
passive market participants to choose) are reflected in the principle of the freedom of contract, the 
importance of which has been stressed exhaustively in both scholarship and jurisprudence23.  
A detailed discussion of the conception and the role of autonomy within the legal system is a 
monumental task that goes way beyond the remit of this project. For a concept of such a cardinal 
importance, autonomy remains a strikingly undefined notion. The discussions carried out by the private 
lawyers tend to focus upon its reflections in the principle of contractual freedom, which, admittedly, are 
already difficult enough (Weatherill, 2013). The differences between particular conceptions of the 
freedom of contract, which developed in different historical moments across the different jurisdictions 
(see, in particular: Micklitz, 2015; Kennedy, 2006), are indeed remarkable. These relate to the overall 
importance attached to 1) the individual freedom (as the popular generalization goes: the premise of the 
common law is that ‘where there is a remedy, there is a right’ while the civil law tradition takes an 
opposite perspective; Worthington, 2015); 2) the source of an individual obligation in contractual 
ordering (as reflected in the transformations of the objective theory of contract and the will theory; 
Kennedy, 2000) and 3) the principal rationale for statutory interventions (e.g. utilitarian or paternalistic; 
Micklitz, 2015). 
These different perspectives are still reflected in the modern discussions on the role of autonomy in the 
digital age. A good illustration of this point is the distinction made by Mik between a  
“contractual” and a “regulatory” perspective on the challenges to consumer autonomy in the technology-
mediated environments. The former perceives the problem as one of a potentially “defective consent”, 
with an ensuring focus on the doctrines like misrepresentation, mistake or undue influence. The latter is 
more concerned with the “systemic dimension” of the analyzed phenomenon, which, in turn, justifies 
the deployment of particular “regulatory instruments”. Examples mentioned in the article include 
mandatory disclosure rules and outright prohibitions found in the EU consumer acquis (Mik, 2016). 
Arguably, however, the line between both perspectives is more difficult to draw.  
Indeed, the evolution of EU private law has largely been shaped by its focus on market integration. This 
internal market orientation accounts not only for the regulatory nature of the European acquis, but also 
for its distinct approach to autonomy of the legal subjects (Comparato and Micklitz, 2013; Comparato 
et al, 2016). Unlike national legal frameworks, private law of the EU is not particularly concerned with 
the theoretical underpinnings such as private autonomy or the freedom of contract, but rather 
instrumentalizes them to achieve its objectives (Micklitz and Patterson, 2013). Arguably, however, it 
does so without undermining the concept of autonomy as such, but rather places this concept in a new 
perspective. Take one of the basic regulatory tools used by the European legislator – the information 
                                                     
23  See e.g. Grundmann et al. (2001); Draft Common Frame of Reference rule II. – I:102; case C-283/11 Sky Österreich. 
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duty. Its widespread deployment is based on a premise that, for the integration project to be sustainable, 
the information asymmetry between consumers and traders needs to be reduced. In other words, for the 
same market-related purposes, the autonomy of the consumers needs to be re-established through 
qualified information (see, for example, Article 6 of Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights (CRD)). 
The importance of transparency for furthering autonomy is also visible in the EU’s General Data 
Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR). In this context, particular attention should be drawn to the 
idea of consent as one of the grounds of the lawful processing of personal data. Pursuant to Article 4(11) 
of the GDPR consent should be “freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous”. The regulation 
goes on to specify that, in assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of 
whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on 
consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract 
(Article 7(4)). Note that, while the GDPR is without doubt a regulatory instrument, its provisions on 
consent vividly evoke of the “contractual perspective”. All in all – irrespective of the criticism of the 
protection through information (Howells, 2005; Ben-Shahar and Schneider, 2014), the disputed practical 
relevance of the provision on “tying” data subject’s consent (Article 29 Working Party, 2017b) and the 
thorny problem of consenting to the secondary use of data (Pearce, 2015) – in both cases the tools used 
by the legislator are aimed to assist in consumer’s (data subject’s) decision-making without 
fundamentally affecting the nature of the good or service offered. Admittedly, this enhanced freedom to 
choose on the demand side is not without (restraining) effect on the suppliers’ freedom to decide. In 
some areas, like in unfair terms law, this bent towards consumer’s interests is even clearer (see also 
Micklitz and Reich, 2014). Most of the time, however, the imposed restrains do not amount to a direct 
inroad into the content of the bargain or determine which goods or services could be lawfully placed on 
the market (see also: Grundmann, 2002). The EU legislator tends to perceive them not only as adequate 
to the level of risk addressed, but also a small price to be paid by the traders in exchange for the benefits 
derived from market integration.  
The latter argument is particularly visible in the field of telecom, energy, transport and partly financial 
services, i.e. the markets previously dominated by state incumbents which were gradually opened to 
competition via EU law. The opening of the markets towards new entrants enlarged the autonomy of 
both the supplier and the consumer. However, the supplier had to accept that the new freedoms are 
coming at a price – regulated autonomy. Private law of the EU therefore, simultaneously, “establish[es] 
market freedoms and therefore increase[s] private autonomy” and “set[s] boundaries to this newly 
created autonomy” or, in other words, “frames” it (Micklitz and Patterson, 2013; Reich, 2014). Such a 
perception – together with the recognition that different legal norms may affect autonomy of the 
particular market actors to a different degree – sheds a more nuanced light on the classical debate about 
the extent to which regulation limits private autonomy. As such, it also allows us to move beyond this 
predominant context for assessing the role of autonomy in private law and fits perfectly well the 
European approach on AI. 
With this in mind it is worth giving some thought to the instrument which the literature reviewed 
recognizes as the most promising candidate, besides the GDPR, for addressing the challenges that 
consumers face in the age of AI – Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices (Mik, 2016; Helberger, 2016; Sax et al., 2018). The act brings yet another example of the rules 
that seek to increase the consumer’s freedom to choose, without exceedingly intervening with the 
trader’s freedom to decide. Indeed, for a practice to be qualified as unfair within the meaning of the 
UCPD’s general clause two conditions need to be met: firstly, the trader must fail to comply with the 
“requirements of professional diligence” and, secondly, the practice must (at least) be likely to 
“materially distort” the economic behavior of the average consumer with regard to the product24. This 
autonomy-based rationale is additionally highlighted in the provisions on “aggressive” practices, where 
                                                     
24  Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices, Article 5(2). 
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a reference to a “significant impairment of the average consumer’s freedom of choice or conduct with 
regard to the product” is made25.  
The noticeable interest of legal scholars in the UCPD seems to reflect the increasingly widespread 
concerns about the impact of data-intensive business models, and particularly the more and more 
sophisticated tools of technological influence, on consumer’s autonomy. With its emphasis on 
consumers’ decision-making powers the UCPD indeed appears to be most apt to provide legal responses. 
Interestingly, however, as recently highlighted by Sax et al., autonomy in the European fair trading law 
has not been conceptualized sufficiently. Therefore, even though autonomy constitutes a legal term, it 
requires a reference point outside the legal system (Sax et al. 2018; Micklitz, 2006). In their recent 
contribution Sax et al. attempt to identify these reference points in the realm of ethics. All in all, they 
distinguish between three requirements for autonomy: independence, authenticity and options. The 
former refers broadly to the capacity of being in control of one’s life, or, more narrowly (referring to 
Valdman, 2010), to the possibility of exercising “managerial control over the motivating elements of 
one’s psychology”. According to this reading, an autonomous agent should be able to consider all the 
available information and options independently and “decide how her values, desires, and goals inform 
her intentions for acting”. Note that this dimension of autonomy comes close to the discussions about 
dignity (see also section 3.4 below; Brownsword, 2017). The second requirements of autonomy in the 
reading of Sax et al., authenticity, refers to the question whether the relevant values, desires and goals 
can be described as truly personal to the decision-maker. This part of analysis focuses on what it means 
to identify with one’s own positions and to what extent a person can be manipulated into forming such 
values, desires and goals. Last but not least, for autonomy of a person to be preserved, an adequate range 
of options to choose from should be available to him or her. The importance of availability and 
awareness of available options also growingly transpires from the contributions of other authors 
investigating the digital transformation from consumers’ perspective (Mik, 2016; Gal and Elkin-Koren, 
2017). Further research devoted to consumer’s autonomy in the age of AI is certainly encouraged. 
1.3.3. Non-discrimination 
The non-discrimination principle reached the consumer law rather late. The origins lay elsewhere. Both 
in the EU and in the US the principle of non-discrimination – or, somewhat more broadly, the principle 
of equal treatment – has traditionally been applied to vertical relations (between the citizens and the 
institutions governed by public law). In the United States its key manifestation is the Equal Protection 
Clause set out in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as interpreted in a seminal 
line of the Supreme Court’s case law26. In Europe, the concepts of equality and non-discrimination are 
generally derived from the Member States’ constitutional traditions, the law of the European Union, and 
human rights law, in particular the European Convention on Human Rights (McCrudden and Prechal, 
2009). Due to this complex and evolving background, including considerable transatlantic influences, a 
coherent theoretical framework underpinning the European principle of non-discrimination is difficult 
to decode.   
The importance of the principle of equal treatment within the legal order of the Community (now the 
Union) was confirmed early on by the Court of Justice27. In the light of this case law, the principle is 
considered as one of the general principles of EU law and requires that comparable situations are not 
treated differently and that different situations are not treated in the same way, unless such treatment is 
                                                     
25  Directive 2005/29/EC, Article 8. 
26  See, in particular judgments of 17 May 1954 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U.S. 497 (1954). 
27  See, e.g. cases C-117/76 Ruckdeschel and Others; C-106/83 Sermide; C-309/89 Codorniu v Council; C-133/93 Crispoltoni 
and Others; equality and discrimination are also explicitly mentioned in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union as 
core values upon which the EU is founded. 
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objectively justified (see generally: Tridimas, 2007). This basic understanding of equality underpins its 
more specific manifestations. In this respect, McCrudden and Prechal distinguish, among others, 
between equality “as an adjunct to the protection of particularly prized public goods” and equality as 
non-discrimination on the basis of (or equal treatment irrespective of) specific characteristics 
(McCrudden and Prechal, 2009). 
The former understanding of equal treatment is most directly linked to the nature of the EU (originally 
the EEC) as a regional political and legal system with a primary aim of market integration. In this 
respect, equality is mainly associated with the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality 
and serves as one of the instruments for furthering market-related goals. This dimension of equal 
treatment is clearly reflected in both primary and secondary law of the EU, most notably in Article 18 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which specifically prohibits discrimination on 
grounds of nationality. Non-discrimination of the nationals of other Member States is also ingrained in 
the concept of EU citizenship and plays an important role in the free movement law28. References thereto 
can further be found in Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market and in the more recently 
adopted Directive 2014/92/EU on payment accounts and Regulation 2018/302 on geo-blocking. With a 
growing number of specific references to non-discrimination of this kind and the gradual expansion of 
the EU’s social dimension, the boundaries between the first and the second understanding of equality 
from the perspective of nationality become blurred. This second understanding corresponds to the 
conception of equality that has underpinned the development of anti-discrimination laws, which focused 
on specific protected categories such as racial or ethnic origin, on both sides of the Atlantic. Notably, 
not only did this dimension of EU anti-discrimination law develop significantly later than in the US 
(perhaps with the exception of the non-discrimination based on gender), but many of its building blocks 
are also considered to have drawn from the American ideas (De Búrca, 2012).  
Indeed, the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of a specific protected category draws from the 
developments in the former colonizing countries, which have gradually introduced laws against race 
discrimination. In the EU the developments were due to an active Court of Justice, which provided the 
ground for taking political action via secondary EU law, via the amendment of the Treaty and, since 
2000, via the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Indeed, particularly from the 2000s onward, a considerable 
body of secondary EU legislation has been adopted, which gave the principle of non-discrimination 
based on protected characteristics a more tangible expression and expanded its horizontal meaning 
(Reich, 2014).  
Analysis of the legal framework as well as of the literature concerned with the horizontal dimension of 
the principle of equal treatment in the EU leads to the following observations. First of all, there appears 
to be a limited range of characteristics on the basis of which discrimination is prohibited by law. Such 
protected characteristics include, in particular, nationality, gender, racial and ethnic origin, religion and 
belief, age and sexual orientation, and do not extend to economic grounds (here the rationales of the 
weaker party protection and the regulated autonomy might be more relevant). At present, the most 
comprehensive anti-discrimination framework in areas of relevance to the present project concerns 
racial and ethnic origin29, gender30 and, with all reservations expressed above, nationality (for a 
comprehensive overview, see: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 
2018). 
                                                     
28  Articles 20, 45 and 49 TFEU; Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. 
29  Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin 
and case C-83/14 CHEZ. 
30  Directive 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply 
of goods and services and case C-236/09 Test Achats. 
A. Jabłonowska, M. Kuziemski, A. M. Nowak, H.-W. Micklitz, P. Pałka, G. Sartor 
16 Department of Law Working Papers 
Secondly, the balance between the principle of non-discrimination and the competing principles of 
private law, such as freedom of contract, appears to depend on the area of law under analysis (Reich, 
2014). Considerations of equality are particularly prominent in labor law, in which the most fully-
fledged framework has been established covering all the protected characteristics mentioned above31. 
This tendency reflects the earlier developments in the US where a prohibition of discrimination based 
on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” in the employment context exists since the adoption of 
Title VII Civil Rights Act of 196432. In other areas, most notably consumer law, to which the present 
project is devoted, the principle of non-discrimination applies less coherently. The differences arise as 
regards both the types of protected characteristics and the types of consumer transactions with respect 
to which discrimination is prohibited. While some legal acts focus only on one protected characteristic 
and have a broadly defined subject matter (Directive 2000/43/EC on racial and ethnic origin which 
prohibits discrimination in social protection, health care, education and access to goods and services, 
including housing, which are available to the public33), others follow an exactly opposite logic (Directive 
2014/92/EU which prohibits discrimination based on all grounds set out in Article 21 of the Charter 
with respect to access to payment accounts34). Such an incoherent approach appears to be attributed at 
least partially to the lack of political consensus on further-reaching harmonization. This is evidenced by 
the disagreement about a proposed directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, which sought to implement 
the principle of discrimination on these grounds outside the labor market35. Overall, provisions aimed 
at combating discrimination in consumer markets tend to focus either on 1) goods and services of 
particular social importance (specified/network services such as payment, insurance and banking, 
services of general economic interest36); 2) goods and services which are generally available to the 
public. 
Of relevance is finally the direct or indirect nature of the discriminatory treatment. The former describes 
a situation where a person is treated less favorably “on grounds” of a protected characteristic (such as 
sex or racial or ethnic origin), than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation. 
The latter refers to a situation where an “apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice” would put 
persons possessing a given protected characteristic “at a particular disadvantage” compared to persons 
not possessing that characteristic.  
Importantly, while the EU law typically provides for only limited defenses to direct discrimination, 
indirect discrimination can often be justified by reference to a more general defense. Indeed, pursuant 
to several anti-discrimination directives, indirect discrimination might be considered lawful, provided 
that the provision, criterion or practice “is objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of 
                                                     
31  Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin; 
Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation; Directive 
2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States; Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal 
treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast); Directive 2014/54/EU on measures 
facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the context of freedom of movement for workers. 
32  For an analysis from a perspective of the modern developments such as automated decision-making see: Barocas and Selbst 
(2017) and Kim (2017). 
33  Discrimination based on sex is prohibited in a similar range of areas. Interestingly, Directive 2004/113/EC also contains a 
specific provision on insurance, which led to a controversial judgment of the Court of Justice in C-236/09 Test Achats. 
34  Directive 2014/92/EU on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to 
payment accounts with basic features, Article 15. 
35  COM(2008) 426, cf. some national laws: German General Act on Equal Treatment (Allgemeine Gleichbehandlungsgesetz) 
of 14 August 2006. 
36  See, e.g. the framework of electronic communications and energy. 
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achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary”37. With respect to discrimination based on nationality, 
the importance of direct and indirect nature of unequal treatment is more nuanced. While the distinction 
seems to play a role in the free movement law38, it is not directly mentioned in Directive 2006/123/EC 
on services in the internal market. Specifically, Article 20(2) of the Services Directive allows for 
differences in the general conditions of access to services based upon the service recipient’s nationality 
or place of residence – both directly and not – to be “directly justified by objective criteria”. This broad 
and ambiguous wording has resulted in a limited effectiveness of the said provision39, which might 
explain why it is being generally overlooked in the anti-discrimination literature. To remedy this 
situation, the recently adopted Regulation 2018/302 on addressing unjustified geo-blocking and other 
forms of discrimination specifies the situations in online transactions where there can be no justification 
for different treatment based on the customers’ nationality, place of residence or place of establishment. 
The regulation, which will apply as of December 2018, thus appears to be introducing a per se ban on 
the specified manifestations of both direct and indirect discrimination in access to goods and services. 
In doing so, it takes an important step in recognizing and operationalizing the principle of non-
discrimination in access to goods and services. Unfortunately – and not unlike other European building 
blocks of non-discrimination in consumer markets – the regulation does not appear to be AI-proof. 
Indeed, as observed by Hacker, even though the horizontal dimension of the EU anti-discrimination law 
is comparably broad, its provisions on “access to goods and services” beyond specific sectors are of 
limited help to the subjects of discriminatory decisions reached by algorithms. This is particularly 
because of the “availability to the public” criterion, which appears to be difficult to reconcile with the 
growing degrees of personalization of both commercial messages about products or services and the 
products and services themselves. What is more, according to the author, considerations of algorithmic 
accuracy provide an easy justification that businesses can put forward to contest allegations of indirect 
discrimination. The difficulties faced by potential victims in holding the owners of algorithms 
accountable are further exacerbated by considerable enforcement deficits such as the lack of access to 
data and algorithmic models (Hacker, 2018). Similar observations have been made in the US literature 
with respect to the relevant anti-discrimination laws applicable to private law relationships, including 
the rather limited provisions concerned with consumer markets, such as the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act of 1974 (Schmitz, 2017). 
Overall, whereas the EU is criticized for suffering from a ‘justice deficit’ (Kochenov et al., 2015), it 
managed quite successfully to make the non-discrimination principle a genuine European value. At the 
same time, and even though the more recent developments in Europe have been more dynamic than in 
the US (De Búrca, 2012; Yoshino, 2011), there is also no unanimity in the EU as to how deep and in 
what ways the principle of non-discrimination should reach. The major field of application is still to be 
found in labor relations and ever stronger in the public domain outside and beyond contractual labor 
relations. The EU legislator did not manage to fully extend the non-discrimination principle to the sphere 
of consumption. Consumers might suffer from discrimination when the access to the market is barred 
of when the supplier selects the consumer for economic transactions on discriminatory grounds. At the 
same time, the building blocks of the existing European framework can be criticized for being a step, if 
not a mile, behind the evolving socio-technological reality (Hacker, 2018). Controversially, the most 
obvious discrimination in consumer markets is not social in nature but economic. D. Caplovitz coined 
the saying of the ‘iron law of capitalism’ ‘the poor pays more’ (Caplovitz, 1967). AI enables even more 
                                                     
37  Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, 
Article 2(2)(b); Directive 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the 
access to and supply of goods and services, Article 2(b); see also case C-83/14 CHEZ. 
38  See, e.g. case C-379/87 Groener, also: Reich, 2014, 66. Note, however, that the framework of non-discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality, with respect to free movement of persons, is specified by Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. 
39  SWD(2016) 173 final. 
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sophisticated forms of personalized advertisements and offers, which invites a renewed focus and 
perhaps a wholly new perspective on the principle of non-discrimination in private law relationships. 
1.3.4. Consumer privacy  
For decades data privacy and consumer policy stood side by side. Data protection lawyers aimed at 
protecting the privacy of the citizens. The judgment of the German Constitutional Court on the right to 
informational self-determination had an impact far beyond German and Europe (see generally Simitis, 
2010). It paved the way for the development of a European policy of data protection in the 1990s and 
now for the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation. The GDPR’s applicability as of the 
25th May 2018 is accompanied by a high degree of public awareness on the behavior of the old and the 
digital economy. The regulation, already mentioned before, defines ground rules not only for the 
relationship of the citizen and the state, but also of the citizen (and consumer) towards the supplier. As 
a result, data protection and consumer protection are coming closer. Consumer data protection turned 
into a new field of legal research, which oversteps the boundaries of two formerly separated fields 
(Helberger et al., 2017). There is a strong connection between traders’ power over consumers and their 
ability to make sense of vast amount of data using algorithms.  
The GDPR put in place quite a complex governance system, to ensure that personal data is being 
processed in a fair and lawful manner. We analyze its requirements in detail elsewhere40, for here it 
suffices to state that data subjects should always know for what purpose and by whom what information 
about them is being used. This horizontal regulation does not, per se, stipulate what purposes data should 
not be used for – hence the other substantive principles and legal instruments will most definitely exist 
in a symbiotic relationship with the GDPR.  
 Consumer data protection impacts and affects not only the European consumers but also the consumers 
outside Europe. ‘The Brussels effect’ (Bradford, 2012) can be easily studied in the reaction of the 
American based big internet companies. They have to adjust their data protection policy to the European 
standards. It remains to be seen whether these companies will pursue a double standard (one for the 
Europeans, one for the rest of the world) and whether and to what extent the big players will monetarize 
data protection by offering different prices for services with and without data privacy. 
                                                     
40  See: CLAUDETTE meets GDPR Automating the Evaluation of Privacy Policies using Artificial Intelligence (2018), 
available at:  http://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2018-066_claudette_meets_gdpr_report.pdf  
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2. Sector analysis: What does business use AI for, what are the gains and the risks? 
To ground the research in the actual market practice, we decided to begin by running a survey of the 
purposes for which the companies are using artificial intelligence and other algorithmic techniques. In 
order to do so, we analyzed more than 100 websites and online media entries. We searched for the AI 
corporate use in the following sectors: finance and insurance, information services, energy and “smart 
solutions”, retail, autonomous vehicles, healthcare and legal. For each set of empirical findings, we 
asked the following questions: 
1. For what purposes is business using AI in the given sector? As a first step in moving away 
from books, ideas in our heads and general statements about “the AI”, we need to establish in 
precisely what ways business is employing artificial intelligence in a given sector of the 
economy. This part is descriptive and analytical. From this analysis we move to the normative 
observations, by asking: 
2. What is the gain for business? The development of AI tools is obviously costly, and so in order 
to understand why companies are using artificial intelligence to automate/realize certain tasks, 
we need to understand what it is that they are trying to achieve. Is it direct or indirect benefit? 
Are the “traditional” business activities being automated, or are companies able to do new things 
thanks to AI? Is the gain actual or potential? Knowing all this is necessary to ensure wise 
(potential) regulation: if imposing certain duties on business leads to more costly/ more difficult 
AI development and deployment, what is it that the economy will lose? Some gains, like security 
or fraud prevention, might be beneficial for society as a whole. Others, like automation of labor 
in call centers, might be solely in the interest of business. In short: what is business optimizing 
for? If we regulate, what could they lose? 
3. What is the (potential) gain for consumers? Clearly, consumers can also benefit from business’ 
deployment of AI. Even though the main purpose of this project is to identify risks, one should 
not forget that apart from risks there might be added consumer value; and combatting the risks 
might, as a side effect, reduce consumer benefits as well. These benefits might come from lower 
prices of goods and services (e.g. costs saved by the smart grid might translate into lower 
consumer prices), higher quality of goods or services (AI-powered financial products might be 
safer, or lead to higher revenues) or reduced search/transaction costs (with personalized 
offers/advertising; personal assistants automating purchasing decisions). In short: what are 
consumers gaining, directly or indirectly, from business using AI? What could they lose if this 
was constrained? 
4. What are the risks to consumers? This question is the core of this project. When business is 
clearly getting something, and when consumers might be benefiting as well, what is the cost that 
consumers pay for that? To answer this question, we analyze the concrete uses in concrete 
sectors, as opposed to a general armchair-scholarship simply listing Big Words like “autonomy”, 
“privacy”, “discrimination”. This should lead us to a specific map of risks, which in turn, 
analyzed jointly with the benefits, can allow us to pose concrete research questions to be 
addressed in Phase Two (chapter 4 of this report). Are the risks potential (maybe, one day) or 
actual and happening now? Are they predominantly individual in structure, or rather collective? 
Do they occur, given the technological inseparability, in a mode which poses particular new types 
of problems to the regulators and enforcers? In short: if regulation is a response to a concrete 
problem, what is the problem? 
5. What are third party effects? One should not forget that even though the primary focus of our 
analysis is the triad of relations: business-consumer-civil society; economic relations occur in a 
wider social, economic, cultural, political and currently essentially global context. There are 
externalities, some more, and some less straightforward. What are the impacts of business’ use 
of AI on labor situation, environment, access to knowledge, social values? In short: when using 
AI in specific cases, what are the third party effects of its mass deployment? 
6. Any other reflections 
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The results are presented below, sector by sector, in the form of a table for each field of business. We 
first answer the questions about each sector, and then list the sources we based our analysis on, as well 
as further interesting readings. 
2.1. Finance and insurance 
The financial sector, including the insurance sector, has been one of the first to attract public and 
scholarly attention when AI and other algorithmic techniques were introduced there. This was notably 
due to high-frequency trading and its potential role in the 2008 financial crisis, as well as credit scoring 
and potential for price discrimination. Financial institutions use artificial intelligence for pattern 
recognition, both in 1) data regarding security of their systems, 2) data about the markets (for more 
efficient algorithmic trading), and 3) data about consumers, for the creation of personalized financial 
products, risk assessment, and personalized pricing. In addition, financial institutions, just as many other 
sectors, employ chatbots for communication with consumers and consumer support, as well as making 
the personalized advice sound more “human”. 
 
Sector Finance and insurance 
What is 
business using 
the AI for? 
1. Fraud prevention, e.g. with respect to insurance fraud – recognising patterns from a 
vast range of data sources to identify bad behaviour 
2. Cybersecurity – analogous application  
3. Customer support – chatbots communicating with consumers; systems allowing 
companies to prioritize customer messages (e.g. by classifying them according to the 
emergency and intensity of emotions) 
4. Personalized and interactive financial advice – recognising patterns from a vast range 
of data sources to identify individual needs and risk profiles of consumers; the use of 
robo-advisors 
5. Algorithmic trading / high frequency trading – the use of AI to predict the most optimal 
trading environment and the use of algorithms to automatically place orders on the 
stock exchange 
6. Personalized insurance rates – assessment of risk based on collected data (e.g. 
collected by a mobile application, e.g. Snapshot introduced by Progressive to provide 
personalized car insurance) 
What is the 
gain for 
business? 
Ad 1 and 2 – Better fraud prevention/security 
Ad 3 and 4 – Fewer employees needed for customer support and advice; improving reaction 
times, better prioritization 
Ad 4 – Establishing long-term relationships with the customers: the longer the customers 
remain with the company, the more data the latter has on them and (potentially) the better 
advice it is able to provide  
Ad 4 and 5 – Encouraging customers to become more active on the financial market (hence 
more profit), including in the area of stock trading 
Ad 6 – Improved risk assessment 
What is the 
gain for 
Ad 1 and 2 – Better protection against fraud/cyber attacks 
Ad 3 and 4 – Easier and faster communication with the company, available 24/7 
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consumers? Ad 4  – Better access to financial products specifically tailored to one’s needs  
Ad 4 and 5 – Potentially more effective wealth management 
Ad 6 – Potentially lower insurance rates 
What is the loss 
for consumers? 
Ad 1 and 2 – using AI to prevent wrongful behaviour may not be controversial in some areas 
(e.g. fighting cyberattacks), but where the assessment is less clear and the system is also 
self-enforcing, due process arguments can be raised  
Ad 3 and 4 – Potentially lower quality of information provided; potentially more difficult to 
communicate with (human) employees 
Ad 4 and 5 – Responsibility for erroneous advice or for the wrongly placed orders unclear, 
risk of abuse / biased advice (robo-advisor maximising gains for the company, not for the 
customers), growing information asymmetry: companies can now gain better insights from 
consumer data, but consumers are not necessarily able to evaluate the quality of advice 
provided to them based on these new insights; how a particular conclusion was reached by 
the AI can even be unknown to the company itself (at the current stage of development AI 
systems based on neural networks are functioning as black boxes) 
Ad 6 – Privacy, potentially higher insurance rates (depending on the case) 
Third party 
effects/ 
externalities 
Potential job losses (customer support, financial advisors, analysts) 
New sources of data about consumers, potentially available to the government, law 
enforcement, hackers and blackmailers; potential risk to the stability of the financial system 
Other The use of AI to provide personalized services as well as automatic advice and support (chat 
bots) and to counteract bad behaviour is an overarching theme. Some further examples are 
provided below (see e.g. how AI is transforming advertising and retail, how it can be used 
to fight fake news or to facilitate IP enforcement).  
Other examples of personalization: 
http://victor-charles.com/web/en/page-home-en/ 
Other examples of chatbots used for customer support: 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/watson/2017/06/how-autodesk-sped-up-customer-service-
times-with-watson/ 
http://www.natural-talk.com/  
Aside from consumer markets, AI – possibly in combination with the blockchain – could be 
used for example to prevent fraud in different sectors of economy, e.g. by verifying the 
authenticity and origin of high value goods such as diamonds: 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/research/2017/05/power-blockchain-watson/ 
https://www.itnews.com.au/news/everledger-uses-blockchain-to-stamp-out-blood-
diamonds-455537) 
 
Sources/Further Readings: 
• PwC, Artificial intelligence in financial services, “PwC”, December 2016, 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/research-institute/artificial-intelligence.html  
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• PwC, Sink or swim: Why wealth management can’t afford to miss the digital wave, “Strategy&”, 
1 June 2016, https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/reports/sink-or-swim  
• Accenture, Banking Technology Vision 2017, “Accenture”, 2017, https://www.accenture.com/us-
en/insight-banking-technology-vision-2017 
• Banking Tech, The future of banking is here: cognitive banking, “FinTech Futures”, 5 August 
2016, http://www.bankingtech.com/502582/the-future-of-banking-is-here-cognitive-banking/ 
• Mariya Yao, Chatbots Go Cha-Ching: The Looming Impact of A.I. In Finance, “Forbes”, 19 April 
2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/mariyayao/2017/04/19/chatbots-go-cha-ching-the-impact-of-
ai-in-finance/#4f7d778220e3  
• Q°emotion, How a bank managed to increase customer satisfaction through emotions analytics, 
“Q°emotion”, https://www.qemotion.com/how-to-use-emotional-analysis-for-banking-and-
insurances-industries  
• BI Intelligence, IBM to use AI to help banks with cybersecurity, “Business Insider, 8 December 
2016,  http://www.businessinsider.com/ibm-to-use-ai-to-help-banks-with-cybersecurity-2016-
12?IR=T 
• Lecia Papadopoulos, How Watson AI is helping companies stay ahead of hackers and 
cybersecurity attacks, “IBM”, 14 August 2017, https://www.ibm.com/blogs/watson/2017 
/08/how-watson-ai-is-helping-companies-stay-ahead-of-cybersecurity-attacks/ 
• Mariya Yao, Can A.I. Defend Our Financial Institutions Against Hackers?, “Topbots”, 29th May 
2017, http://www.topbots.com/financial-services-institutions-artificial-intelligence-cybersecurity/ 
• nanalyze, 6 Startups Using AI for Algorithmic Trading Strategies, “nanalyze”, 7 August 2016, 
http://www.nanalyze.com/2016/08/artificial-intelligence-algorithmic-trading/ 
• Olivia Solon, World’s largest hedge fund to replace managers with artificial intelligence, “The 
Guardian”, 22 December 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/22/ 
bridgewater-associates-ai-artificial-intelligence-management 
• Gary Brackenridge, Machine learning is transforming investment strategies for asset managers, 
“CNBC”, 6 June 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/06/machine-learning-transforms-
investment-strategies-for-asset-managers.html 
• Michael Chui, James Manyika, and Mehdi Miremadi, Where machines could replace humans—
and where they can’t (yet), “McKinsey Quarterly”, June 2016, 
http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/where-machines-
could-replace-humans-and-where-they-cant-yet 
 
2.2. Information services 
“Information services” might be an imperfect term regarding its descriptive power, but in our analysis 
it has proven extremely efficient in “catching” new digital economy’s business models of social media, 
online advertising, content hosting and screening, as well as facilitating communication. Information 
services use artificial intelligence and other algorithmic techniques for advertising. This might be the 
subject attracting most attention of consumer lawyers interested in artificial intelligence (however, with 
an overspill to public law, vide political advertising in the aftermath of the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal). Information services also use AI to offer more personalized and targeted business 
communication. In addition, AI is used for translations, content screening (to assess its quality, 
compliance with the platform’s rules of conduct, compliance with intellectual property rules of 
copyright and trademark law), as well as powering communication via chatbots. 
 
Sector Information services 
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What is 
business using 
the AI for? 
1. Transforming digital advertising – recognizing patterns at the individual level and not 
based on profiling (segmentation); displaying ads related to actual preferences of the 
targeted consumer and not only to products he or she has viewed, his or her 
demographic data, etc. 
2. Machine translation – In 2016 Google decided to carry out an overhaul of its 
translation service (Google Translate) and replace the code developed by engineers 
over a decade with a neural network (Google's Neural Machine Translation system); 
systems based on neural networks could potentially be applied in other areas where 
existing machine translation systems are used today (like in the case of Airbnb listings) 
3. Fighting fake news – the use of AI to determine whether a trending topic on social 
media is factual or not; analysing and identifying fake audio and video  
4. Automatic assessment of the quality of user-generated content (e.g. articles on 
Wikipedia) and, possibly, adding missing information (e.g. based on information 
available in different language versions) 
5. Virtual assistants (text-based and voice-based chatbots), integrated, for example, into 
messaging apps (like Facebook Messenger) 
What is the 
gain for 
business? 
Ad 1 – Advanced consumer targeting and ads personalization could allow companies to 
maximize returns on digital advertising. 
Ad 2 – More accurate translation tools could be used as stand-alone products (Google 
Translate) or be integrated into other products (commercialisation potential). By way of 
illustration, the use of AI by Google reduced translation errors by an average of 60%. This 
allowed Google to effectively compete with other IT companies such as the Chinese 
company Baidu. 
Ad 3 and 4 – Improving credibility and quality of online content  
Ad 5 – Attracting more users and gaining new insights about them, which can be monetized 
e.g. via advertising or product innovation 
What is the 
gain for 
consumers? 
Ad 1 – Exposure to more relevant content 
Ad 2 – More accurate machine translation, potentially substitutable for human translation. 
Machine translation is faster and cheaper than human translation. 
Ad 3 and 4 – Easier access to content of a potentially higher quality, lower risk of 
misinformation 
Ad 5 – Virtual assistants could quickly answer to various queries that consumers may have 
(e.g. what is the cheapest way to stream a particular TV show) thus further reducing their 
search costs 
What is the loss 
for consumers? 
Ad 1 – An even bigger impact on consumers’ purchasing decisions 
Ad 2 – Machine translation actually “paid for” with personal data. More generally: growing 
dependence on a limited number of IT players who are able to afford major AI investments. 
If automatic translation is further integrated into other products, and virtually 
indistinguishable from human input, one may wonder what would happen if a translation is 
incorrect and based on this a consumer takes a purchase decision he would not have taken 
otherwise. 
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Ad 3 and 4 – Pre-verification done by an algorithm could discourage consumers from 
evaluating the content (news) critically; furthermore, criteria used by the algorithms could 
lead to discrimination/censorship of certain content creators (e.g. new contributors on 
Wikipedia) or types of content (e.g. on politically controversial topics); algorithms could 
further stabilize past patterns, reproduce mistakes or be subject to abuse, all this leading to 
a distortion of the content available to consumers. 
Ad 5 – Companies not only gain access to, but also an understanding of consumers’ 
communications (with chatbot and with other users) and can use it, for example for 
advertising purposes. 
Third party 
effects/ 
externalities 
Potential job losses (e.g. translators) 
Impact on the freedom of expression 
New source of data about the consumers, potentially available to the government, law 
enforcement, hackers and blackmailers 
Other A related issue is the use of AI in the creative sector. Here, two main dimensions can be 
identified: AI as creator and AI as enforcer. As regards the former, it is observed that creative 
input can potentially also come from AI systems and not only humans. AI-generated works 
/ inventions could be produced faster, with less effort and in large quantities. In the latter 
respect, AI could not only be used to recognize the patterns of illegal behaviour, but could 
also learn how the law (e.g. on copyright exceptions) is applied. This would make the IP 
enforcement not only more effective, but also potentially more balanced (although not 
necessarily more legitimate and transparent). See:  
http://www.osborneclarke.com/insights/defending-both-creators-and-the-public-will-ai-
and-the-blockchain-transform-ip-management/  
https://script-ed.org/article/computers-as-inventors-legal-and-policy-implications-of-
artificial-intelligence-on-patent-law/  
https://law.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ipkm/artificial-intelligence-ai-and-intellectual-
property-ip-a-call-for-action/  
Overlap with data protection and IP law 
 
Sources/Further Readings 
• Juniper Research, AI machine learning to drive ‘real time bid’ advertising spend to $42bn globally 
by 2021, “Juniper research”, 5 September 2016, https://www.juniperresearch.com/press/press-
releases/ai-machine-learning-to-drive-%E2%80%98real-time-bid%E2%80%99-a,  
• See also: http://www.campaignlive.co.uk/article/watch-m-c-saatchi-launches-artificially-
intelligent-outdoor-campaign/1357413  
• John Mruz, AI-to-AI communication in advertising increases brand safety and improves ad 
performance, “Ibm”, 11 July 2017, https://www.ibm.com/blogs/watson/2017/07/ai-to-ai-
communication-helps-increase-brand-safety-and-drive-better-ad-performance/  
• Gideon Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening, “The New York Times”, 14 December 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html, See also: 
original paper describing Google’s project https://research.google.com/pubs/pub45610.html  
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• Thomson Reuters, Machine learning turns “fake news” on Twitter into old news, “Thomson 
Reuters”, 27 March 2017, https://blogs.thomsonreuters.com/answerson/machine-learning-
fake-news-twitter/, See also: http://www.fakenewschallenge.org/  
• Rob Price, CGI and AI are going to turbocharge 'fake news' and make it far harder to tell what's 
real, “Business insider”, 28 July 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/cgi-ai-fake-news-
videos-real-2017-7?IR=T  
• Aaron Halfaker, Dario Taraborelli, Artificial intelligence service “ORES” gives Wikipedians X-
ray specs to see through bad edits,  “Wikimedia”, 30 November 2015, 
• https://blog.wikimedia.org/2015/11/30/artificial-intelligence-x-ray-specs/, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-34982570  
• Aaron Halfaker, Investing in our shared future, supported by AI: Announcing the Scoring Platform 
team, “Wikimedia”, 19 July 2017, https://blog.wikimedia.org/2017/07/19/scoring-platform-
team/  
• Alexei Oreskovic, Facebook bought an AI startup that could turn its middling virtual assistant 
into a Siri killer, “Business insider”, 31 July 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-
acquires-ozlo-ai-startup-2017-7?IR=T  
 
2.3. Energy and “smart solutions” 
Whether AI-powered systems can actually be described as “intelligent” is a fascinating matter for a 
debate with high importance for the public perception and politics, yet arguably of secondary importance 
for our analysis. What came to be commonly accepted though, at least on the level of language, is that 
AI-powered systems and products can be “smart”. Smartphones, smart homes, smart TVs, smart grids, 
smart cities – soon everything might start to be smart. Every now and then the public excitement rises 
when it is revealed yet another thing has been made “smart”, as for example with Amazon’s introduction 
of the “smart lock”, to allow its couriers to open consumers’ doors in order to safely (sic!) place the 
parcel inside a consumer’s house41. “Smartness” is not only a feature of consumer products 
though – whole grids, adjusting distribution of any media, ranging from energy to internet, can become 
(and in many places already have become) “smart”. Hence, in the “smart sector”, business uses AI for 
both creation of smart consumer products and services, as well as smart delivery of “traditional” supplies 
like energy. 
 
Sector Energy and smart solutions 
What is 
business using 
the AI for? 
1. “Smart-grid” – real time analysis of consumer energy consumption patterns 
2. Smart solutions for public spaces and commercial buildings (e.g. smart elevators: the 
use of AI to predict and suggest resolutions to potential problems)  
3. Smart solutions for households (e.g. digital assistants responding to consumer 
requests such as Google Home, Amazon Echo, Apple’s HomePod or Baidu’s Little Fish 
as well as more autonomous home hubs which are currently being developed) 
What is the 
gain for 
business? 
Ad 1 – More efficient use of the grid, less energy losses, lower costs of grid maintenance 
Ad 2 – Improved efficiency, fewer faults, easier maintenance  
Ad 3 – Multiple commercialisation opportunities (selling the device itself, partnering up 
                                                     
41  https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/25/16538834/amazon-key-in-home-delivery-unlock-door-prime-cloud-cam-smart-lock  
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with other companies and with application developers, gaining new insights about 
consumers and utilising them for advertising) 
What is the 
gain for 
consumers? 
Ad 1 – Potentially cheaper energy 
Ad 2 – Depends on particular application (for elevators: less waiting time, fewer delays and 
malfunctions)  
Ad 3 – Facilitating the daily running (obtaining information, planning the day, making calls, 
playing music, shopping online), optimising the use of water, power, etc. (switching off the 
lights, adjusting the heating/cooling systems), improving safety (controlling locks and 
alarms), facilitating home maintenance. In the future: predicting problems before they 
happen and responding accordingly. 
What is the loss 
for consumers? 
Particularly Ad 1 and 3 – Business gains even more information about consumer’s habits 
(e.g. what amount of energy they are using), hence also when they are at home and when 
not, when they are sleeping, when they have guests etc. (privacy) 
Ad 3 – Risk of malfunctioning or hacking; problems with liability attribution 
Third party 
effects/ 
externalities 
1. Smart grid and smart homes could be good for the environment (more efficient use of 
energy means less pollution) 
2. Potential job losses (e.g. maintenance) 
3. New sources of data about the consumers, potentially available to the government, 
law enforcement (for example, in a US case authorities have asked Amazon to turn 
over data from a suspect’s Echo), hackers and blackmailers 
Other Overlap with data protection law 
Possible combination of AI and blockchain 
 
Sources/Further Readings: 
• Scott Carey, How EDF wants AI to optimise its nuclear power stations and the smart home?, 
“ComputerworldUK”, 11 May 2017,  http://www.computerworlduk.com/data/edf-eyes-ai-
optimise-its-nuclear-power-stations-smart-home-3658843/  
• Constance Douris, Balancing Smart Grid Data and Consumer Privacy, “Lexington Institute”, 14 
July 2017, http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/13750-2/   
• Jamie Condliffe, What’s Next for AI Home Assistants, “MIT Technology review”, 16 February 
2017, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603672/whats-next-for-ai-home-assistants/  
• Michael Reilly, Should an Amazon Echo Help Solve a Murder?, “MIT Technology review”, 27 
December 2016, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603278/should-an-amazon-echo-help-
solve-a-murder/  
• Memoori Smart Buildings research, The Innovative Startups that could bring AI & Blockchain to 
Smart Buildings, “Memoori”, 2 March 2017, https://www.memoori.com/innovative-startups-
bring-ai-blockchain-smart-buildings/, See also: https://www.memoori.com/automated-smart-
cognitive-past-future-smart-buildings/  
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• Lynne Slowey, Look who’s talking: KONE makes elevator services truly intelligent with Watson 
IoT, “IBM”, 16 February 2017, https://www.ibm.com/blogs/internet-of-things/kone/, 
https://www.ibm.com/watson/stories/kone-with-watson.html, https://www.kone.us/smart  
•  -, Meet MyxyPod. A voice assistant and multiroom speaker, 2016/2017, 
https://myxyty.com/myxypod-smart-home-speaker/  
• Freddie Dawson, The House That Learns: Bringing Artificial Intelligence Into The Home, 
“Forbes”, 24 May 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/freddiedawson/2016/05/24/the-house-
that-learns-bringing-artificial-intelligence-into-the-home/#54f27c7f3fa3, http://aiport.ai-
build.com/  
2.4. Retail 
According to a popular story, a father discovered that his daughter was pregnant from baby product 
samples sent by a supermarket chain, which in turn predicted so based on her shopping patterns in the 
light of vast amounts of all customers’ data. Whether this really happened does not really matter. What 
matters is that this story, just as many others, is extremely plausible. Retail selling – the very core of the 
consumer society, when the act of consumer purchasing happens – has been using artificial intelligence 
in a variety of ways. Firstly, adjusting the way the products are displayed, physically or virtually. We 
all know how in supermarkets crisps tend to be placed next to beer, water on the opposite side of the 
shop from bread, sweets on the level of children’s eyes next to the cash desk, when they are bored 
waiting in line. These easy tricks can be now refined to a level of sophistication unseen before, based 
on millions of data points about consumers’ purchasing patterns. Secondly, the communication with the 
customers has become much more personalized, especially where online shopping is concerned, with 
the boundary between (personalized) retail offers and advertising becoming more blurred than ever 
before. Finally, with the rise of “algorithmic consumers”, “cyber-butlers”, i.e. digital personal assistants, 
the very idea that it is a human making a purchase decision, might to a certain extent soon become 
outdated – with all the ensuing gains and losses.  
 
Sector Retail 
What is 
business using 
the AI for? 
1. Providing insights for improved omni-channel retail solutions, i.e. solutions that 
combine brick-and-mortar stores and traditional delivery options with a variety of 
digital channels such as: in-store digital tools (interactive catalogues, intelligent 
mirrors, beacons, video cameras, robo-advisors), websites, mobile applications, 
customer cards, social media, chats bots, etc. 
2. Creating personalized offers (e.g. coupons to be downloaded) and recommendations 
(e.g. which size or type of a dress should a consumer buy) based not only on previous 
purchases, but on wider and more precise data sets; providing real-time information 
about products which could be of interests to consumers (e.g. sending a mobile 
notification about a discount on umbrellas just as a consumer is approaching a retail 
shop on a day when rain is expected) 
3. Understanding current trends (e.g. fashion trends based on Instagram photos) and 
creating corresponding products  
4. Some digital assistants for households (like Amazon Echo/Alexa) can already be asked 
to place orders for products and services 
What is the 
gain for 
Improved merchandising operations, better management and monitoring of the supply 
chains, optimised inventory levels 
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business? 
What is the 
gain for 
consumers? 
An easier and more flexible shopping experience 
What is the loss 
for consumers? 
1. Retailers gain access to and understanding of a vast amount of data about particular 
consumers - also in brick-and-mortar stores (e.g. through beacons or video analytics 
allowing companies to tell which products people are looking at, and even where they 
are looking on the product) - and are able to exploit their weaknesses  
2. Personalized offers could be discriminatory 
3. Privacy issues 
4. Risk of haphazard (uninformed) or erroneous purchases (e.g. as a result of a machine 
error or compliance with a child’s request) 
Other Overlap with data protection law 
 
Sources/Further Readings: 
• Roger Bales, How cognitive computing will revolutionize the retail industry, “Ibm”,15 May 2017, 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/systems/how-cognitive-computing-will-revolutionize-the-retail-
industry/, https://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?htmlfid=GBE03769USEN  
• ELEKS, How Machine Learning Can Drive Retail Sales, “NewCo Shift”, 31 May 2017, 
https://shift.newco.co/how-to-use-machine-learning-to-sell-better-8f909ab425b4  
• Coherent Path, Is ‘artificial intelligence’ the new ‘omnichannel’?, “Coherent path”, 13 April 2017, 
http://coherentpath.com/is-artificial-intelligence-the-new-omnichannel/  
• Vijayakumar Kabbin, 4 industries that will be transformed by machine learning in 2017,  
“Information age”, 6 April 2017, http://www.information-age.com/uk-public-trial-driverless-
shuttle-bus-123465530/  
• Softbank, n/d, Pepper (robot): For business, “Softbank robotics”, 
https://www.ald.softbankrobotics.com/en/solutions/business  
• Will Knight, Amazon Has Developed an AI Fashion Designer, “MIT Technology review”, 
24 August 2017, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608668/amazon-has-developed-an-ai-
fashion-designer/  
• Sarah Perez, Starbucks unveils a virtual assistant that takes your order via messaging or 
voice, “Techcrunch”, 30 January 2017, https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/30/starbucks-unveils-
a-virtual-assistant-that-takes-your-order-via-messaging-or-voice/  
• Jess Anderson, Tesco and Estimote, pioneering grocery stores of the future, “Estimote”, 8 
March 2017, http://blog.estimote.com/post/158169494355/tesco-and-estimote-pioneering-
grocery-stores-of  
• Cosmose, Omnicookie connects offline stores with online ads, “Cosmose”, https://cosmose.co/- , 
Not AI, but potentially a new source of data for AI analysis 
• Heuritech, Heuritech launches an Ai solution for Fashion & Beauty, “Heuritech”, 
http://www2.heuritech.com/  
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• Harriet Taylor, Lowe's introduces LoweBot, a new autonomous in-store robot, “CNBC”, 3 
August 2016, https://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/30/lowes-introduces-lowebot-a-new-
autonomous-in-store-robot.html  
• Andrew Liptak, Amazon’s Alexa started ordering people dollhouses after hearing its name on 
TV, “The Verge”, 7 January 2017, https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/7/14200210/amazon-
alexa-tech-news-anchor-order-dollhouse  
2.5. Autonomous vehicles 
Probably nothing excites the public opinion as much as the subject of autonomous vehicles – drones and 
self-driving cars. The former appear in discussions ranging from automated delivery of goods, to spying, 
to warfare; and the issues of privacy and security polarize the discussions. The latter fueled and gave 
new relevance to the endless discussion of the “trolley” problem, the question of whom a car should 
sacrifice, if it cannot avoid a collision. Unsolved questions that were purely theoretical until now have 
gained salience. With huge promises of increasing safety and efficiency of transport, self-driving cars 
also tend to be seen as a source of danger, disrupting the way in which transport has functioned for over 
a century now. A significant number of studies has been devoted to autonomous vehicles, which is why 
we decided to not really concentrate on them. Still, leaving them out of the general picture would leave 
a big gap in our map, so we conducted a little study of this subject as well. 
 
Sector Autonomous vehicles  
What is 
business using 
the AI for? 
1. The use of AI in the development of autonomous cars (early stage) – self-driving cars 
not following the instructions provided by a programmer or relying on external 
analytics (i.e. sending data to a server or the cloud for analysis), but rather relying on 
an algorithm that has taught itself to drive and is able to respond to the situations on 
the road in real time.  
2. The use of AI in the development of autonomous drones – drones not requiring a 
human operator, able to recognize and analyse their surroundings, including people 
below them (facial recognition), learning and improving themselves in the process 
3. Combining the two: creation of wheeled, autonomous drones capable of switching 
between flying and driving 
What is the 
gain for 
business? 
Commercialising autonomous vehicles in new markets or using them to improve operations 
in existing markets: 
1. Passenger transport: autonomous cars for personal use as well as autonomous taxis 
(for both urban and long-distance transport) 
2. Aerial photography, carriage of goods: autonomous trucks and drones (in addition to 
numerous non-consumer uses such as industrial maintenance and servicing, law 
enforcement and military) 
What is the 
gain for 
consumers? 
Potentially faster, safer and easier transportation 
What is the loss 
for consumers? 
Safety and accountability: 
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1. Reliance on neural networks makes it very difficult to tell how a given result was 
reached – problematic in case of an accident or an error 
2. Risk of hacking  
Third party 
effects/ 
externalities 
Privacy of third parties (e.g. photographed by a drone) 
Damage caused to third parties (e.g. an autonomous car may prioritize the life, health and 
property of the vehicle’s owner or user over that of a passer-by) 
Other Ethical issues: whom to sacrifice if necessary 
 
Sources/Further Readings: 
• Mariusz Bojarski, Ben Firner, Beat Flepp, Larry Jackel, Urs Muller and Karol Zieba, By End-to-
End Deep Learning for Self-Driving Cars, “Nvidia”, 17 August 2016, 
• https://devblogs.nvidia.com/parallelforall/deep-learning-self-driving-cars/, 
http://www.nvidia.com/object/drive-automotive-technology.html, 
http://www.nvidia.com/object/uavs-drones-technology.html  
• Lex Davies, Ford says it’ll have a fleet of fully autonomous cars in just 5 years, “Wired”, 16 
August 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/08/ford-autonomous-vehicles-2021/  
• Katie Collins, Driverless taxis could be the bullet train of the Tokyo 2020 Olympics, “CNET”, 22 
August 2016, https://www.cnet.com/news/driverless-taxis-could-be-the-bullet-train-of-the-
tokyo-2020-olympics/  
• Johana Bhuiyan, Uber wants to demonstrate its network of flying cars by 2020, “Recode”, 25 April 
2017, https://www.recode.net/2017/4/25/15422592/uber-flying-cars-vtol-network-2020-
dubai-texas  
• Simson Garfinkel, Hackers Are the Real Obstacle for Self-Driving Vehicles, “MIT Technology 
review”, 22 August 2017, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608618/hackers-are-the-real-
obstacle-for-self-driving-vehicles/  
• Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI, “MIT Technology review”, 11 April 2017, 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/, - discusses 
current research to make AI more explainable 
• Tom Simonite, AI-Powered Drone Will Follow You Around and Take Pictures, “MIT Technology 
review”, 29 March 2017, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604009/ai-powered-drone-will-
follow-you-around-and-take-pictures/  
• James Ryan, Managing traffic in the skies, 7 June 2017, https://blog.x.company/managing-
traffic-in-the-skies-494e2d992358  
• The Economist, T.S., Why Uber’s self-driving car killed a pedestrian, “The Economist”, 29 May 
2018, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/05/29/why-ubers-self-
driving-car-killed-a-pedestrian  
2.6. Healthcare  
Healthcare, just like privacy and data protection, is a subject-matter where a typical continental lawyer 
would at this point stand up and shout: “health is a constitutionally protected good, not a product! People 
receiving healthcare are patients, not consumers! How dare you apply market logic on such a 
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fundamental good as human health!”. In a way, we cannot disagree with this point – health is one of the 
most important goods protected by the legal system, and a situation in which those who can afford 
treatment end up being healthier than those who cannot, is socially undesirable. There is, indeed, some 
ethical dissonance in placing health in the same category as selling shoes. However, the social and 
market practice do not seem to be bothered by these considerations, and health services, as well as 
development and sales of healthcare equipment, have become an enormous sector of the contemporary 
economy. Therefore, admitting that health should be given a special place in market considerations, we 
decided to analyze this sector in the same manner as any other. Indeed, the possible amount of 
applications of AI in healthcare is immense. From diagnostics to optimizing hospitals’ work and the 
usage of autonomous vehicles in life-saving operations, artificial intelligence is roaming around our 
hospitals. Let us hope that compassion will remain genuine. 
 
Sector Healthcare 
What is 
business using 
the AI for? 
1. Diagnostics – examples 
• AI systems can be taught to diagnose from a case description and a clinical 
image (IBM Watson system has, for instance already been applied to examine 
mammography and cardiac patient imaging studies as well as tumor biopsies) 
• Streams, a system developed by Deep Mind (Google), is able to review test 
results for serious issues, such as acute kidney injury, and send smartphone 
alerts to the doctor. The system does not currently use machine learning 
although it is envisaged that in the future AI-driven alerts could also be 
delivered. Furthermore, AI could help predict future illnesses even before 
they manifest. 
2. E-health solutions (mixed solutions, such as Babylon, in which medical advice is based 
both on AI analysis and on doctor’s assessment; fully automated systems for purposes 
of self-diagnosis, health assistance (automatic nurses), medication management and 
even “therapy”, e.g. Woebot (mental health chat bot), Quitxt (helps users quit 
smoking) 
3. Drone delivery of lifesaving medicines 
What is the 
gain for 
business? 
Commercialising AI systems in the healthcare sector  
Increasing efficiency of internal procedures 
Gaining access to even more consumer data, including sensitive data 
What is the 
gain for 
consumers? 
Ad 1 – More accurate analyses, potentially faster treatment 
Ad 2 – Cheaper and more accessible medical advice / “therapy” 
Ad 3 – Drone delivery is faster and doesn’t rely on physical infrastructure 
What is the loss 
for consumers? 
Ad 1 and 2 – Risk of erroneous diagnoses and predictions, for reasons which might not be 
readily explainable (AI based on neural networks as a black box), less personal contact with 
medical professionals  
Ad 2 – Privacy, particularly where the system is developed by a commercial entity (e.g. 
Woebot belongs to Facebook)  
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Third party 
effects/ 
externalities 
Risk of growing inequalities if only rich can afford AI-supported treatment 
Other Ethical issues: what to do in case of conflict between a human doctor and robotic judgment?  
Overlap with data protection law 
Sources/Further Readings: 
• Recode, Full transcript: Zipline CEO Keller Rinaudo talks life-saving drones on Too Embarrassed 
to Ask, “Recode”, 10 March 2017, https://www.recode.net/2017/3/10/14875324/transcript-
zipline-founder-keller-rinaudo-delivery-drones-too-embarrassed-to-ask, http://flyzipline.com/  
• Imaging Technology News, Examples of Artificial Intelligence in Medical Imaging Diagnostics, 
16 December 2016, https://www.itnonline.com/videos/examples-artificial-intelligence-medical-
imaging-diagnostics, https://www.itnonline.com/videos/development-artificial-intelligence-aid-
radiology/5239024570001  
• IBM, n/d, Now patients can get personalized therapeutic options nationwide, “IBM”, 
https://www.ibm.com/watson/stories/quest-with-watson.html,  
• See also: https://www.ibm.com/watson/health/oncology-and-genomics/oncology/  
• PubMed Health, Behind The Headlines: Doctors 'vastly outperform' symptom checker apps, 
“ITN”, 11 October 2016, https://www.itnonline.com/videos/examples-artificial-intelligence-
medical-imaging-diagnostics 
• Medical Futurist, n/d, Artificial Intelligence Will Redesign Healthcare, “The medical futurist 
institute”, http://medicalfuturist.com/artificial-intelligence-will-redesign-healthcare/  
• Babylon, n/d, Hand-picked doctors, supported by cutting edge technology “Babylon”, 
https://www.babylonhealth.com/  
• AiCure, n/d, Artificial Intelligence for Continuous Patient Monitoring, “AiCure”, 
https://aicure.com/  
• Lora Kolodny, Virtual nurse app Sense.ly raises $8 million from investors including the Mayo 
Clinic, 14 February 2017, https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/14/virtual-nurse-app-sense-ly-raises-8-
million-from-investors-including-the-mayo-clinic/, See also: http://sensely.com/  
• Mustafa Suleyman, Dominic King, Independent Reviewers release first annual report on 
DeepMind Health, “Deep mind”, 5 July 2017, https://deepmind.com/blog/independent-reviewers-
annual-report-2017/  
• Ciarán Mc Mahon, What the Research Really Suggests About That Facebook Chatbot Therapist, 
“Slate”, 18 July 2017, 
• http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2017/07/18/what_research_says_about_woebot_the_fa
cebook_chatbot_therapist.html, https://www.woebot.io/  
• Paul Boutin, The 7 Best Articles on Bots for Healthcare, “Chatbots magazine”, 6 May 2017, 
https://chatbotsmagazine.com/the-7-best-articles-on-bots-for-healthcare-28abc907528e, 
https://quitxt.org/  
• Recode, Full transcript: Zipline CEO Keller Rinaudo talks life-saving drones on Too Embarrassed 
to Ask, “Recode”, 10 March 2017, https://www.recode.net/2017/3/10/14875324/transcript-
zipline-founder-keller-rinaudo-delivery-drones-too-embarrassed-to-ask, http://flyzipline.com/  
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2.7. Legal  
AI-powered applications in the sector of legal services are booming. According to the Stanford CodeX 
Legal Tech index42, there are currently more than 1000 legal startups using AI to either develop in-house 
products or offer AI-powered products on the market. It turns out that a significant amount of tasks 
traditionally performed by lawyers can be to a large extent automated, even if we are still very far from 
creating a “robo-judge” and fully automating legal reasoning. Our own research confirms this claim in 
the sister-project called “CLAUDETTE” (http://claudette.eui.eu), where we tried to automate the 
analysis of consumer contracts and privacy policies of online platforms. These developments usually 
cause distress among young lawyers – “will we also lose our jobs?”. On the other hand, we believe that 
easier access to justice is to be welcomed, given how many people, despite legal professionals’ inflation, 
still cannot afford a lawyer, and how many tasks, especially in the third sector, do not get performed at 
all (e.g. abstract control of fairness in consumer contracts). However, just as in the case of any other AI-
driven automation, there are risks we should be aware of.  
 
Sector Legal 
What is 
business using 
the AI for? 
1. Use by professional law firms: 
Systems such as Lex Machina or ROSS Intelligence are already able to retrieve relevant 
information from large sets of legal acts and case law and perform legal analytics. 
Further deployment of AI in this area could make it possible to form subjective 
interpretations and find out what a judge would likely do in the case at hand. 
2. Automated advice provided by chatbots such as DoNotPay  
What is the 
gain for 
business? 
Ad 1 – Reduces time and effort, allows lawyers to make better decisions as to which cases 
they want to take and adjust their fees accordingly 
What is the 
gain for 
consumers? 
Ad 1 – Potentially more adequate fees (adjusted to the probability of success) 
Ad 2 – Access to basic (automatic) advice without a fee or at a significantly lower fee, for 
example a chat bot can successfully appeal parking tickets 
What is the loss 
for consumers? 
Ad 1 – Growing information asymmetry between lawyers and clients, potential for abuse, 
hindered access to legal advice for people identified as unlikely to win; lower chances of 
winning the case if one cannot afford the assistance of an AI-driven law firm 
Ad 2 – Legal advice provided by a bot might turn out to be of low quality 
Third party 
effects/ 
externalities 
Potential job losses (e.g. legal clerks, paralegals) 
The risk of stabilising existing patterns of legal argumentation and jurisprudence 
Access to justice 
Other The impact largely depends on the extent of AI adoption. If AI systems were to become 
pervasive (like WestLaw or beck-online), then the problems of information asymmetry 
between lawyers and clients and access to justice could become a real issue. If, by contrast, 
                                                     
42  https://techindex.law.stanford.edu  
A. Jabłonowska, M. Kuziemski, A. M. Nowak, H.-W. Micklitz, P. Pałka, G. Sartor 
34 Department of Law Working Papers 
AI systems were adopted by certain (more powerful) law firms only, other issues would arise 
(an even stronger position of a party which can afford the assistance of a law firm relying on 
AI, for example businesses in their disputes with consumers). 
Sources/Further Readings: 
• Artificial Lawyer, The Lex Machina Story: From Start-Up to LexisNexis, “Artificial Lawyer”, 21 
March 2017, https://www.artificiallawyer.com/2017/03/21/the-lex-machina-story-from-start-up-
to-lexisnexis/, https://lexmachina.com/about/  
• Robert Ambrogi, Lex Machina Adds Analytics For A New Area Of Law: Employment Litigation, 
“LawSites”, 12 July 2017, https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2017/07/lex-machina-adds-analytics-
new-area-law-employment-litigation.html  
• Karen Turner, Meet ‘Ross,’ the newly hired legal robot, “The Washington Post”, 16 May 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/05/16/meet-ross-the-newly-hired-
legal-robot/?utm_term=.f376504c6a06  
• Danielle Muoio, A 19-year-old created a free robot lawyer that has beaten 160,000 parking 
tickets, “Business insider”, 28 June 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/joshua-browder-bot-
overturns-160000-parking-tickets-2016-6?IR=T  
• John Mannes, DoNotPay launches 1,000 new bots to help you with your legal problems, 
“Techcrunch”, 12 July 2017, https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/12/donotpay-launches-1000-new-
bots-to-help-you-with-your-legal-problems/, 
• https://donotpay-search-master.herokuapp.com/  
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3. Analysis by use: Data gathering and knowledge generation, automatic decisions, 
advertising, Personal Assistants 
The effects of the sectoral analysis presented in the previous section demonstrate that, on the one hand,  
the gravity of the risks that consumer face differs from one part of the economy to another (the risk of 
being discriminated in advertising is not comparable to the risk of having a cancer misdiagnosed). On 
the other hand, there are certain common patters one can observe. Having analyzed the empirical 
material, we have abstracted four general uses of AI by business:  
1. data gathering and knowledge generation; 
2. automated decision making; 
3. advertising and other commercial practices; 
4. digital personal assistants (or, more broadly, (ro)bots). 
Important caveat: these “uses” do not constitute a clear-cut taxonomy. On the contrary, there might be 
quite some overlap in the analysis, given that these categories belong to different orders. For example: 
an AI-powered system displaying a targeted offer with a personalized price and form of presentation to 
a consumer, and reporting back on whether the consumer clicked, is simultaneously generating 
knowledge, taking an automated decision, and advertising. Hence, one could just as well imagine 
speaking about perspectives on the use of AI by business. We believe, however, that it makes sense to 
keep these analyses separate. The normative considerations that come to one’s mind when talking about 
decisions (fair/unfair) are different from those linked to commercial practices 
(fair/misleading/aggressive etc.). This said, we will not get defensive about this distinction – on the 
contrary, we would welcome any comments and feedback.  
In this section we repeat the exercise from the previous one, i.e. study the way business uses AI and 
other algorithmic techniques, but instead of clustering uses in different sectors together, we cluster uses 
across sectors. One way to put it would be that as the previous section was based on vertical categories, 
this one is based on horizontal ones. Another way is to state that while the previous section was 
categorized by sectors, this one is categorized by uses. 
How does this categorization fit with our claim that the intersection of consumer law and AI should be 
studied cases by case, bottom-up? That’s where the big picture comes into play. Our idea is that, to 
provide an extensive map of the ways in which businesses use AI, one could have a matrix with sectors 
on one axis, and uses on another. Clearly, the challenges stemming from data gathering and knowledge 
generation in healthcare or legal sector will be different from those in “smart” grids and houses, and 
might need different responses. However, it is possible that some uses can be studied across sectors (for 
example targeted advertising), and beg for special focus only in certain sectors (e.g. pharma). Hence, 
this approach allows us on the one hand to refine the analysis from the previous section, while on the 
other hand to notice some commonalities not visible after only the vertical study. 
3.1. Data gathering and knowledge generation 
Data gathering and knowledge generation might be the most fundamental “use” of AI by business, 
serving as a foundation for reflection and potential regulation. It was the availability of big data – the 
“dataquake” – that enabled high-paced development and mass deployment of AI in the first place; data 
not necessarily actively collected, but also generated as a side product of consumer use of online 
platforms and services (Alpaydin, 2016; Cristianini, 2016). Businesses use the data they gather to create 
profiles of consumers, use these profiles to display targeted content (ads/offers/content); and both to 
predict consumer behavior. In this sense, this first use is probably the most fundamental one, enabling 
the other ones.  
Arguably, knowledge/information (a)symmetry has for long time been of interest to private and 
consumer lawyers (Akerlof, 1970). Classical economic models assumed perfect information. The 
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realization that information is not freely available to everyone equally (Coase, 1960) and – even more 
fundamentally – by nature local, dynamic and difficult to aggregate (Hayek, 1945) was one of the pillars 
on which the private law and regulation were based in the last half a century. Now, with big data and 
machine learning systems to make sense out of it, some of the most crucial assumptions are being 
challenged. 
It was data that fueled the boom in recent developments in machine learning (Alpaydin, 2016). It is 
finding patterns in this data, as well as later using these patterns (profiles) for a variety of purposes, that 
seem to be the most fundamental aspect of the whole business AI enterprise. Data became a resource, 
valuable however only because machine learning systems are able to turn it into knowledge. The 
profession of data scientist is said to be the most promising job in the US right now. The availability of 
profiles/patterns, paired with advances in behavioral sciences, are a real game changer when it comes to 
knowledge generation right now.  
All this gives rise to two general types of normative considerations. On the one hand, there are those 
that could be labeled “dignitarian”/”privacy for the sake of privacy”. These are based on the opinion 
that there are some things that companies should not know about consumers, regardless of what the 
effects of this knowledge might be. On the other hand, there are concerns that could be labeled 
“consequentialist” – concentrating on the ways in which this knowledge might be misused by 
companies, to the detriment of consumers. Both strands of the debate transpire through the existing 
scholarship, including some of the notable positions listed below. 
A robust academic position regarding the use of artificial intelligence and other algorithmic techniques 
for profiling is the book edited by Hildebrandt and Gutwirth (2008): Profiling the European citizen. It 
provides an extensive overview of technical (what is profiling, how does it work), empirical (in what 
ways different stakeholders employ it) and legal knowledge (what legal goods are at stake). Within it, 
two chapters could serve as a marvelous source of knowledge for a researcher wishing to analyze the 
use of artificial intelligence by business from the point of view of consumer law. Firstly, the chapter by 
Kamp, Körffer and Meints, dealing with the questions of customer loyalty programs and scoring. 
Consumer partaking in loyalty programs, for example using loyalty cards in a supermarket, or collecting 
miles in air-traffic, become valuable sources of data for companies, both regarding the construction of 
profiles, and the later usage of these profiles for targeted commercial communications. Moreover, the 
customer behavior is being used as a source of knowledge to be deployed in risk assessment and fraud 
prevention in, among others, financial services. The authors analyze the problem first and foremost from 
the point of view of personal data protection law (at the time Directive 95/46/EC, now the GDPR); 
though their analysis can also serve as a valuable resource for others wishing to apply different 
normative standards to the issue at hand. The second position within this edited volume that could be of 
enormous value for a consumer lawyer studying business’ use of AI, is the chapter by Anrig, Browne 
and Gasson (2008). It provides a general overview of different types of algorithms used for the creation 
of profiles and finding patterns in behavior. 
Several other interesting positions have been identified. While discussing the impact of data on digital 
markets, Kerber (2016) points out that the problems of privacy, competition and consumer protection 
cannot be separated, either analytically or for the purposes of regulation, and called for an integrated 
approach to scholarship, regulation and enforcement. The nature of digital markets is such that data will 
be used there to generate knowledge whether it is regulated or not. Since the existing legal framework 
might be insufficient, one could just as well consider the creation of new categories in this process. 
Costa-Cabral and Lynskey (2017) argue along similar lines and note that the values embedded in the 
data protection framework can be integrated into the competition policy and act as both internal and 
external constraint on competition law. Ezrachi and Stucke (2016) point to a threat of major online 
intermediaries (mega-platforms), which have access to vast sources of data, dominating the emerging 
digital markets, such as the on for personal assistants. Gal and Elkin-Koren (2017) attempt to allay these 
concerns and note the respective risk might be mitigated, among others, by the possible change of the 
“locus of data needed for the operations of algorithmic consumers from the Internet towards more 
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physical, and possibly less concentrated, loci (such as smart homes, smart cars, smart appliances, and 
smart clothes)” brought about by the Internet of Things. While this point is certainly valid, and 
experience shows that positions in the digital market can be much more fragile and elusive than they 
initially seem (Podszun and Kreifels, 2016), one can also argue that it is no longer data itself, but rather 
the ability to extract knowledge therefrom that allows key digital players to maintain their leAd This, in 
turn, requires access to advanced learning algorithms and sufficiently high computing power, which the 
new entrants may find difficult to afford. 
On a different note, Barocas and Selbst (2016), discussing the big data’s “disparate impact”, point out 
that the existing data, from which knowledge is generated, contains historical biases. This is why this 
new “knowledge” (in inverted commas, since there is a chance for it not to be true) can contain and 
reproduce biases. Draper and Turow (2017), analyze in detail how data about consumer preferences can 
be used for audience construction. This data’s bjectivity can be questioned not only because of the 
historic bias, but also as a result of its necessarily functional nature. An interesting comparative 
perspective has been offered by King and Forder (2016), who provide a survey of the approaches to 
knowledge building from the American and Australian perspective. Moving from knowledge generation 
by business for business to information provision, a very interesting analysis of the phenomena of filter 
bubbles and path dependence can be found in the piece of Desai (2015). 
Further research into this area can go either in the more theoretical direction – i.e. what constitutes 
knowledge, what does it mean to know something in the algorithmic age – or in the direction of policy 
recommendations. The latter needs to be provided case-by-case, for each type of use separately. 
However, insights from other sectors can obviously inform and inspire further research projects.  
 
 
Use type Data Gathering and Knowledge Generation 
In what way is 
business 
employing AI 
for this use? 
1. Structuring data 
2. Finding patterns in data/ creating profiles 
3. Quicker/more accurate response to the market needs 
4. Enabling other uses 
What is the 
gain for 
business? 
- Ability to base the market/strategic decisions on much deeper and finer knowledge 
- Shorter reaction spans 
- Ability to engage in targeted commercial practices/ automate decision making 
process 
- Optimization of resources’ usage 
What is the 
gain for 
consumers? 
- Potentially, goods and services better fitting consumer needs 
- Potentially lower prices 
What is the loss 
for consumers? 
- Significant intrusion into privacy 
- Growing information asymmetry between consumers and business 
- Inability to understand business’ behaviour 
- Potentially, chilling effects on consumer behaviour 
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Third party 
effects/ 
externalities 
- Higher market entry costs for businesses that do not have the knowledge/data 
- Natural data monopolies/ distortion of competition 
- Creation of new power centres (knowledge rich corporations) 
- Creation of new valuable data repositories, tempting for both governments and 
criminal groups 
Other Data has become a commodity and is de facto being treated like property, no matter how 
much private lawyers will insist it is not.  
 
Sources/Further Readings: 
• Nello Cristianini, The road to artificial intelligence: A case of data over theory, “New Scientist”, 
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg23230971-200-the-irresistible-rise-of-artificial-
intelligence/  
• Louis Columbus, Data Scientist Is the Best Job In America According Glassdoor's 2018 Rankings , 
Forbes, January 29th 2018 https://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/?toURL=https:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2018/01/29/data-scientist-is-the-best-job-in-america-
according-glassdoors-2018-
rankings/&refURL=https://www.google.it/&referrer=https://www.google.it/  
• Timothy Summers, Facebook is killing democracy with its personality profiling data, “The 
Conversation”, http://theconversation.com/facebook-is-killing-democracy-with-its-personality-
profiling-data-93611  
• Domingos, P. (2015). The Master Algorithm, Basic Books.  
3.2. Automated decision making 
While the concept of automated decision-making is commonly used in the literature, its meaning is not 
unambiguous. In a broad sense, automated decision-making can describe the very nature of IT-enabled 
algorithmic processes, which is producing outputs by means of executing a computer code (Article 29 
Working Party, 2017a; Kroll et al., 2017). Admittedly, it is the fact that the underlying data collection 
and analysis as well as the subsequent procedural steps are performed automatically (by technological 
means) – and therefore more quickly and extensively than the same could ever be done by humans – that 
lies at the heart of the challenges investigated as part of this project. According to this understanding, 
algorithmic decision-making could thus refer to 1) automated data gathering and knowledge building 
and to 2) the performance of subsequent procedural steps – encoded in an algorithm or adjusted 
autonomously by artificial agents – with a view to reaching a predetermined goal. Obviously, such a 
perception gives rise to significant overlaps with other applications of AI in consumer markets 
investigated as part of this project. Once again, we would like to argue that this is not really a problem.  
Indeed, one who embarks on the task of constructing a perfect definition of automated decision-making 
soon finds him or herself confronted with a range of difficult decisions to make. For a start, to what 
extent should one be concerned with a range of automated decisions leading to the production of a final 
output? Is it always possible to establish what the relevant final output is? And to what extent should 
one focus on whether there is a “human in the loop”? By way of illustration, in their recent report: Public 
Scrutiny of Automated Decisions, Upturn and Omidyar Network define automated decisions as 
“decisions made with the aid of systems that limit human judgment”. This strikingly anthropocentric 
notion follows the claim that “today’s automated decisions are not defined by algorithms alone. Rather, 
they emerge from automated systems that mix human judgment, conventional software, and statistical 
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models, all designed to serve human goals and purposes”. In other words, the wide empirical study 
conducted by both organizations suggests that it rarely happens that a decision would be taken solely by 
a machine. However, more recent legislative developments at the EU level, which directly engage with 
the topic of automated decision-making – particularly the General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679, 
focus on decisions taken solely by automatic means. From this it would seem that a full automation of a 
decision-making process creates specific risks with regard to the individuals concerned or, at least, 
makes the otherwise existing risks significantly more serious.  
This brings us back to the two broader categories of the challenges that the use of AI by businesses poses 
to consumers. Just as with profiling and knowledge generation, on the one hand there is the “dignitarian” 
approach. According to this approach, the mere fact that a decision about an individual is being taken 
solely (or largely) by a machine is normatively suspect and should be counteracted, regardless of what 
the substance of that decision is. On the other hand, there are more liberal positions, which would rather 
be opposed to potentially negative consequences of such automated decisions. The former is linked to 
the broader effects of automatic decision-making upon personal autonomy and dignity (addressed, 
among others, by Gal and Elkin-Koren, 2017; Brownsword, 2017; André at al., 2018 and Mik, 2016). 
The latter, by contrast, is more concerned with the possibility of erroneous, discriminatory or 
exploitative outcomes (Brauneis and Goodman, 2018; Bar-Gill, 2018; Kim, 2017a; Barocas and Selbst, 
2016; Zarsky, 2016; Vladeck, 2015; Citron and Pasquale, 2014; Schmitz, 2014). None of these 
approaches should be treated as prevailing globally. 
 There are clearly different types of automated decisions that might require different normative 
responses, depending on the matter to be automatically decided, and the legal good at stake. Some 
decisions might be those where we would like to have a human in the loop given how grave a matter at 
hand is. When it comes to sentencing, visa denial or medical treatment, we might think human dignity 
requires that an individual has to be there to decide about the fate of an individual, for purely 
deontological reasons. Naturally, consequences of unjust decisions related to matters of especially high 
legal or socio-economic gravity might be also especially grave. Not surprisingly therefore, this is also 
the area upon which the scholarship tends to focus (on the use of algorithmic techniques by employers 
and by public authorities see e.g. Kullmann, 2018; Kim, 2017b; Brauneis and Goodman, 2018; Dressel 
and Farid, 2018; Barrett, 2017; Rich, 2016). In other context, like online ads or amateur machine 
translation, we might be fine with certain decisions being taken just by machines. However, even when 
gravity is high, there are some spheres where a human cannot be kept in the loop for technical reasons 
(too quick to consult), like the decision of self-driving cars on whom to sacrifice (not to mention 
autonomous weapons – fortunately outside the realm of consumer law, for now). Then, when it comes 
to advertising or commercial practices, there might be actions too frequent to consult, as billions of 
decisions are taken daily. As always, the normative assessment should be conducted on a case-by-case 
basis.  
Interestingly, the logic behind specific rules on automated decision-making found in the General Data 
Protection Regulation reflects both of the aforementioned perspectives, even if the instrument is 
generally recognized as imperfect. Indeed, Article 13(2)(f) requires the data controller to provide the 
data subject with the information on the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, 
at the time personal data is btained (yet, notably, not at the time when the decision is reached). The data 
controller should also provide the data subject with meaningful information about the logic involved, 
the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject. Furthermore, 
pursuant to Article 22(1), the data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely 
on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or 
similarly significantly affects him or her. This right – already constrained by the “gravity” factor – is 
subject to further limitations laid down in the subsequent paragraph. These include situations where a 
decision is necessary for entering into or performance of a contract or is based on the data subject’s 
explicit consent. Even in that case, however, the GDPR obliges the data controller not to base automated 
decisions on special categories of personal data, such as data revealing racial or ethnic origin and 
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political opinions or health data (with limited exceptions), as well as to implement suitable measures to 
safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain 
human intervention on the part of the controller. The right to be informed about automated decision-
making, the right to object thereto as well as the right to obtain human intervention are all concerned 
with the deontological dimension, i.e. the automatic nature of the processing per se. Further rights 
assigned to the data subject – to express his or her point of view and to contest the decision – already 
hint at the consequential dimension, i.e. the specific decision reached. The GDPR in itself, however, 
does not provide a viable solution to this set of concerns, as observed by a number of commentators 
(Wachter et. al, 2017; Vedder and Naudts, 2017; cf. BEUC, 2018). 
To sum up, we recognize that the question whether decisions are being taken with or without human 
involvement can be an important factor to bear in mind. However, what appears even more essential for 
the understanding of challenges that automated decision-making brings to consumer markets are the 
concrete purposes for which the investigated techniques are being used. Consequently, the remaining 
part of this section as well as the subsequent ones (in more specific contexts) will focus on the use of 
software agents, including AI-powered, that automatically adjust business conduct in order to 
increase the likelihood of consumers purchasing a product or a service, or to otherwise optimize 
commercial gains of traders. Automated decision-making in that sense often results from the previous 
processes of automated data gathering and knowledge building, addressed in section 3.1. above 
(similarly Article 29 Working Party, 2017a).  
As regards the business use of automated decision-making, a distinction might be made between 
algorithmic decisions taken at a pre-contractual, contractual and post-contractual stage. The former 
encompass targeted and personalized advertisements and offers, including personalized prices (Bar-Gill, 
2018; Steppe, 2017; Ezrachi and Stucke, 2016). Algorithmic decisions taken at this stage may also result 
in the refusal to serve a specific consumer – a decision of which the effects upon the consumer may be 
particularly significant (using the GDPR’s terminology) when the lack of such access affects the 
consumer’s ability to fulfill his or her essential social needs. The decisions taken at the contractual stage 
may refer, in particular, to personalized quality (e.g. of customer service; Schmitz, 2014; cf. Bar-Gill, 
2018). This thread of the discussion is also linked to the so-called smart contracts, in which (in 
particular) contractual performance can become automated (Mik, 2017). However, both now and in the 
foreseeable future, smart contracts are not likely to be used in business-to-consumer relations to an 
extent higher than marginal. The same seems to be true for the use of algorithmic decision-making 
techniques at the post-contractual stage, particularly in dispute resolution (for a further discussion see 
Barnett and Treleaven, 2018; Larson, 2010). The focus of the present report thus remains on automated 
decisions reached before and during contractual relationships, other than smart contracts. It is also worth 
noting that in the long-term relationships, which appear to be increasingly prevalent in the digital 
economy (for smart products see: Helberger, 2016), elements associated with all contracting stages 
become interrelated. At the same time, boundaries between information and advertisement (or, as 
Helberger puts it, between “informing, nudging and outright manipulation”) become blurred (on a 
similar problem of drawing a line between health content and commercial content in the context of 
mHealth apps, see Sax et al., 2018). This is particularly true with respect to the personal digital assistants, 
which are discussed separately in section 3.4 below, following an additional section 3.3. on targeted and 
personalized advertising. As already explained, we chose to keep these discussions separate in order to 
underline the specific issues arising in these contexts, such as exerting technological influence and 
outsourcing decision-making powers.  
A challenge arising from the business use of automated decision-making upon we wish to focus here is 
the use of software agents to coordinate or personalize contractual conditions, most notably the prices 
charged to particular consumers. The issues posed by pricing algorithms are linked to price coordination, 
on the one hand, and price discrimination, on the other.  
The idea of algorithmic price coordination refers to the deployment, by different undertakings, of pricing 
algorithms, which continually monitor and adjust to each other's prices. The topic has met with a 
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particularly strong interest in the competition law literature. By way of illustration, Ezrachi and Stucke 
draw a number of scenarios – some of which they consider more problematic than others (Ezrachi and 
Stucke, 2017). The least controversial case is the one in which computers are used to directly execute 
human instructions (“the Computer as a Messenger”). At the other end of the scale are those situations 
in which the measures taken are determined autonomously by machine-learning algorithms and only the 
target – e.g. profit maximization – is being set by humans (“Digital Eye”). In this latter case a market 
outcome similar to a prohibited collusion among competitors cannot be ruled out, yet a breach of 
competition law – particularly the existence of an anticompetitive intent – might be difficult to 
demonstrate (Ezrachi and Stucke, 2017; Janka and Uhsler, 2018). At the same time, there seems to be 
no uniform view in the literature as regards the extent and severity of this issue and, therefore, also as 
regards the relevant policy implications. While certain authors believe that there is a need to reconsider 
some of the embedded assumptions of competition law (Mehra, 2015), others regard the respective 
challenges as overstated and draw attention to the use of alternative policy tools, such as consumer 
protection laws (Lindsay and McCarthy, 2017). 
Algorithmic price coordination should be distinguished from algorithmic decision-making processes 
resulting in price discrimination. In the economic theory the notion of price discrimination is associated 
with a practice of offering identical products or services to different consumers at different prices where 
such differences are not motivated by different cost structures, e.g. different costs of supply (Stigler, 
1968; Levine, 2002). The term “discrimination” used in this context thus has a different meaning than 
in anti-discrimination law, as discussed in section 1.3.3 above. With the rise of big data, businesses are 
gradually gaining the capacity to adapt prices so that virtually every individual consumer can be charged 
the maximum price he or she is willing to pay. Such a phenomenon, referred to as first-degree price 
discrimination, is perceived particularly critically by the European data protection authorities (European 
Data Protection Supervisor, 2015; Article 29 Working Party, 2013). Analyses carried out from the 
economic point of view appear to be less critical and more nuanced (Levine, 2002; Fudenberg and 
Villas-Boas, 2012; Rayna et al., 2015; Thierry et al., 2015). In this respect a particularly interesting 
contribution has been provided by Oren Bar-Gill, who investigates, with the help of an economic 
analysis, in which market conditions price discrimination may result in both consumer harm and 
efficiency losses. The author explores the phenomenon of price discrimination with much nuance and 
proposes a range of respective policy options, such as increased privacy protection and enhanced 
enforcement of the rules against misleading and aggressive advertising, along with more unorthodox 
proposals like personalized price caps and personalized disclosures (Bar-Gill, 2018; see also Porat and 
Strahilevitz, 2014; Hacker, 2017). 
Automatic decision-making leading to differences in prices charged to particular consumers may also 
go beyond price discrimination in the abovementioned understanding. This refers, in particular, to the 
markets where costs borne by the traders in connection to a transaction are heterogeneous, like in the 
case of credit or insurance. In this case, businesses have even higher incentives to invest in algorithms 
aimed to determine whether individual consumers qualify for a product or service and if so, on what 
terms the product or service should be offered to them. Even though such a differentiation may be 
considered less objectionable from the economic point of view and may even result in societal benefits 
(e.g. reduced human bias in consumer vetting), the risks posed by it for consumers cannot be 
disregarded. Indeed, many commentators point to the problems of biased datasets, erroneous or 
discriminatory categorizations as well as the risk of perpetuating inequalities and cycles of poverty 
(Schmitz, 2014; Chander, 2017; Feldman et al., 2015). The possibility of (mis)using insights about 
consumers to maximize business gains cannot be excluded either (see: Zarsky, 2016 on unfair transfer 
of wealth). The problem becomes even more significant if algorithms are based on machine learning 
and, according to the current levels of knowledge, essentially function as black boxes (Pasquale, 2015; 
Vladeck, 2016; Perel and Elkin-Koren, 2017; cf. Kroll et al. 2017, Rudin, 2014).  
Policy responses to the concerns raised by algorithmic decision-making proposed in the literature are 
remarkably diverse. More often than not several complementary measures are recommended. The 
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specific proposals range from the calls for greater transparency (Schmitz, 2014), over technological 
solutions (Kroll et al., 2017; Doshi-Velez and Kortz, 2017), to ex post review (Kim, 2017a; Perel and 
Elkin-Koren, 2017) and social policy interventions (Zarsky, 2016 on government-based loans; Barocas 
and Selbst, 2016 on algorithmic decisions being “too accurate”, i.e. exposing societal implications of 
persisting inequalities).  
 
Use type Automated Decision Making 
In what way is 
business 
employing AI 
for this use? 
1. Using AI-powered systems to partly replace humans decision makers 
2. Using AI-power systems to take into account much bigger amount of data/knowledge 
3. Automating the “mechanical” parts of the decision-making process, in order to leave 
the creative parts to humans 
What is the 
gain for 
business? 
Ad 1 Increasing the pace of the decisions: ability to take business decisions much quicker  
Ad 2 Increasing the quality of the decisions: ability to base the decisions on a much higher 
amounts of data/ much more accurate knowledge; 
Ad 3 Potentially increasing objectivity of the decisions, removing undue influence, 
emotions, human limitations etc 
What is the 
gain for 
consumers? 
Ad 1 Potentially shorter waiting times 
Ad 2 Potentially more accurate decisions 
Ad 3 Potentially more objective/unbiased decision 
What is the loss 
for consumers? 
Risk of falling into historical bias  
Inability to question the automated systems decision 
Risk of unfair decisions, unduly favouring the business’ needs 
Third party 
effects/ 
externalities 
The excluded/ historically discriminated against social groups risk deepening the exclusion 
Other There is a need to re-think the concepts of a decision, of agency 
Discussion of selected papers 
Bar-Gill, O. (2018). Algorithmic Price Discrimination: When Demand is a Function of Both 
Preferences and (Mis)perceptions. University of Chicago Law Review, Forthcoming 
The paper by Bar-Gill investigates the issue of price discrimination in the age of big data. The analysis 
is based on the understanding of price discrimination, which does not, in itself, carry a negative 
connotation and simply refers to the differentiation of prices charged by a given supplier to particular 
consumers. The reasons for such a differentiation, in particular whether or not the differences in prices 
charged can be attributed to the different costs of supply, do not appear to be decisive for the definitional 
purposes of this paper. That said, the main part of the author’s analysis is, indeed, devoted to the markets 
where sellers offer homogeneous products to heterogeneous consumers and charge personalized prices 
that correspond to each consumer’s willingness to pay (WTP). One of the key insights of the paper is 
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the understanding of the consumer’s WTP as a function of consumer preferences and (mis)perceptions. 
This finding has significant implications for the welfare effects of price discrimination, which are 
analyzed subsequently. According to the author, when algorithmic price discrimination targets 
preferences, it harms consumers but increases efficiency. On the other hand, when price discrimination 
targets misperceptions, and particularly demand-inflating misperceptions (which seems to be the most 
likely market scenario), not only the consumer welfare loss decreases, but so does the efficiency. 
According to Bar-Gill, in those circumstances legal intervention may be warranted. Among several 
policy options the author points to the increased privacy protections and enhanced enforcement of the 
rules against misleading and aggressive advertising, along with more unorthodox proposals like 
personalized price caps and personalized disclosures. 
• Problem addressed: Big data provides traders with insights not only about consumers’ 
preferences, but also about their misperceptions (cognitive biases etc.). The insights thus obtained 
can be used to establish individual consumers’ willingness to pay and charge personalized prices 
so as to maximize traders’ gains. 
• Key finding/argument: Price discrimination, which relies on both consumer preferences and 
consumer misperceptions, not only decreases consumer surplus, but also reduces efficiency. 
• Solution proposed: Policy responses could target either price discrimination or consumer 
misperceptions. The former include: direct prohibitions of price discrimination, facilitation of 
price arbitrage, improving transparency to trigger fairness-based consumer backlash, limiting 
sellers’ access to information about consumers’ willingness to pay (increasing privacy protections 
and data security) or setting personalized price caps. The latter include, in particular, more robust 
tools against unfair and deceptive practices and personalized disclosures.  
Citron, D. K., & Pasquale, F. (2014). The Scored Society: Due Process For Automated 
Predictions. Washington Law Review, 89, 1. 
The authors investigate the automated scoring systems, which have an increasing impact on crucial life 
opportunities of consumers/citizens. According to Citron and Pasquale such systems are not free from 
bias and can lead to arbitrary and discriminatory outcomes, as demonstrated by the case study of credit 
scoring. Nevertheless, methods and logic of predictive systems remains obscure (often guarded by trade 
secrets). The problem of obscurity becomes even more significant when machine-learning techniques 
are applied. The authors thus call for the integration of “cognitive perspective of AI”, by which they 
appear to understand the introduction of human values such as fairness and justice to the picture. More 
specifically they refer to the concept of “technological due process” and require that both the scoring 
algorithms themselves (“technology-driven rulemaking”) and the individual decisions taken on that 
basis (“technology-driven adjudication”) are subject to review and revision. The values of due process 
to which they refer are those of transparency, accuracy, accountability, participation and fairness.  
• Problem addressed: Automated scoring systems leading to arbitrary judgments and 
discrimination of historically subordinated groups. Broader social implications such as a widening 
gap between the privileged and disadvantaged (similarly, Schmitz, 2014). Although their influence 
is growing, algorithms cannot be meaningfully checked, among others for reasons of opacity.  
• Key finding/argument: Need for “technological due process” – procedural framework to ensure 
that the scoring algorithms and subsequent decisions are subject to review and revision. 
• Solution proposed: Individual rights available already at the stage of data gathering, access to 
data sets pertaining to specific individuals. Ideally public or, alternatively, confidential review of 
the logics of predictive scoring, including the source code (e.g. by trusted third parties). Informing 
scored individuals when their scores are communicated to subsequent decision-makers. Providing 
consumers with the tools for interactive modeling – ability to see the changes in one’s score across 
the range of hypothetical situations). Allowing consumers to challenge adverse decisions affecting 
them. Licensing and auditing requirements for scoring systems at the stage when scores are used 
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in decision-making (at least in critical settings like employment, insurance, health care). Oversight 
by regulators, notably the Federal Trade Commission (under its authority to combat unfair trade 
practices) – access to scoring systems, testing on hypothetical examples by IT experts, issuing 
impact assessments evaluating the system’s negative effects and identifying risk mitigation 
measures.  
• Related literature: Zarsky, 2014; Pasquale and Citron, 2014 (responses). 
Kim, P. T. (2017a). Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination. University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review Online, 166(1), 189. 
The author of the contribution responds to Kroll et al. (see below) by pointing to the limits of technical 
mechanisms for ensuring accountability of algorithms and arguing that auditing should remain an 
important tool to detect and counter discrimination. As a starting point, Kim observes that there is no 
consensus regarding the meaning of discrimination and that it may not be possible to satisfy the different 
definitions simultaneously. For example, the decisions made by a system that seeks to predict outcomes 
will differ depending on whether nondiscrimination is defined as 1) equalizing the proportion of correct 
negative and correct positive predictions for each group, or 2) equalizing the proportion of false positives 
or 3) false negatives across the groups. More importantly, the author notes that biased decisions may 
result not from the code or from implicit bias in the input data, but rather from the broader social 
processes. According to Kim, the use of randomization, advocated by Kroll at al., not only does little to 
remedy this situation, but can also be difficult to accept in many social contexts. By way of illustration, 
while incorporating randomness to establish which online ads are more likely to generate clicks may not 
be particularly problematic, the same cannot be said about the use of this technique to predict job 
performance, credit worthiness or recidivism (context matters). Kim furthermore takes issue with 
another strategy, discussed by Kroll et al. – the one drawn from the notion of “fairness through 
awareness” developed by Dwork et al. (2012). The author notes that it is not only exceedingly difficult 
to identify “all relevant features” which determine “how different people are” – also measuring them in 
an unbiased way might be a daunting task. Once again, the problem seems to be the one of societal 
origin and not likely to be remedied by technological tools. Consequently, Kim underlines the 
importance of ex post auditing of algorithmic decision-making processes. In her view, contrary to the 
suggestion of Kroll et al., the judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in Ricci vs. DeStefano does not 
preclude ex post correction of detected discriminatory outcomes, especially the prospective ones. On 
the whole, although Kim observes that “designing algorithms to be nondiscriminatory is by far the 
preferable practice”, the author warns against an excessive reliance on these techniques. 
• Problem addressed: Discriminatory outcomes of automated decision-making, which cannot be 
addressed by technological tools alone.  
• Key finding/argument: The sources of certain discriminatory outcomes lie in the broader societal 
processes. Technological tools discussed by Kroll at el. are not suitable to address them. The 
judgment in Ricci does not preclude ex post auditing.  
• Solution proposed: Ex post auditing should remain an important part of the framework for 
countering discrimination by algorithms.  
• Related literature: Kroll et al., 2017. 
Kroll, J. A., Barocas S., Felten E. W., Reidenberg J. R., Robinson D. G., & Yu H. (2017). 
Accountable Algorithms. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 165, 633. 
The article by Kroll et al. discusses the specific technical tools for improving the accountability of 
algorithmic decision-making. The authors underline the limits of transparency and ex post auditing and 
argue for an ex ante design of algorithms so as to ensure procedural regularity (due process) and assist 
in the achievement of substantive policy goals. Noteworthy mechanisms include techniques aimed to 
verify whether several investigated decisions were reached according to the same and previously 
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disclosed procedure (cryptographic commitments, zero-knowledge proofs) and whether random inputs 
were chosen fairly (incorporating seed values). The authors further observe that incorporating well-
designed randomness can maximize the gains from learning from experience and hence reduce the 
negative effects of past prejudice and implicit bias reflected in the input data. Several techniques for 
furthering substantive fairness, defined in various ways, are also illustrated. One of such techniques 
relies on the theoretical model of “fairness through awareness”, developed by Dwork et al. (2012), which 
requires that similar individuals have a similar chance of receiving any possible outcome. Other 
approaches are based on the concepts of “fair affirmative action”, “fair representation”, “regularization”, 
“fair synthetic data” or “interpretability” of machine learning systems (on interpretability, or the role of 
explanation, see also Doshi-Velez and Kortz, 2017). The authors then briefly discuss the impact of 
applicable US antidiscrimination law and point to the tensions posed by algorithmic decision-making to 
its foundational concepts such as disparate treatment and disparate impact. A reference is also made to 
the judgment of the US Supreme Court in Ricci v. DeStefano, which is viewed as a possible legal 
obstacle to ex post corrections of discriminatory algorithms (note, however, that a different reading of 
Ricci has been advocated by Kim, 2017a – see above). The paper concludes with recommendations 
addressed at both computer scientists and policymakers.  
• Problem addressed: A growing number of decisions are taken by technological means, yet 
accountability mechanisms have not kept up with technology. Transparency as well as ex post 
review and oversight are in themselves neither optimal, nor sufficient.  
• Key finding/argument: Technological tools exist that can improve accountability of algorithms 
by making it possible to verify, ex post, whether automated decisions comply with the legal 
standards. Tools to ensure procedural regularity are already within reach. Similar approaches can 
also increase accountability for substantive policy goals like non-discrimination.  
• Solution proposed: The discussed techniques should be implemented ex ante, at the design stage. 
Further research regarding specific tools as well as an enhanced cooperation between computer 
scientists and policymakers are necessary. Administrative agencies could become engaged in 
developing guidelines for software developers.  
• Related literature: Kim, 2017a (response); Dwork et al., 2012. 
Schmitz, A. J. (2014). Secret Consumer Scores And Segmentations: Separating “Haves” From 
“Have-Nots”. Michigan State Law Review, 1411. 
In her article, Schmitz investigates the broader societal implications of consumer scoring. The discussion 
goes beyond non-discrimination on the basis of specific characteristics, but is concerned more generally 
with the very use of predictive segmentations and scores by companies “to assess each consumer’s likely 
value to the company and to decide what offers and remedies each consumer deserves in the company’s 
assessment”. The author argues that such a differentiation in price and quality can perpetuate the cycles 
of poverty and increase power imbalance between the powerful “haves” and the disempowered “have-
nots”. The article goes on to discuss the extent to which the identified concerns are addressed by legal 
mechanisms available in the US (Fair Credit Reporting Act, Federal Trade Commission Act, Dodd-
Frank Act establishing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and federal antidiscrimination law, 
including the Equal Credit Opportunity Act). The author does not consider this framework to be 
sufficient and argues for increased privacy protections, most notably related to transparency, opting-out 
from data processing, and dispute resolution. Attention is also drawn to the role of the FTC and a call is 
made for stricter auditing and accountability of data brokers.  
Zarsky, T. (2014). Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society. Washington Law 
Review, 89, 1375. 
The article is a response to the paper by Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society (Citron 
and Pasquale, 2014; discussed before). The author concurs with their overall argument that the use of 
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algorithms for purposes of consumer scoring brings about significant societal challenges. What he is 
missing in the original contribution is a deeper scrutiny of the discrimination-based concerns associated 
with this process. To fill this gap, Zarsky offers an analysis of the notion of discrimination (in theory, 
not in law and doctrine), identifies both the opportunities and threats brought by consumer scoring and 
outlines the possible policy responses. Because this dimension of anti-discrimination law has not been 
addressed in much detail before, the subsequent discussion of Zarsky’s paper is more extensive. 
The article discusses the strength of specific fairness-related arguments, which underlie the 
discrimination-based concerns, across a variety of contexts. These arguments can be either deontological 
(discriminatory intent), or consequential (discriminatory outcome: social segregation and 
stigmatization). The most extensive discussion is devoted to discrimination against protected groups, in 
which case the rationales against discrimination appear to be most salient. In this respect the author 
distinguishes, yet again, between explicit discrimination, implicit discrimination and instances of 
disparate impact. The overall message seems to be that justifications for prohibiting discrimination are 
strongest in the former case and weakest in the latter, even though the boundaries between particular 
categories may not be easy to draw. One of the noteworthy observations is that – from the point of view 
of investigated rationales – implicit discrimination can often be equally unacceptable as the explicit one. 
Consequently, the author calls for an expansive notion of intent, which also includes certain reckless or 
negligent actions, such as the reliance on tainted tools and datasets or the use of blatant proxies. 
The author goes on to discuss the specific consequential justifications, which can be invoked against 
discrimination via disparate impact (i.e. where no discriminatory intent can be found). He begins with 
the theory of social segregation, which he considers particularly relevant in the context of credit and 
employment as the areas in which “lower ratings and scores applied to a specific group quickly translate 
into transfers of wealth and changes in social structure”. According to the author, the argument does not 
work with equal strength for other contexts such as “advertising, marketing, and perhaps insurance”. 
Here, however, the stigma-based concerns may be more serious. The specific assessment depends on 
“how visible and salient the process is in the eyes of those discriminated against, as well as other 
segments of the public”. This, in turn, is linked to the transparency of algorithmic processes and the 
gravity of the social stigma attached to a given group. 
Last but not least, the author addresses the question of algorithmic discrimination beyond protected 
groups. Here, two specific justifications are considered – the so-called negative spiral and arbitrariness-
by-algorithm. The premise of the former is that “the scoring process generates extremely negative 
outcomes to some people which are disproportionate to the actual differences among the individuals” 
and can result in a self-fulfilling prophecy. In the latter case the problematic factor is that individuals 
are judged “based on what inferences and correlations suggest they might do, rather than for things they 
have actually done”. However, after a brief discussion, Zarsky does not find these two concerns as 
serious as they initially seem. He notes that, as the negative spiral problem only affects specific 
individuals and does so almost randomly, it does not result in a group stigma and therefore the 
psychological damage is not as strong. Additionally, and more importantly (he argues), the individuals 
harmed will generally have someone to turn to for help in stopping the downward spiral as it will not 
affect everyone in their social group in an equal degree. Notably, the fact that consumers are being 
scored in general, and offered differentiated conditions of access to goods and services as a result, does 
not seem to be perceived as a discrimination-based concern of its own. As regards the second issue, 
Zarsky observes that – assuming that the scoring process is premised upon non-spurious correlations 
and the errors are random and reasonable – the fact that the resulting errors are based on correlations 
does not make it more problematic compared to the alternatives. It is worth noting that, in their response 
to Zarsky, Pasquale and Citron warn against an excessive reliance on such assumptions (Pasquale and 
Citron, 2014).  
• Problem addressed: Discrimination-based concerns related to scoring mechanisms 
• Key finding/argument: Most serious concerns relate to explicit and implicit discrimination of the 
protected groups. With respect to disparate impact a more nuanced approached is recommended. 
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In some areas, such as credit and employment, the risk of segregation can be sufficiently serious 
to call for regulatory responses. In others, such as marketing and (tentatively) insurance, the 
stigma-related arguments can be more salient, yet the overall assessment will depend on a variety 
of factors (visibility of discriminatory processes, historical context of stigmatization). As regards 
discrimination beyond protected groups, the “negative spiral” and “arbitrariness-by-algorithm” 
arguments are considered, but eventually not perceived as exceedingly problematic from the non-
discrimination perspective. The author, however, does not deny the seriousness of related 
autonomy-based concerns in his other works (Zarsky, 2016). 
• Solution proposed: Throughout the paper Zarsky puts forward several policy recommendations, 
which generally revolve around (internal and external) auditing, licensing and education. The 
benefits of automated scoring (e.g. reducing human bias and, paradoxically, the stigma-reducing 
effects of opacity) are also pointed out. The author is more hesitant about transparency and seems 
to favor its milder forms such as interactive modeling. Despite the fact that, from the policy 
perspective, the author does not find the rationale against algorithmic discrimination beyond 
protected groups to be particularly strong, he does not deny the possibility of individual harm 
being caused in this context and considers how the respective risks could be mitigated. He advises 
against a requirement to carry out ex ante causation studies to establish relevancy of all factors 
considered by the algorithm, but rather sees a potential in ensuring that independent scoring 
mechanisms are applied in different contexts and that competition between different scoring 
systems exists. Finally, in his view, the government could be required to ensure that scoring 
mechanisms do not prevent individuals from fulfilling their essential social needs, such as 
healthcare. A similar argument is made in a later paper by the same author with respect to credit, 
where the idea of secure government-based loans and subsidies is advanced (Zarsky, 2016).
  
• Note that the paper proceeds from the assumption that the scores are premised upon individuals’ 
previous behavior, rely on non-spurious correlations and are followed through diligently. The 
author’s reliance on these assumptions may be subject to criticism (Pasquale and Citron, 2014); it 
shows, nevertheless, that the literature considers the elements related to the design and execution 
of algorithms important. To ensure such baseline conditions (e.g. procedural regularity) 
technological solutions, such as those advocated by Kroll et al. could be considered (Kroll et al., 
2016; discussed above). 
• Related literature: Citron and Pasquale, 2014; Pasquale and Citron, 2014. 
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Online sources and further readings: 
• Omidyar Network, Public Scrutiny of Automated Decisions: Early Lessons and Emerging 
Methods, 27th February 2018, https://www.omidyar.com/insights/public-scrutiny-automated-
decisions-early-lessons-and-emerging-methods  
• Working Party Article 29, Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling for 
the purposes of Regulation 2016/679 (wp251rev.01), 13th February 2018, 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=612053  
• MIT Moral Machine Game http://moralmachine.mit.edu/  
• Tim Sandle, Bankers says AI will be your newest coworker, “Digital Journal”, April 20th 2018, 
http://www.digitaljournal.com/business/bankers-says-ai-will-be-your-newest-
coworker/article/520324  
• O’Neill, C. (2016). Weapons of math destruction. How Big Data Increases Inequality and 
Threatens Democracy. Broadway Books. 
3.3. Advertising and other commercial practices 
If knowledge generation is the basis for all other uses, and automated decision making is in one way or 
another the nature of each use of AI by business, then targeted and personalized advertising is the 
party that seems nowadays best prepared, and where everyone wants to be. Having the ability to reach 
exactly the consumers who might purchase the product, in a way that they will find most convincing, is 
a dream come true for businesses. Big data-fueled algorithmic applications allow traders to develop 
better and more effective ads, by figuring out what consumers best respond to. Some consumers might 
be happy with this as well – but the risks of manipulation, aggressive advertising and discrimination are 
real.  
Indeed, according to the performed market analysis and the literature overview, software agents are 
increasingly being used by businesses to exert technological influence upon consumers with the aim of 
steering them towards specific products or services. Such influence can be exerted whenever a consumer 
uses a connected device – be it a laptop, a smartphone, a fitness band or a smart speaker – and is closely 
linked to the concept of personalization. 
Personalization in this context can be understood as a tailored display of information (Mik, 2016), made 
possible by extensive data gathering and knowledge building. Initially, the term “personalization” has 
been used as a slight overstatement, perhaps a marketing slogan in itself. Indeed, a marketing experience 
can hardly be described as “personal” if it consist in the matching of (pre-formulated) commercial 
messages to consumers identified as more likely to respond to these messages based on several segments 
(profiles) to which they were assigned. The more recent developments in data collection and analysis 
have, nevertheless, made it possible to optimize ad exposure to a much higher degree. The development 
is presented to consumers as a source of an added value – after all, the advances in microtargeting 
increase the relevance of commercial messages addressed to them. Unsurprisingly, however, concerns 
about consumers’ wellbeing are also voiced (Mik, 2016; Calo, 2014).   
Two factors are particularly important for this context: 1) the intransparent, diverse and potentially 
highly persuasive nature of the different “nudges” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009), deployed by commercial 
actors in the digital sphere (e.g. ranging from the order of search results to the specific commercial 
messages addressing a consumer) and 2) the novel kind of information asymmetries arising between 
suppliers and consumers (see also section 1.3.1 above). Of course, the very fact that consumer decisions 
are being influenced by advertisers, who resort to a wide variety of techniques, is in itself nothing new. 
Both in the online and in the offline world “advertising”, in the strict sense of the word, is by far not the 
only tool of exerting influence on consumer decisions (take the example of the layout of a supermarket 
and the order of the search results). It has been argued, nevertheless, that the methods of “choice 
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architecture” deployed by businesses online can be radically more effective compared to their offline 
counterparts. As noted by Mik, the scale, variety and effectiveness of the technology-enabled influence 
are not comparable to any marketing strategies known from the offline world. In her view, it is especially 
the “combined, mutually-enforcing effect of multiple technologies” that raises questions about the 
“legally permissible levels of transactional exploitation” (Mik, 2016). Along similar lines, Calo warns 
against the threats of “digital market manipulation” (Calo, 2014).  
Indeed, the analytical and predictive techniques that can nowadays be applied to create granular pictures 
of particular consumers and interact with them provide the traders with the different, more powerful 
tools of exerting influence (also referred to in the literature as “hypernudges”; Yeung, 2017). Most 
notably, the insights obtained about consumers are no longer limited to their established or inferred traits 
and preferences, but also include their (mis)perceptions and vulnerabilities, such as psychological and 
physiological states (Bar-Gill, 2018; Helberger, 2016; Mik, 2016). With further advances in big data 
analytics and the growing uptake of the Internet of Things, the accuracy of insights obtained about 
particular consumers is bound to increase even more. This suggests that the transformation brought 
about by the digital technology is not merely a one of degree. Although the knowledge that digital 
businesses possess about consumers is still largely based on correlations and segmentations (the latter 
becoming more accurate and granular), arguably, a substantive change is also taking place. A growing 
number of reports focus on businesses’ ability to obtain genuinely individual insights about particular 
consumers (a phenomenon which is sometimes described as individualization43 or extreme 
personalization44). This allows not only for a more effective decision-making regarding exposure to 
commercial communications, but also the creation of advertisements and products tailored to specific 
consumers, with all the related concerns discussed before.  
 
Use type Advertising and Other Commercial Practices 
In what way is 
business 
employing AI 
for this use? 
1. Ads creation: testing how well particular groups of consumers respond to different 
types of commercials; improving the effectiveness of different types of 
communication 
2. Ads delivery: Displaying ads to those who have the highest probability of clicking/ 
purchasing the product/ service 
3. Targeted offers: fine-tuning the characteristics/price of a product/service to the needs 
of a given category of consumers, or even a particular consumer 
What is the 
gain for 
business? 
Ad 1 More effective content of ads 
Ad 2 More effective distribution of ads 
Ad 3 Higher chance of concluding a transaction 
What is the 
gain for 
consumers? 
Potentially more relevant content displayed 
Potentially lower transaction/search costs 
                                                     
43  https://www.targetmarketingmag.com/article/individualization-new-personalization-content-marketing-resolution-
2018/all/  
44  https://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolis/2017/11/30/extreme-personalization-is-the-new-personalization-how-to-use-ai-to-
personalize-consumer-engagement/#51ee3dc9829a  
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What is the loss 
for consumers? 
Risk of aggressive advertising (exploiting consumers’ vulnerabilities) 
Risk of discrimination in advertising  
Risk of seeing only the content falling into historically revealed preferences (risk of missing 
out) 
Third party 
effects/ 
externalities 
Growing dependence on targeted ad delivery providers 
 
Other The distinction between an advertisement and an offer, an add and a contract, is getting 
more and more blurred. A more in-depth typology of commercial practices, as they currently 
are, might be needed 
Discussion of selected papers 
Draper, N. A., & Turow J. (2017). Audience Constructions, Reputations, and Emerging Media 
Technologies: New Issues of Legal and Social Policy. In: R. Brownsword, E. Scotford & K. 
Yeung (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology. Oxford University 
Press. 
Draper and Turow argue that the phenomenon of audience construction in advertising – the will to reach 
a particular category of consumers by advertisers – is nothing new and can be traced all the way back to 
different media, including television, radio and press. Advertisers always tried to differentiate who sees 
what commercial communication by, among others, choosing to place ads for women/men/children in 
magazines culturally associated with this audience; and used to deploy the categories currently 
informing different “profiles” long before the age of AI. What has changed now is the scale on which 
this can be done, both regarding the amount of audiences (much finer profiling), and accuracy of actually 
reaching them. For the purposes of this project, what matters is that: profiling is not a new phenomenon, 
on the contrary – it is a natural consequence of how marketing has always functioned. Maybe involving 
marketing experts in research projects regarding consumer law and ads is a good idea? 
Helberger, N. (2016). Profiling and Targeting Consumers in the Internet of Things – A New 
Challenge for Consumer Law. In: R. Schulze & D. Staudenmayer (Eds.), Digital Revolution: 
Challenges for Contract Law in Practice. Nomos. 
The author discusses the challenges associated with profiling and targeting against the background of 
European consumer law. Most notably, Helberger attempts to link the observed increase in the role 
played by collection and use of data with consumer protection concepts and provisions such as those 
related to consumer information and fairness in commercial transactions. According to the author,  there 
is already an obligation on the part of the traders to inform consumers about the use of tracking 
techniques and personalized communications under the existing consumer law (Directive 2011/83/EU 
on consumer rights). As regards the problems of automated decision-making, the author considers that 
this could be regarded as an indicator of contractual unfairness – where the sharing of data “has the 
potential to lead to consumer detriment, algorithmic discrimination or other forms of unfavourable 
decision-making”. The same could also be true, in her view, for certain forms of “nudging” or 
personalized advertising, especially when consumer choice is limited due to trader’s monopoly or when 
the consumer is particularly weak. The source of one of such weaknesses Helberger sees in the 
consumer’s susceptibility to the “digital market manipulation” (Calo, 2014). The subsequent part of the 
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chapter discusses the idea of digital market manipulation in more detail and points to the potential of 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive in countering its negative effects. 
• Problem addressed: The challenges of profiling and targeting which affect not only privacy and 
data protection, but also the protection of contractual fairness, adequate information and 
autonomous and free consumer choices. 
• Key finding/argument: Consumer law, and in particular Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, 
can be treated as a point of departure for the conceptualization of fairer marketing practices in the 
digital age (here, particularly, in the Internet of Things). In playing this role, the unfair commercial 
practices law can complement the data protection framework.  
• Solution proposed: Further elaboration of the UCPD notions. 
Online sources and further readings: 
• Julia Carrie Wong, 'It might work too well': the dark art of political advertising online, “The 
Guardian”, March 19th 2018, 
• https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/19/facebook-political-ads-social-media-
history-online-democracy   
• Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, 2013, https://arxiv.org/abs/1301.6822  
• Daniel Fagella, Artificial Intelligence in Marketing and Advertising – 5 Examples of Real 
Traction, “techemergence”, January 17th 2018, https://www.techemergence.com/artificial-
intelligence-in-marketing-and-advertising-5-examples-of-real-traction/  
• Alex Hern, Can we really trust Google as judge, jury and executioner of online ads?, “the 
Guardian, February 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/feb/15/google-chrome-
adblocking-online-ads  
3.4. Personal Assistants (“Algorithmic Consumers”, “Cyber-Butlers”) 
On May 8th 2018 Google demonstrated the new capabilities of the Google Assistant, which (who?) can 
now make phone calls on behalf of a user, in order to book a reservation at any small business, like a 
restaurant or a hairdresser’s. What thrilled the audience and perplexed many commentators was not only 
the Assistant’s impressive ability to achieve its task in the light of unpredictable responses of a human 
interlocutor, but most of all how closely it imitated the human way of speaking. With reactions like “um” 
or “mhm”, voice modulation and pauses, it was close-to-impossible to tell that the phone call was being 
held by a machine. Quickly labelled “deceitful AI”, the technology’s new capabilities gave rise to 
questions about whether a robot should always disclose its robotic identity, and whether we are getting 
close to passing the Turing test.  
The debate is by no means new, though. Personal digital assistants, coming under the labels of “cyber-
butlers” (Brownsword 2017), “algorithmic consumers” and others, have been attracting the attention of 
scholars and media for quite a while now. Apple’s Siri, Google’s Assistant and Amazon’s Echo feature 
in countless articles and videos online, ranging from voices full of praise, to those filled with concerns. 
The most advanced, commercially available personal assistants are currently based on automatic speech 
recognition, natural language understanding and text-to-speech technologies. Agents of this kind can be 
used to “voice-control one’s world”, for example to make and handle phone calls (e.g. to make an 
appointment), place orders in online stores, manage one’s agenda, play music, check traffic or weather 
conditions, read the news, control one’s smart home, etc. They are available on a variety of mobile and 
smart home devices, such as smartphones and smart speakers. Other, usually text-based agents 
(chatbots) can also be accessed via messaging applications such as Facebook Messenger or WeChat.  
On the one hand, commentators underline that these devices – existing also as a part of the Internet of 
Things, connected to one another and initiating communication – make consumers’ lives significantly 
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easier. They allow them to make purchases, retrieve information, make their homes smarter etc. without 
much effort. Some of the functions performed by digital assistants are, in themselves, a response to 
challenges created by technology. One of such examples is the use of personal assistants to make 
recommendations, which allows consumers to navigate through the exponentially growing data volumes 
(software agents are able to dramatically reduce search costs). Attention can further be drawn to the idea 
of “algorithmic buying groups” (Gal and Elkin-Koren, 2017), which can, at least theoretically, be formed 
on the demand side not only to negotiate better conditions, but also to reduce privacy- and 
discrimination-based concerns associated with knowledge building and automated decision-making, as 
discussed in previous sections of this report. A similar idea is also reflected in less advanced solutions 
such as credit report products, which have long been available on the market. Products of this kind offer 
consumers access to their own credit history and score, and provide advice that can be used to improve 
one’s score and minimize interest rates (Langely, 2014). It is not entirely unthinkable that, in a not-too-
distant future, advice of this kind could be provided by artificial agents (also referred to as “robo-
advisors”; see Lightbourne, 2017).  
At the same time, virtual assistants also pose a number of economic and non-economic risks for 
consumers. Some of them are rather anecdotal (and, in the literature, usually discussed by contract 
lawyers), such as the risk of transactions performed as a result of machine errors or compliance with a 
child’s request. Other, like those related to unauthorized access by third parties and systems’ critical 
failures (security-related concerns), constitute crosscutting risks associated not only with algorithmic 
consumers, but with software agents in general. Naturally, in both contexts, the degree of harm suffered 
by consumers will depend according to the context (the harm caused by a breach to consumer’s smart 
home may be more serious compared to a situation when third party manipulation affects the content of 
displayed ads). 
More importantly, personal assistants allow their suppliers to gain access to and understanding of a vast 
amount of consumer data. This is due to the personal assistants’ ability to “hear everything”, since their 
microphones and other input devices are always “on”. The fact that they often communicate with smart 
home (data from physical sensors) and smartphone (data from virtual sensors) exacerbates the problem. 
This results in privacy-related concerns of an unprecedented degree as well as in the equally significant 
risks of consumer cognitive limitations and vulnerabilities being exploited for economic gain. The latter 
is particularly true when artificial agents represent a variety of different interests at the same time, of 
which consumers are not aware. By way of illustration, if artificial agents are deployed by businesses 
within their internal structures, consumers should generally be aware of the need to evaluate their 
operations critically. This can be the case, inter alia, for chatbots used to facilitate customer service or 
the more advanced internal robo-advisors, particularly if active in the sectors where they cannot be 
expected to act as fiduciaries. In these situations the impact of digital assistants on consumers’ decision-
making capacities might not be a prime concern (other issues may, in turn, become more salient, like 
the consumer’s ability to effectively communicate with the company and bring his or her claims). The 
same, however, is not necessarily the case for intelligent assistants provided in the remaining contexts 
mentioned above, including in the most relevant case of personal assistants provided by companies like 
Google or Amazon. These products are, nevertheless, far from the idea of a “virtuous assistant”, in which 
consumers’ interests are prioritized by default. Instead, they rather involve an ambiguous and opaque 
network of interests, which puts further strain on the already fragile boundary between advertisement 
and information. Following Baldwin, the initial question asked here is whether the context in which 
consumers’ decision is subject to an external influence is manageable (Baldwin, 2014). Where such an 
influence is not perceived, consumers’ ability to neutralize its effects becomes limited, which, in turn, 
poses a risk to his or her freedom of choice. 
A related challenge concerns the potential decrease of the range of options effectively available to 
consumers. This results not from the economic calculations mentioned above, but from purely technical 
and unintended factors, such an inability of an algorithm to detect certain nuances in the consumer 
profile or the incorrect assumptions having been made and reproduced. The risks voiced in this regard 
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concern: a) monopolization/de-neutralization of distribution channels in consumer markets (designing 
purchasing systems in a way that makes them prefer the products offered by the same corporate group, 
or “trusted”, i.e. paying, partners); b) lower quality of products/services, or c) a mismatch between 
consumers’ actual and revealed/inferred preferences. 
Yet another point related to consumers’ autonomy refers to the very basic idea of outsourcing decision-
making powers to artificial agents. Admittedly, one could argue that this dimension of digital assistants 
is not problematic from the perspective of autonomy and dignity, as the original autonomous decision 
to rely upon such an agent can be attributed to the consumer. This is, nevertheless, only half of the story. 
The argument is illustratively described by Brownsword: 
At first blush, the use of such PDAs [personal digital assistants] might seem to be unproblematic. If 
Diana chooses to rely on her PDA, how does this challenge human dignity? However, if it turns out 
that Diana’s freedom to use her PDA is more apparent than real, her ‘consent’ might not be adequate 
to authorise the kind of exploitation of her personal data that might trouble advocates of HD2a [the 
rights-based conception of human dignity]. (Brownsword, 2017) 
Arguably, this part of Brownsword’s analysis can equally be applied to the discussion of “private 
autonomy” in the civil law understanding. Here, a question may indeed be asked about which conditions 
must be fulfilled for a consumer’s representation to become legally binding. Moreover, when the 
subsequent decisions of the PDA exploit the consumer’s cognitive limitations and behavioral biases, a 
broader normative assessment might be required of the “legally permissible levels of transactional 
exploitation” of a systemic nature (see also Mik, 2016).  
The dignity-based concerns discussed by Brownsword do not stop here, however. As further argued by 
the author: 
More importantly, we need to take a harder look at the way in which Diana relies on her PDA. In 
particular, what if Diana comes to rely on her PDA to analyse her moral dilemmas and determine 
how she should act? For those who belong to an aspirant moral community, it is axiomatic that each 
agent should develop a sense of what it is to do the right thing for the right reason, and try always 
to do just that. Human dignity involves more than merely acting in line with the right thing; the 
paradigmatic expression of the dignity of humans is in doing what an agent judges to be the right 
thing even where there is an opportunity to do the wrong thing. (Brownsword, 2017) 
The autonomy and dignity-based concerns thus do not appear to be less pronounced when personal 
assistants are employed by consumers to perform different tasks, compared to a situation in which a 
consumer is clearly an object of an automated decision. As a matter of fact, the contrary can be true. 
This is particularly the case when the market for PDAs becomes dominated by a limited number of mega 
platforms, which further a number of interests that cannot be aligned. 
It is therefore not surprising that the existing literature focuses on the role of such mega platforms in the 
emerging markets for digital assistants. The prospects flowing from this assessment are rather bleak. 
According to Stucke and Ezrachi (2017), at least three key elements bode in favor of such mega-
platforms taking over the personal assistant’s market and keeping its main determinants unaffected: data, 
network effects, and the scope of platform's services (or else “tying free services with algorithmic 
consumer functions which build upon economies of scale, scope and speed” as noted by Gal and Elkin-
Koren, 2016). This poses a risk to consumer welfare, for example when there is a significant mismatch 
between consumer purchases and consumer preferences. Along with the aforementioned considerations 
of imperceptible influences, the described situation leads to an intuitive call for more transparency. 
However, consumers’ inability to assess the extent to which the respective risks may materialize would 
likely not be overcome by traditional rules on mandated disclosure. When trying to understand the 
choices made by algorithms after being provided with relevant information, consumers would continue 
to face the very same cognitive problems as the ones that algorithms seek to counteract in the first place 
(Gal and Elkin-Koren, 2017). Similar factors are also believed to prevent consumers from switching, 
even if competing and more privacy-friendly products are available (as illustrated by the market of 
search engines; Stucke and Ezrachi, 2017). On top of this, new cognitive biases are also, arguably, being 
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created – or amplified – by the digital transformation itself. An example of this could be the perceived 
tendency to take authenticity of digital data for granted, as evidenced by the alarming expansion of fake 
news.  
 
Use type Digital Personal Assistants 
In what way is 
business 
employing AI 
for this use? 
1. Sales of digital assistants themselves (selling products) 
2. Enabling “smart solutions” in  the environment of consumers 
3. Collecting information about the preferences and habits of consumers 
4. Facilitating communications with consumers through chatbots 
5. Means of advertising/suggestions  
6. Delivery of requested and/or targeted content/goods and services 
What is the 
gain for 
business? 
Ad 1/2 Direct profit 
Ad 3 Source of data about consumers preferences and behaviours 
Ad 4 Faster and cheaper communication 
Ad 5/6 Additional channels for (personalized) commercial practices 
What is the 
gain for 
consumers? 
Ad 2 More convenient home solutions 
Ad 4 Potentially easier and faster communication with businesses 
Ad 5/6 Easier access to content, goods and services 
What is the loss 
for consumers? 
Ad 1/5/6 Growing dependence on the digital personal assistants 
Ad 2 Security risks in case of hacking and/or systems’ failure 
Ad 3 Privacy concerns, both dignitarian (businesses know more and more about consumers, 
including sensitive data) and consequentialist (risk of discrimination, aggressive commercial 
practices) 
Ad 4 Potentially lower quality of information/more difficult communication 
Ad 5 Potentially discriminatory/aggressive/otherwise exploitative content 
Ad 5/6 Decrease in the autonomy and freedom of choice of consumers 
Third party 
effects/ 
externalities 
Potential job losses (salespersons, call persons) 
Risks of unfair competition for SMEs 
Higher threshold of market entry 
Other The general philosophical question one faces here is the choice between freedom and 
privacy on the one hand, and convenience and efficiency on the other 
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Discussion of selected papers 
Gal, M. S., & Elkin-Koren, N. (2017). Algorithmic Consumers. Harvard Journal of Law & 
Technology, 30(2), 309. 
The article investigates the impact of algorithmic consumers, i.e. digital agents designed to facilitate or 
handle commercial transactions for consumers. It presents both benefits and challenges of algorithmic 
consumers. Overall, it appears to place more emphasis on the benefits and focuses on the role of antitrust 
law in that regard. 
Problem addressed 
At the individual level, the identified problems include: the possible reduction of consumers’ autonomy 
and choice as well as an increased vulnerability to certain consumer harms caused by unauthorized 
access and manipulation. The authors also refer to the broader societal implications, such as the potential 
loss of social interactions and the growth of inequality between designers/owners on the one hand, and 
consumers/suppliers on the other. They note, at the same time, that the deployment of algorithmic 
techniques by consumers can also affect these factors in a positive way. Most notably, as noted by the 
authors, algorithmic consumers are capable of significantly enhancing consumer choice. They can also 
make consumers less vulnerable to some risks. For example, the fact that algorithms are immune to bias 
can render targeted online advertising less relevant (which, in itself, can be considered both as a merit 
and a flaw). Furthermore, the operation of “algorithmic buying groups” can reduce the risks related to 
privacy and discrimination. 
Key finding/argument 
At the market level, the deployment of algorithmic techniques by consumers can lead to a possible 
increase in consumer welfare, lowering the costs and providing better quality. However, the extent of 
this increase will depend on several factors, most notably the market power of the algorithm providers, 
relative to (a) suppliers (stronger algorithms provide stronger incentives to compete on the merits), (b) 
consumers (possibly less value passed on to consumers if the market power of algorithm providers is 
strong), (c) competing algorithm providers. The competitive pressure placed upon algorithm providers 
depends, in particular, on entry barriers to algorithmic markets as well as, to some extent, on the 
consumers’ ability to compare competing algorithms. The main identified barriers to entry include: 
access to data (input market), access to consumers (output market) and exclusionary conduct (excluding 
competitors – e.g. by entering into exclusive dealings contracts with suppliers or excluding suppliers by 
choosing not to buy from them).  
Solution proposed 
The solutions proposed focus on the regulatory tools addressing the potential entry barriers into 
algorithmic consumer markets. The perspective is thus significantly different from that of the present 
project. Some links can, nevertheless, be established. 
Attention should be drawn, in particular, to the solutions related to “reducing barriers to consumer 
access” (understood as access to consumers). These barriers may arise from many factors, including 
imperfect information on the part of consumers. If the consumer’s information is limited, then the 
consumer is less likely to switch providers. Consequently, it seems that the tools aimed to enhance 
consumer decision-making capacities can also be conceptualized as aimed at the reduction of the 
competitive barrier to consumer access (note that this point is not made by the authors). 
In this regard, the authors note that the tools mitigating this barrier can either be provided by the market 
(e.g. comparison firms) or have a regulatory nature. As regards the latter, instruments mentioned by Gal 
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and Elkin-Koren include the laws prohibiting misleading information and the laws requiring 
transparency about some product features. However, these elements are not discussed in more detail 
(“In this regard algorithms are no different from other products [except for the black box effect]” – there 
is no discussion of the black box, however). This is probably because the authors prefer to focus on what 
they perceive to be a more significant barrier, namely the access to consumers via intermediaries (mega 
platforms like Google, Apple, Facebook, which are also most likely to develop algorithmic consumers). 
The scholars subsequently attempt to tackle this concern from the antitrust angle, but eventually 
acknowledge the limits of the (US) antitrust law as it currently stands. Therefore, the challenge regarding 
the “erection of entry barriers that arise from the tying of free services with algorithmic consumer 
functions which build upon economies of scale, scope and speed” remains. 
With respect to access to data, the role of antitrust law is again discussed and its limitations are similarly 
acknowledged. According to the authors, these barriers can, to some extent, be reduced by the 
market – for example when data sources alternative to mega platforms are offered by the IoT. Other 
complementary tools, briefly addressed in the paper, could encompass the rules on data portability and 
interoperability. 
Finally, an aspect, which the paper addresses in most detail, relates to “exclusionary conduct”. The focus 
once again remains on the role of antitrust law, about which, by contrast, the authors appear to be more 
optimistic. More specific solutions within this domain are also offered (e.g. how to assess whether 
parallel conduct amounts to an agreement, how to assess which agreements are anticompetitive, what is 
an anticompetitive intent). 
Online sources and further readings: 
• Chris Welsh, Google just gave a stunning demo of Assistant making an actual phone call, “The 
Verge”, 8th May 2018, https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/8/17332070/google-assistant-makes-
phone-call-demo-duplex-io-2018  
• Alex Cranz, Google Assistant Impersonating a Human Is Scary as Hell to Me, “Gizmondo”, 9th 
May 2018, http://www.gizmodo.co.uk/2018/05/uhh-google-assistant-impersonating-a-human-is-
scary-as-hell-to-me/  
• Alex Harn, Google's 'deceitful' AI assistant to identify itself as a robot during calls, “The 
Guardian”, 11th May 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/may/11/google-
duplex-ai-identify-itself-as-robot-during-calls  
• Lance Ulanoff, Did Google Duplex just pass the Turing Test?, Medium.com, 8th May 2018, 
https://medium.com/@LanceUlanoff/did-google-duplex-just-pass-the-turing-test-ffcfe6868b02  
• Adam Dechis, The Seven Best Things You Can Do With an Amazon Echo, “Life Hacker”, 30th 
March 2016 https://lifehacker.com/the-seven-best-things-you-can-do-with-an-amazon-echo-
1766989219  
• Rory Carroll, Goodbye privacy, hello 'Alexa': Amazon Echo, the home robot who hears it all, “The 
Guardian”, 21st November 2015 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/nov/21/amazon-
echo-alexa-home-robot-privacy-cloud  
• Lily Hay Newman, Turning an Echo into a spy device only took some clever coding, “Wired”, 
https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-echo-alexa-skill-spying/   
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4. Time for Phase Two: Further questions in place of conclusions 
The very aim and ambition of this project have been to pave the way for the next stage of 
interdisciplinary research. We departed from the premise that there is not one AI problem, and there 
will be not one solution to challenges posed by AI. On the contrary, the response will be different across 
the sectors, both regarding the substance and form of the potential regulatory response. In the previous 
sections of this report we have provided an overview of the ways in which businesses employ artificial 
intelligence in relations with consumers, as well as analyzed what the risks and the gains are for whom, 
stemming from that use. We have gathered empirical material and reviewed the relevant scholarly 
literature in order to shed more light on the respective risks and gains for consumers and evaluate them 
through the lens of consumer law principles. Now, it is time to ponder what to do about all this. 
The research undertaken throughout this project was supposed to serve as a starting point for the further 
analysis in the concrete, interdisciplinary research environments. We hope that it can serve as a valuable 
source of inspiration, knowledge and orientation for scholars interested in pursuing this path further. In 
this section we present 25 research questions, in a seed form. We believe that every single one of them 
is important and must be addressed not only by lawyers, but by interdisciplinary teams comprising 
engineers, data scientists, normative scientists, and governance experts. Only in a mutual dialogue will 
we be able to move forward. We group the questions into four categories: 1) Normative (what should 
be the goals we strive for?); 2) Technological (how is it technologically possible to achieve these goals?); 
3) Governance (how should the relevant legal frameworks and the broader incentives systems be 
designed) and 4) Theoretical. As we claim, all of them, all of the types, should be pondered 
jointly – feasibility (technical and political) influences the choice of goals, the formulation of goals 
influences the range of possible means. However, we believe there is a value in presenting them 
separately.  
4.1. Normative questions (goals) 
Question 1: Should there be limits to price discrimination in consumer retail markets? If so, 
what limits: type of good/service, type of criteria? 
With targeted communication based on profiling and individual data, businesses are able to offer the 
same goods and services for different prices to different customers on a mass scale. As of now, “price 
discrimination” is not forbidden by EU consumer law45. Even more, one could argue that the ability to 
offer different prices is one of the foundations of the market economy, based on bargaining, individual 
profit seeking and negotiations. On the other hand, the standard practice in consumer retail markets, 
with which in mind consumer law had originally been developed, has been such that everyone pays the 
same price for the same publically offered goods and services. If a millionaire and a beggar walk into 
McDonald’s, they will both pay $1 for their cheeseburger. Everyone pays the same price in a 
supermarket, displayed on the product/shelf. Did this practice already give rise to a legal standard? The 
reason for that practice is not businesses’ egalitarian mindset, it is (was) just the cheapest to offer the 
same retail price to everyone who walks in, without engaging in negotiations with everyone. Now, with 
targeted offers on publically available websites (and, at some point, possibly also retail stores), based 
on profiles and individual data, quickly computed by robust machines, every consumer can be displayed 
a price corresponding to what the system assumes is the highest number that they are willing to pay. A 
student from a poor country can see a lower price for a flight than a professor from a rich country.  
Maybe this is even desirable? Could price discrimination be to the benefit of consumers, when the poor 
pay less and the rich pay more? Or maybe there is a risk that price discrimination will actually make the 
                                                     
45  See e.g. European Commission, Guidance on the Implementation/Application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair 
Commercial Practices, SWD(2016) 163 final, p. 134. 
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poor pay even more? What if the businesses rely not only on consumers’ willingness to pay, but also on 
their misperceptions (vulnerabilities, cognitive biases) or personal characteristics (e.g. race, age, gender) 
in setting respective prices? Is it problematic that prices are set and disclosed bilaterally and cannot 
easily be compared (“do we still have a market”)? Should price discrimination be 
encouraged/discouraged or controlled in specific markets or sectors, e.g. when the goods are (not) easily 
substitutable or with universal services (water, electricity, different media)? Should scoring and 
algorithmic decision-making in cases of credit etc., when costs borne by traders are heterogeneous, be 
treated differently from products with homogenous costs of supply? Should we rethink the notion of 
substitutability? Could the principle of weaker party protection justify a more hands-on policy on 
personalized pricing – especially if we conclude that the principle assumes particular importance in the 
digital age, due to the new and unprecedented asymmetries between traders and consumers? What about 
the principle of regulated autonomy and the consumer’s freedom to choose as one of its main 
components? Is there a risk that consumers will get “stuck” in their profiles? Could personalized quality 
be the next big question? 
Recommended readings:  
Bar-Gill, O. (2018). Algorithmic Price Discrimination: When Demand is a Function of Both Preferences 
and (Mis)perceptions. University of Chicago Law Review, Forthcoming 
Question 2: Should discrimination in consumer markets be forbidden? If so, under what 
conditions and what does it mean for algorithms? 
In the EU there is a body of laws that prohibit discrimination in access to good and services. However, 
as for now, one cannot speak of a comprehensive set of rules and even when such rules exist the logic 
behind them is not always consistent. Some of them appear to be more concerned with the internal 
market building, while others seem to focus on the protection of persons with specific characteristics 
such as racial or ethnic origin, gender or sexual orientation from a negative socio-economic impact 
(segregation, stigmatization). A question then becomes warranted: can we agree whether discrimination 
in access to goods and services should be prohibited and, if so, based on what kind of rationale? Practice 
shows that a normative assessment can be difficult to make even in the most clear-cut cases of different 
treatment on the basis of concrete personal characteristics, e.g. when a gay couple is denied a wedding 
cake. However, the question only becomes more complicated as one goes deeper. For example, scholars 
have long pondered upon the complex questions of affirmative action and intersectionality. It might be 
desirable to take certain protected characteristics into account to right the wrongs of the past or prevent 
the negative consequences from occurring. And what if a combination of different characteristics creates 
a cumulative disadvantage? Should the law provide additional responses and, if so, what should be the 
respective parameters and goals? What about economic factors – are they entirely irrelevant for this 
debate? Now add algorithms to the equation, as already hinted at in Question 1. Is it problematic if the 
factors that software agents take into account in producing their outcomes (e.g. deciding on consumer’s 
eligibility for the product and/or presenting an offer) include personal characteristics like ethnic origin 
or gender? If so, is it problematic per se or only when the negative outcomes materialize?  
Recommended readings: 
Zarsky, T. (2014). Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society. Washington Law Review, 89, 
1375. 
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Question 3: Should responses to the issue of discrimination in consumer markets differ 
according to the context? For example, does discrimination resulting from the use of algorithmic 
techniques in specific markets – e.g. to assess credit eligibility or calculate insurance rates – call 
for targeted responses?  
Certain consumer goods and services have traditionally been subject to more regulation than others due 
to the importance and/or risks they carry for consumers. Financial markets are a prime example. Are 
these also the markets where questions of differentiated treatment should be scrutinized in most detail? 
Indeed, the issue of algorithms used in particular by credit institutions to score consumers and assess 
their eligibility for particular services have drawn a great deal of scholarly attention. Traders’ incentives 
to profile consumers in such markets are understandable from an economic point of view, considering 
the heterogeneity of costs associated with specific transactions. However, are there any red lines? What 
if credit conditions offered to women are consistently less favorable than those offered to men? Does it 
matter where the source of this outcome lies or what the trader has done/could have done to prevent it? 
For example, does it matter whether a discriminatory outcome follows from an application of a machine-
learning algorithm? Often non-discrimination laws refer to “objective criteria” / “business reasons” as a 
possible justification for (indirect) discrimination. What if algorithms become “too good” in 
understanding the reality and their discriminatory predictions are, in fact, correct? Should businesses be 
obliged to adjust their conduct nevertheless or should action rather be expected from public regulators 
and the civil society? 
Recommended readings: 
Barocas, S., & Selbst, A. D. (2016). Big Data’s Disparate Impact. California Law Review. 104, 671. 
Citron, D. K., & Pasquale, F. (2014). The scored society: due process for automated predictions. 
Washington Law Review, 89, 1.  
Helveston, M. N. (2016). Consumer Protection in the Age of Big Data. Washington University Law 
Review, 93(4), 859. 
Question 4: Should discrimination in online ad delivery be forbidden? If not, should there be 
limits? 
It is no wonder that there is considerable public attention for questions of discrimination in assessing 
the eligibility of consumers for a product or service that they seek to access in order to fulfill their core 
societal needs. It seems intuitively wrong to make it impossible for them to access such goods or 
services, or to do so only on prohibitive conditions, purely because of their race or similar 
characteristics – irrespective of where the source of the problem lies. But what if such differentiated 
treatment applies to marketing messages? With targeted advertising based on profiling and individual 
data, businesses are able to display advertisements, which are highly “personalized”, including 
discriminatory. Following a long-established aim to show commercials to those who might want the 
product most (toys commercials on TV channels with cartoons, private banking commercials on 
business news channels, make-up advertisements in magazines aimed at women, etc.), businesses are 
now able to craft the choice for every single consumer out there. There are benefits, of course: if one 
must see ads (that is why so many online services are “free”, at least in monetary terms), one might just 
as well see interesting ads. However, there are also challenges. Businesses maximize the amount of 
clicks, and the personalization is often based on historical data, which might be biased. As a result, as 
studies have shown, commercials for high-paid jobs tend to be displayed to white males, while criminal 
records bureaus tend to pop-up when googling an African-sounding name.  
As of now, discrimination in ad delivery – unlike discrimination in access to goods and services (even 
if only partially) – is not forbidden. However, this might be due to the fact that such discrimination was 
simply impossible before the advent of the algorithmic era. There is a difference between choosing an 
A. Jabłonowska, M. Kuziemski, A. M. Nowak, H.-W. Micklitz, P. Pałka, G. Sartor 
60 Department of Law Working Papers 
audience (where someone might still “break in” – no one stops a poor student from reading a business 
magazine), and choosing a specific client (who has no ability to “change” his profile). On the other hand, 
one can imagine instances of differentiation of ads based on categories like race, religion or gender, 
which seem normatively acceptable. Consider showing books on catholic theology to Catholics, make-
up foundations of a particular color to people of a particular skin tone, or clothes corresponding to 
cultural norms associating them with a concrete gender to people of that gender. This seems to be less 
problematic than differentiating based on these criteria when advertisements of jobs, or housing, or all-
inclusive package travels are concerned. Should discrimination in ad delivery, based on certain criteria, 
be forbidden? As a rule with exceptions or as an exception to the rule? Should it be process-based or 
outcome-based? If the focus remains on the process, how much efficiency are we willing to sacrifice, 
given that a lot of data might indirectly indicate protected groups? If the focus remains on the outcome, 
how much is too much? If 51% of a job’s ad audience is white male, is that discrimination already? 
60%? 90%? 
Recommended readings: 
Chander, A. (2017). The Racist Algorithm?. Michigan Law Review, 115, 1023.  
Question 5: Should consumers be protected from targeted advertisements and offers that seek to 
exploit their vulnerabilities? 
There is a thin line between showing me what I need, showing me what I think I need, and showing 
me what I fear I need. With highly personalized advertising, businesses might coerce consumers into 
commercial decisions they would not have taken without the circumstance of “vulnerability”. Everyone 
is vulnerable every now and then. A person suffering from insomnia might buy sleeping pills when 
awake at 3am, someone constantly looking for a job might purchase a sketchy guide on how to prepare 
for job interviews, etc. As of now, Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC, defines 
commercial practice as aggressive when “in its factual context, taking account of all its features and 
circumstances, by harassment, coercion, including the use of physical force, or undue influence, it 
significantly impairs or is likely to significantly impair the average consumer’s freedom of choice or 
conduct with regard to the product and thereby causes him or is likely to cause him to take a 
transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise”. With the access of big data, merged 
with the insights from behavioral and cognitive studies, businesses currently understand consumers’ 
decision-making behavior better than consumer themselves. What is more, it is highly possible that an 
artificial agent itself learns how to exploit vulnerabilities, from the thousands of available data points 
and without anyone’s supervision or direct command, even if its task has been neutrally defined as 
“display the ad to X persons with the highest possibility of clicking, at the moment when the chance is 
the biggest”. One could argue that if consumers fall for these types of tricks, it is their fault, and the law 
should not interfere. One could just as well argue, however, that the role of consumer law is to intervene 
to protect weaker party, particularly at the times when he or she is vulnerable. 
Recommended readings: 
Calo, R. (2014). Digital Market Manipulation. George Washington Law Review, 82, 995. 
Sax, M., Helberger, N., & Bol, N. (2018). Journal of Consumer Policy, 41, 103 
Question 6: Should the use of certain (more invasive) profiling techniques be forbidden? If not, 
should there be limits?  
The risks mentioned above can generally be linked to the traders’ use of algorithmic techniques for 
generating knowledge about consumers and acting upon that knowledge. The same goes for the further 
set of risks, which relate to the influence that traders can exert on consumers’ decisions thanks to the 
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use of such techniques. An underlying concern here is that the action that businesses can take after the 
relevant knowledge has been generated can become “too effective”. In other words, the use of 
algorithmic techniques by traders allows them to maximize their benefits without much regard to the 
various consumer interests (charge maximum prices consumers are willing to pay, present targeted 
messages when consumers are most vulnerable, engage in discriminatory treatment). As discussed 
before, one may consider such outcomes to be unwarranted and seek for regulatory responses. 
One may, however, also look at the ways in which the knowledge has been generated in the first place 
and find it desirable to already put limits there. A similar logic underlies the EU data protection law, 
which focuses on the processing of personal data. Following the spirit of this framework one may wish 
to place the limits on the categories of data being processed (see Article 9 of the GDPR on the processing 
of sensitive data) or on the means used to collect a given piece of (personal) data (see the provisions on 
“cookies” in the ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC, currently under revision). In both cases emphasis is 
placed on the data subject’s explicit consent. In practice, however, consent often remains 
theoretical – either due to consumers’ cognitive limitations and behavioral biases or due to its effective 
tying to the use of the product or service. If we agree that there should be limits to the ways in which 
knowledge about consumers can be generated, does consent in general as well as its current legal 
framework present a viable solution? Or should certain ways of acquiring knowledge – for example 
advanced facial recognition technologies – remain off limits to the business?  
Recommended readings: 
Pearce, H. (2015). Online data transactions, consent, and big data: technological solutions to 
technological problems?. Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 21(6), 149 
Yeung, K. (2017). ‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a mode of regulation by design. Information, 
Communication & Society, 20(1), 118. 
Question 7: Should consumers have a right to “turn” personalization “off” or be able to 
influence what content they are being displayed?  
Building upon the previous question, one could ask to what extent consumers could be given a more 
general right not to be profiled and personalized, with benefits and losses of opting out. Seeing 
commercials that one could find interesting may be more pleasant than seeing commercials of 
completely random products; getting a lower price is always nicer than getting a higher one. Yet targeted 
advertising could also expose consumers to a risk of discrimination/aggressive communications and 
does not exclude the possibility of the consumer ultimately paying more. What if a consumer wants to 
remain an “average consumer”? Should one have such a right? Should it be general or specific? If 
specific, should it apply to certain types of markets/data? How to make such a right operable, considering 
past experience with consent? Consider the idea behind the recent regulation 2018/302 on geo-blocking, 
according to which consumers should generally be able to look at the conditions at which a product or 
service is offered to consumers from other Member States46 and (in a more limited number of cases) 
make purchases on these terms without being hindered from doing so. Could this idea be generalized 
(e.g. should it be possible to buy online anonymously)? What would a non-profiled commercial 
communication even mean? It is probably fine to show ads in a given language in a jurisdiction where 
this language is most spoken; e.g. to display offers of academic books on an academic website. Should 
the limit of personalization be “the foreseen audience of the place”?  
Alternatively, should consumers be given a possibility to influence the type of content that is being 
displayed to them: either by resorting to technological tools, or by being provided with information on 
how to adjust their conduct? Again, could the answer differ depending on the product or service 
                                                     
46  See especially Article 3 on access to online interfaces. 
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concerned? What kind of measures/tools could this be? And who should be the one providing them? A 
recent example from the EU lawmaking process is an idea to oblige the providers of web browsers to 
provide different privacy settings – as actors mediating between consumers and businesses which use 
tracking tools that extract information from consumers’ devices (Article 10 of the proposed ePrivacy 
regulation47). One could further require businesses that apply personalized prices or display personalized 
ads to disclose that fact to consumers, as well as the factors that are taken into account in that context. 
Based on this information one could envisage a development of tools for interactive modeling that could, 
for example, encourage consumers to adjust their privacy settings or otherwise adjust their conduct. Yet 
another idea is the one of algorithmic buying groups that could be formed on the demand side to 
negotiate better conditions as well as other potential tools increasing consumer welfare. 
Recommended readings: 
Gal, M. S., & Elkin-Koren, N. (2017). Algorithmic Consumers. Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, 
30(2), 309. 
Question 8: Should we strive for an environment in which consumers always knows that they are 
being profiled, tracked, displayed targeted content, including personalized offers, and by whom? 
Should this information be general or specific?  
If the answer to the previous two questions is negative, or only partly affirmative, would it still make 
sense to create technical means thanks to which consumers always knows that they are being profiled, 
or displayed a targeted price/commercial communication, on what basis and for what purpose? Would 
that be means of increasing their autonomy, or shielding them from unknown manipulations? What could 
be unintended consequences of such an environment, could it cause panic, feeling of being observed, 
or – on the contrary – could the ubiquity of this information cause consumers to completely ignore it? 
Is more information good or bad here? When and how should it be displayed to be effective (if at all)? 
Once again, should we rely on increasing the autonomy of consumers, i.e. more liberal approach, or just 
regulation of AI-deployment, i.e. a more patriarchal stand?  
Recommended readings: 
Mik, E. (2016). The erosion of autonomy in online consumer transactions. Law, Innovation and 
Technology, 8(1), 1. 
Question 9: Should all, or at least some, automated decision-making systems be required to 
demonstrate procedural regularity?  
In an era in which an increasing number of decisions is being taken by automated means, consumers 
(the civil society, oversight authorities) may want to know that such decisions are at least taken under 
an announced set of rules consistently applied in each case. This may be particularly true for decisions 
of a particular socio-economic gravity for consumers, for example related to their financial affairs. 
Should the algorithmic decision making systems be designed in a way to demonstrate that a given 
decision has not been taken on a whim, but rather resulted from a pre-defined set of conditions? If it 
turns out that such a requirement is unfeasible for certain types of decision-making systems (e.g. due to 
their constant adaptability), should businesses be prevented from using this type of systems in certain 
contexts? 
  
                                                     
47  COM(2017) 10 final 
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Recommended readings: 
Kroll, J. A., Barocas S., Felten E. W., Reidenberg J. R., Robinson D. G., & Yu H. (2017). Accountable 
Algorithms. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 165, 633. 
Question 10: Should robots/chatbots be obliged to identify themselves as such? Should they 
otherwise be obliged to take specific actions towards consumers, e.g. regarding 
purchases/recommendations made? 
With an increasing number of communications between consumers and traders being conducted via 
artificial agents, one could consider whether there is a risk that trading parties becoming unaware of the 
status of their interlocutors (human or not?). If such a risk exists, the question is whether such a lack of 
awareness could be a cause for concern. Indeed, recent years have brought significant developments 
when it comes to chatbots provided by traders for purposes of communicating with consumers, as well 
as personal digital assistants that can handle a variety of tasks on behalf of consumers. Should such 
agents be obliged to identify themselves vis-à-vis their interlocutors (both consumers and traders)? As 
regards personal assistants deployed on the demand side: should traders be free to offer such services in 
any shape or form, or should there be certain baseline conditions to be followed – e.g. information 
duties, requirements on privacy settings / settings for the outsourcing of consumers’ tasks (making 
purchases and recommendations), or maybe even fiduciary duties?  
Recommended readings: 
Stucke, M. E., & Ezrachi, A. (2017). How Digital Assistants Can Harm Our Economy, Privacy, and 
Democracy. Berkeley Tech. LJ, 32, 1239. 
Brownsword, R. (2017). From Erewhon to AlphaGo: For the sake of human dignity, should we destroy 
the machines?. Law, Innovation and Technology, 9(1), 117.  
Question 11: Should we have the right to “talk to a human?” In what cases or sectors? 
The question, to some extent, builds upon the previous point on chatbots’ identification. Indeed, one can 
argue that an information requirement such as the one considered above is of little use to consumers 
who seek to establish contact with the trader and are not willing to speak to a machine, or are not satisfied 
with the outcomes of such communication. Should consumers in such cases be provided with an explicit 
right to “talk to a human”? Note that the EU law already provides for a fair number of information duties 
regarding trader’s contact details, for example the E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC requires that “the 
details of the service provider” are provided “including his electronic mail address, which allow him to 
be contacted rapidly and communicated with in a direct and effective manner” (Article 5(1)(c)). Is this 
norm effective? How would it translate to the chatbot context? 
Consumers’ willingness to “talk to a human” might also go beyond their frustration about having to 
communicate with a machine. Perhaps more importantly, consumers are also being exposed to a growing 
number of decisions being taken by (fully) automated means. These range from the already discussed 
situations of loan denials to the blocking of user accounts on social media. Should traders be obliged to 
always keep a human in the loop? What for: to better understand the decisions (explanation), to 
reconsider the decision (appeal), to simply feel like one is not facing a blind machine (dignity)? 
Depending on the rationale, as well as possibly the sector and the type of consumers’ interest at stake, a 
different set of measures might be warranted. Some of them have been explored by the EU lawmaker in 
the GDPR, which the literature tends to welcome as a first step – although not a sufficient one. 
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Recommended reading: 
Article 29 Working Party (2017a). Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and profiling 
for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679. 
Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B., & Floridi L. (2017). Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-
Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation. International Data Privacy Law, 
7(2), 76. 
4.2. Technological (means) 
Question 12: How do we “filter out” certain types of data from the AI-powered system’s 
decision-making process, if information can also be conferred indirectly? Do we intervene in 
data sets/ learning algorithms/ modify the outputs? 
Assuming that an answer to some of the normative questions is affirmative (yes, prohibit price 
discrimination, discriminatory/aggressive advertising), how does one do that? From the machine 
learning point of view, the tasks realized by the systems operating the targeted commercial practices are 
the same: maximize the chance of a certain action (opening an ad, making a purchase) by matching a 
particular content (ad, price level) with a particular individual, based on data you have about behavior 
patterns of consumers in general (profiles), and information about a particular individual. If one wants 
to put constraints on the ways in which these tasks are carried out by AI-powered systems, these 
constraints will need to be realized, in one way or another, in the design of these systems. What are the 
technical options here? Is it best to intervene on the level of training data sets? Or the training 
algorithms? Or put some “correctors” on top of the results? Or in any other way? Is it possible to filter 
out certain types of information, given that with big data a lot of information might be indirectly 
communicated by other information (e.g. age, gender, religion or sexual orientation based on the 
websites on visits, or books one looks for)? What exactly are the trade-offs here? How much less 
efficient would the systems become as a result of this type of interventions?  
Question 13: What are the useful ways of formalizing legal norms? What is the information that 
engineers need to do that? 
Consider a simple example, based on GDPR’s prohibition of processing personal data about the 
individuals’ political opinions. Assume that we want AI-powered systems not to collect/utilize 
information about political opinions for purposes of knowledge generation or targeted communication. 
For a human, the term “political opinion” has a clear core and a fuzzy border. For example, “Paolo 
supports Party X” is a piece of information about Paolo’s political opinion, while “Paolo supports 
Fiorentina” probably not. However, would a statement “Pablo thinks that taxes in Italy are too low” be 
a political opinion? Or, “Paolo lives in the center of Rome, but secretly supports Lazio”? In all these 
cases, a human normative agent would be able to take into account numerous factors, without necessarily 
even being able to list them or make them explicit, in order to argue for one position or another, while 
at the same time often subconsciously “feeling” what an answer is in the given context. However, a 
machine processing data, if its command is “classify information about individuals, but when you 
encounter a piece of information about a political belief, disregard it”, does not have any second thoughts 
about the task. How to provide AI-powered systems with an equivalent of that feeling? 
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Question 14: How do we monitor the usage of the techniques from the previous two questions, if 
the outcomes are only “visible” to individual users on their individual devices? How does one 
oversee that which cannot be seen? A “stealth problem”  
Assume a normative standard is clear – for example: disregard data about gender when displaying job 
advertisements; do not base ads or sexual orientation unless the consumer explicitly opts-in; never 
personalize diet-supplements ads using medical and/all psychological data etc. – and assume there are 
technical means to meet these standards – how could one technically check whether businesses actually 
comply? Unlike commercial practices on billboards, TV, in press or radio, targeted ads are visible only 
to a particular consumer, on their device. In case of discrimination, they might probably never notice. 
In case of aggressive advertisements, they might not realize. Hence, there is a need for oversight. But 
how does one monitor that? What are the options? Experiments (“tinkering”?), analysis of the code? 
How does one notice the infringement, if the infringement is hidden?  
Recommended readings: 
Perel, M., & Elkin-Koren, N. (2017). Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in Algorithmic 
Enforcement. Florida Law Review, 69, 181. 
Kim, P. T. (2017a). Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
Online, 166(1), 189. 
4.3. Governance (means) 
Finally, assuming we know what the concrete problem is, we have established what the desired state of 
affairs is (the goal), and we know how to technically achieve this goal, how do we design a governance 
system (including liability rules, rules on certification, oversight system etc.) that will convince business 
to comply?   
Question 15: Could transparency obligations regarding targeted/personalized advertisements 
and offers be derived from the existing EU legal framework? If not, should they be introduced? 
Building on Question 8, one cannot fail to note that the existing EU law already provides for a wide 
range of transparency obligations. Some of them may be found in the data protection framework 
(GDPR), other in consumer and marketing law stricto sensu. When it comes to personalized 
advertisements, the most directly relevant instrument appears to be the UCPD – and particularly its 
provisions on misleading actions and omissions. For example, Article 7(4)(c) lists the price to be paid 
by the consumer among the material information, which should generally be provided by the trader in 
the invitation to purchase. Where the nature of the product means that the price cannot reasonably be 
calculated in advance, at least the manner in which the price is calculated should be disclosed. None of 
this, however, appears to imply a disclosure duty related to the use of personalized pricing. Could such 
a duty be derived from a general provision of Article 7(1)? Or perhaps a respective information duty 
could be derived from the other parts of consumer protection acquis (and come within the remit of the 
UCPD’s misleading omissions regime via Article 7(5))? A possible candidate for such a duty is Article 
6 of the Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights, which requires traders to disclose a list of 
information – e.g. about the characteristics and the total price of the goods or services and the 
functionality of digital content – before the conclusion of a distance contract. However, the respective 
provision on price is formulated in a similar way as in the UCPD and therefore seems to be subject to 
similar limitations. Interestingly, recital 19 of the Directive points out that “the notion of functionality 
should refer to the ways in which digital content can be used, for instance for the tracking of consumer 
behavior”. Interpreted in this way, Article 6(1)(r) of the CRD could be considered as a source of, at 
least, a general information duty related to targeting – somewhat similar to the one derived from the data 
protection framework. Nonetheless, besides a further set of questions (beginning with: when exactly is 
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a business-to-consumer contract for the supply of digital content concluded?), the degree to which this 
provision could be used to improve transparency of specific personalized offers appears to be quite 
limited. One could then perhaps consider rethinking the construction of the information duties in the 
CRD, either by redrafting the specific information items or – according to a more far-reaching 
proposal – by exploring the idea of the so-called “personalized disclosure”. Yet another unorthodox idea 
could be to treat the unilaterally drafted algorithms as standard contract terms and, as such, consider 
them to fall under Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts and the price-related 
transparency obligations found in Article 4(2) of that act.  
Against this background, do specific provisions or the broader rationale of the existing EU law support 
the existence of transparency obligations related to personalization and tracking mechanisms? Could 
such provisions be derived from the existing law and if so, are they able to produce the desired 
outcomes? Or would it be necessary to introduce legislative amendments? If so, should we strive for 
targeted amendments of the existing laws or rather look for innovative ideas? 
Recommended readings: 
Hacker, P. (2017). Personalizing EU Private Law: From Disclosures to Nudges and Mandates. European 
Review of Private Law, 25(3), 651. 
Porat, A., & Strahilevitz, L. J. (2014). Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data. 
Michigan Law Review, 112(8), 1417. 
Question 16: Do we need to re-think the legal framework of aggressive commercial practices? 
Should we prohibit them as a general rule, or bottom-up based on types of goods/ particular 
types of data/ cognitive biases? 
If one believes – in line with Question 5 – that there is indeed a space for intervention when targeted 
advertisements and offers seek to exploit consumers’ vulnerabilities, what needs to be considered is how 
a relevant prohibition could be implemented. Should it be captured by a general rule – as it is currently 
in the UCPD – or rather (or perhaps additionally) be defined on a case-by-case basis? Should some of 
the most invasive practices be blacklisted? Should certain types of products/services be controlled more 
than others? Or should it rather be the types of cognitive biases that should be the criterion of 
prohibition? In short, how to operationalize all of this?  
Recommended readings: 
Helberger, N. (2016). Profiling and Targeting Consumers in the Internet of Things – A New Challenge 
for Consumer Law. In: R. Schulze & D. Staudenmayer (Eds.), Digital Revolution: Challenges for 
Contract Law in Practice. Nomos. 
Question 17: Do we need to rethink the legal framework of non-discrimination in access to goods 
and services? 
Even though the horizontal dimension of the EU anti-discrimination law is comparably broad, its 
provisions on “access to goods and services” beyond specific sectors are of limited help to the subjects 
of discriminatory decisions reached by algorithms. This is particularly because non-discrimination in 
consumer relations seems to be linked to the “general conditions of access” to a service, made available 
to the public at large by the provider, which apply in the absence of an individually negotiated agreement 
between the trader and the customer. Such a concept appears to be difficult to reconcile with the growing 
degrees of personalization of both commercial messages about products or services and the products 
and services themselves. Nevertheless, it still plays and important role in the European legislative 
initiatives, including the most recent ones. For example, the geo-blocking regulation 2018/302 will, as 
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of December 3rd 2018, apply to a situation where there are different general terms addressed at different 
national markets. It will not address the scenario in which prices are personalized depending on (among 
others) where the consumer comes from. Is it possible that, at some stage, there will be no “general 
conditions” (for some products/services)? Should we only then start to be worried about algorithmic 
price coordination or consider unorthodox solutions like personalized price caps? Until when is 
transparency or a ban on (traditional) geo-blocking enough? 
Further points of criticism can be raised against the European legal framework of non-discrimination. 
One of such concerns is that, under existing rules, considerations of algorithmic accuracy provide an 
easy justification that businesses can put forward to contest allegations of indirect discrimination. The 
difficulties faced by potential victims in holding the owners of algorithms accountable can be further 
exacerbated by enforcement deficits such as the lack of access to data and algorithmic models. 
A further practice affecting all sectors are the prices adjusted to the individual willingness to pay, as 
already, to some extent, addressed before. Does this practice give rise to additional discrimination-based 
concerns and, if so, is it covered by the existing non-discrimination law? Admittedly, economic factors 
are generally not treated as protected characteristics. But what if algorithms establish consumers’ 
willingness to pay based on criteria such as nationality – does this amount to direct discrimination? What 
if such a protected characteristics is only one of many factors? What if proxies are used? How to find 
out that there is a broader impact, etc.? Could it be that first-degree price discrimination is inherently 
non-discriminatory, considering that it goes against its “collective spirit”? 
Recommended readings: 
Hacker, P. (2018). Teaching Fairness to Artificial Intelligence: Existing and Novel Strategies Against 
Algorithmic Discrimination Under EU Law. Common Market Law Review, Forthcoming 
Question 18: Do we need Special Data Protection Regulations? Should we govern the types of 
data collected, or the purposes for which they are used? 
If artificial intelligence, as of now, means mostly machine learning, then regulation of “artificial 
intelligence” can be either regulation of algorithms, or regulation of data. The former is still ahead of 
us, the latter already here, in form of the GDPR – General Data Protection Regulation. The GDPR put 
in place numerous rules and principles to which data controllers and processors must adhere for the 
processing to be lawful. These rules and principles apply across all the sectors, all types of business 
models. Admittedly, a more specific set of rules applies to electronic communications (the ePrivacy 
Directive, currently under review), many of which, however, still appear to have the traditional 
telecommunication sector in mind. At the same time, arguably, processing of data generated by smart 
grids poses different challenges than data about shopping history, websites visited, or questions asked 
to digital personal assistants. Do any of these spheres require special data protection regulations, as for 
example already exist regarding medical data or telecoms? 
Question 19: How to design a governance system for spheres where minor-but-widespread, 
stealth infringements might occur? Do we need sector/problem-specific / new governance 
responses? 
We present this as a “single” question, but in reality it needs to be asked separately for each and every 
normative + technical problem. For example, if consumers see an ad based on prohibited sensitive data, 
might: a) not even know it is illegal; b) realize it is illegal, but fail to undertake any action, since the cost 
of doing something is much higher than cost of ignoring. Hence, it might be that for each and every 
individual consumer the harm is small, but on the societal level, the most basic principles we agreed 
upon as a community are being bluntly disregarded. What are the options here? Oblige businesses to 
conduct self-assessment drawing from the idea of accountability found in GDPR? Grant individuals 
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rights to compensation, allow collective actions? Rely on administrative fines? Rely on ex post (auditing 
/ punishing infringement) or ex ante instruments (e.g. standards on how algorithms should be designed)? 
Question 20: How to conceptualize the relationship between data protection law, consumer law 
and competition law – both at the substantive and procedural level? Do we need a digital unit in 
the relevant agencies so that they can cooperate better?  
There is no doubt that all three domains (and likely further ones) are seriously affected by the growing 
importance of algorithms and AI in the market. What are the relevant overlaps and are they helpful or 
problematic? To what extent could these systems complement each other? How do the relevant 
enforcement frameworks interrelate? Is there a need for more coordination?  
Recommended readings: 
Costa-Cabral, F., & Lynskey, O. (2017). Family ties: the intersection between data protection and 
competition in EU Law. Common Market Law Review, 54(1), 11. 
Helberger, N., Zuiderveen, B. F., & Reyna, A. (2017). The Perfect Match? A Closer Look at the 
Relationship between EU Consumer Law and Data Protection Law. Common Market Law Review, 
54(5), 1427. 
Kerber, W. (2016). Digital markets, data, and privacy: competition law, consumer law and data 
protection. Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 11(11), 856. 
4.4. Theoretical/conceptual 
At the very, very end, a couple of questions that did not fit into any other categories. They are much less 
“concrete” than those above. We could not refrain ourselves from posing them, though. These questions 
escape the regulatory logic of “what should we do” and take us rather in the direction of “what does all 
this mean for law and society?”. 
Question 21: What could we gain from conducting research into “AI & Law & Literature”, 
studying cultural representations of robots and autonomous systems? Do works of (popular) art 
influence scholarly discourse? Do artists’ ideas give us some, even indirect, guidelines on how to 
proceed?   
Our ideas on what artificial intelligence is often come from works of (popular) culture. It is primarily 
the works of fiction where we “meet” intelligent machines, observe their interactions with human beings 
and learn about potential opportunities and challenges of co-inhabiting the world with them. Watching 
Westworld or I, Robot might lead us to questions about machines’ rights. Terminator and Matrix force 
us to think about the existential threat to humanity that making the machines too powerful could pose. 
However, these works, and the images of AI presented there, appear to have little to do with what AI is 
today and will be tomorrow. Have these (false) images already crawled into the current legal discourses 
and political strategies? How to remedy this? On the other hand, even if artists portray AI differently 
than the reality does, is there something we could, as a society, learn from these works? Are certain 
questions raised by art, deep down, the questions we are facing now or will face tomorrow? Should we 
read the novels about robots, the market analysis, and our laws together? 
Question 22: What does it mean to be a “person” in the age of “personalization”? Who/what is 
the person in “personalized advertising/content”? An actual consumer or his alter ego?  
Personalism is one of the foundations of the Western legal culture. A “person” is at the center of the 
system of private law. The individual, not the collective, is the bearer of rights and duties. The distinction 
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between persons and things fundamentally informs the architecture of the legal system. Everyone is 
equal in the eyes of law, everyone is granted freedom and autonomy to lead his or her life. Hence, 
“personalization” of products, offers, and even rules, could seem a promising development. However, 
that is not what “personalization” means. With big data and AI, targeted communications and profiling, 
we stop being equal. Everyone gets something else. Different offers, different products, different 
commercials. “Personalization” means “differentiation”. Based on profiles. On data. On probability. Not 
on interactions with a human being. With an actual person. What does this tell us about this fundamental 
concept? 
Question 23: How do we reconcile the conflict between freedom and autonomy on the one hand, 
and efficiency and convenience on the other?  
20th century witnessed the heated debate between proponents of market-based economy and central 
planning. The question of which approach leads to more efficient social orderings have been answered 
by the history itself. None of the countries which attempted to create a centrally planned economy 
succeeded. Hence, both the deontological arguments (human dignity, freedom) and the consequentialist 
ones (efficiency) ended up offering support for a property & contract based social orderings favoring 
individual autonomy, freedom and market over planning. Probably the most famous explanation has 
been offered already by Hayek, who argued that knowledge about the resources available and the needs 
is dispersed, local and cannot be aggregated. This, however, changes with big data, Internet of Things 
and artificial intelligence. Currently, consumers make their preferences explicit all the time, by simply 
using smartphones, online platforms and services. Soon AI-powered and big data-fueled systems might 
become better at suggesting choices, making choices, and ultimately replacing individuals and 
collectives at taking economic decisions. For many, such a situation might seem convenient. Hence, as 
a society, we might be approaching a choice between freedom and efficiency. How to address this 
question? 
Question 24: The vanishing line between advertising and contract, and what it implies. What 
does it mean for a legal system if it is difficult to tell the difference between what is still 
advertising and what is an offer and when the issues of personalization at pre-contractual and 
contractual stages become closely convergent?  
Traditionally, a contractual offer and an advertisement have been treated by the legal system as two 
distinctive phenomena. As a result, they have been regulated by different legal instruments, informed 
by different principles. The first had a firmly established normative position in the contract law sources, 
the latter has become an object of regulation with the rise of the consumer society. Currently, in the era 
of AI-powered personalization, the distinction between the two is blurring. Do we need to redefine 
them? Or do we need a completely new conceptual framework to make sense of the existing market 
practice? 
Question 25: Are there areas where artificial agents should behave in accordance with other 
(higher?) standards than humans while performing seemingly analogous tasks? For example, in 
the self-driving cars context, should we strive for one right ethical standard? 
Artificial intelligence-powered systems perform more and more tasks traditionally undertaken by 
humans. These tasks are not legally neutral, i.e. they could lead to law infringement. However, the laws 
of today have been written with human beings as addressees in mind. And machines are not humans. In 
certain spheres, they can act significantly faster and be more efficient. In others, they are still far behind 
the capabilities of an average human. They are different, for better and for worse. The “trolley problem”, 
discussed in connection with self-driving cars, is a good example. We do not tell human drivers whom 
to sacrifice in the circumstances of and extreme and immediate decision. That is because humans act 
based on instinct, reflex, and cannot be expected to reason in the span of milliseconds, or to act in 
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accordance with pre-programmed set of rules. Machines, most probably, can. On the other hand, humans 
are quite good at abstract reasoning, based on general rules. “You should not process data about political 
opinions” is a norm that in the majority of cases will be clear and easy to implement for a human. For a 
machine the term “political opinion” might need to be specified to a much higher degree. One cannot 
simply assume the background knowledge and intuitions that humans have as a result of merely being 
a part of a given society and living in a particular culture. It might be that, to achieve the same goals, we 
need different norms for machines and for humans doing the same things. Or, it might be that our goals 
are different. How to go about solving this puzzle?
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